歐盟應對俄羅斯北溪 2項目說不

In August, subsidiaries of several western companies — Eon, Engie, OMV, Shell and Wintershall — decided not to participate in Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2.

今年8月，幾家西方公司（Eon、Engie、OMV、殼牌(Shell)和德國溫特沙爾公司(Wintershall)）的子公司決定不參與俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司(Gazprom)的北溪-2 (Nord Stream 2)項目。

The consortium, led by the Russian state-owned gas monopoly, was established to design, finance, build and operate two additional strings of the undersea gas pipeline between Russia and Germany.

由這家俄羅斯國有天然氣寡頭牽頭的這個財團的設立，是爲了俄羅斯與德國之間兩條新的海底天然氣管道的設計、融資、建設和運營。

The companies also withdrew their application for merger approval, submitted to the Polish competition protection authority in December.

這些公司還撤回了合併審批申請，該申請於去年12月遞交至波蘭競爭保護部門。

In the view of the Polish government, such a step showed that they had no counter-arguments to the regulator’s concerns about the likely effect of the project on competition in the Polish and EU gas markets.

在波蘭政府看來，這種行爲表明，對於該監管機構就該項目對波蘭和歐盟天然氣市場競爭可能造成的影響的擔憂，他們沒有反駁意見。

Together with eight other EU member states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia), and with the tacit support of a couple of others, Poland has opposed Nord Stream 2 since it was first announced by Gazprom in 2015.

自從俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司於2015年首次宣佈北溪-2項目以來，在一些國家的默許支持下，波蘭與其他8個歐盟成員國（捷克、愛沙尼亞、克羅地亞、匈牙利、立陶宛、拉脫維亞、羅馬尼亞和斯洛伐克）一道反對該項目。

It undermines European solidarity and the Energy Union, the EU’s flagship project.

它破壞了歐洲的團結和歐盟的旗艦項目能源聯盟(Energy Union)。

The economic arguments for Nord Stream 2 were always questionable, especially considering overcapacity on existing supply transit routes from Russia to the EU.

支持北溪-2項目的經濟理由一直令人質疑，特別是考慮到目前從俄羅斯到歐盟的供應運輸線路已運力過剩。

And given Europe’s considerable dependence on Russian gas and the damage the project would cause to the Ukrainian economy (which is subsidised by the EU), the political motivations behind it seemed obvious.

鑑於歐洲對俄羅斯天然氣的嚴重依賴以及該項目可能給烏克蘭經濟（由歐盟提供補貼）帶來的損害，其背後的政治動機似乎顯而易見。

With the withdrawal of the western companies, the case against Nord Stream 2 looks even more powerful.

在西方公司退出後，反對北溪-2項目的理由看上去更爲充分。

A project that previously appeared merely controversial now looks like a Trojan horse capable of destabilising the economy and poisoning political relations inside the EU.

這個以前看上去只是具有爭議的項目，現在看來就像一匹特洛伊木馬，可能會造成經濟不穩定並毒害歐盟內部的政治關係。

EU institutions that should make the core principles and unity of the bloc their priority have not taken a firm stand on Nord Stream 2.

應當把歐盟核心原則及團結作爲優先考慮的歐盟機構，在北溪-2項目上沒有采取堅定立場。

And suggestions from Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, that a legal solution could be found have yet to amount to anything.

歐盟委員會(European Commission)主席讓-克洛德.容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)認爲，可以找到合法解決方案，但目前什麼結果都沒有。

This ambiguous position is difficult to explain, especially when one considers, on the one hand, the EU sanctions against Russia imposed after the illegal annexation of Crimea and, on the other, the fact that Gazprom is owned by the Russian state.

歐盟這種模糊的立場很難解釋，特別是考慮到一方面歐盟在俄羅斯非法吞併克里米亞之後對其實施了制裁，另一方面俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司由俄羅斯政府所有。

By supporting Nord Stream 2, the EU in effect gives succour to a regime whose aggression it seeks to punish through sanctions.

通過支持北溪-2項目，歐盟實際上是在幫助這個它希望通過制裁懲罰其侵略行爲的政權。

This contradiction is unsustainable.

這種矛盾是不可持續的。

The EU cannot continue to offer financial support to Ukraine, maintain sanctions against Russia and call for a resilient energy union while at the same time collaborating on Nord Stream 2 with Gazprom.

歐盟不可能一邊向烏克蘭提供財力支持、繼續對俄羅斯實施制裁，並呼籲建立一個抗打擊的能源聯盟，一邊繼續與俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司在北溪-2項目上展開合作。

This is why Poland and other central and eastern European member states have called on the commission to act as a guardian of EU treaties and to demand that Nord Stream 2, including its offshore sections, conform in full with EU law.

這就是爲什麼波蘭和其他中東歐成員國一直呼籲，歐盟委員會成爲歐盟條約的守護者並要求北溪-2項目（包括其海底區段）全面符合歐盟法律。

The commission should also guarantee that the most vulnerable member states are protected from an external monopoly seeking to apply political pressure on them.

歐盟委員會還應保證，最脆弱的歐盟成員國不受謀求對其施加政治壓力的外部壟斷者的壓迫。

It has the power, if not to freeze the project completely, then at least to limit its disruptive impact on the European gas market and on the security of supply policies.

它至少有權力限制其對歐洲天然氣市場以及供應安全政策的破壞性影響，如果不是徹底凍結該項目的話。

Nord Stream 2 is a test of European unity and of the credibility of EU institutions.

北溪-2項目是對歐洲團結以及歐盟機構可信性的考驗。

Poland is determined to defend the bloc’s fundamental principles, even if that might mean appealing to the Court of Justice of the EU.

波蘭決定維護歐盟的基本原則，即便這可能意味着向歐洲法院(Court of Justice)上訴。

Support for the project by any member state or a passive approach by the commission that results in preferential treatment being given to Nord Stream 2 — for instance, exemption from the market rules enshrined in the so-called third package of legislation — may be subject to legal challenge by Poland or other countries, in the court if need be.

任何一個歐盟成員國支持該項目，或者歐盟委員會採取被動策略導致向北溪-2項目提供優惠待遇（例如可不遵守關於能源市場的所謂第三套立法(third package of legislation)規定的市場規則），都可能受到波蘭或其他國家的法律挑戰，如果需要可能對簿公堂。

If EU institutions are unclear as to the scope of their competences, Poland and its partners are ready to provide clarity in the courts.

如果歐盟機構對其職權範圍含糊不清的話，那麼波蘭及其夥伴準備赴法庭明確。

Promoting the economic interests of certain countries at the expense of the security and stability of others is no way for the EU to escape the crisis it finds itself in.

以一些國家的安全和穩定爲代價推動另一些國家的經濟利益，絕非歐盟擺脫所處危機之道。

Nor is it likely to imbue disillusioned citizens with renewed faith in European institutions.

這也不可能讓大失所望的公民重拾對歐盟機構的信心。

Doing that requires abandoning the pursuit of short-term individual gain in the interests of the EU as a whole.

要做到這一點，需要根據整個歐盟的利益放棄對短期個體好處的追求。

The Nord Stream 2 affair should not be allowed to stand as an example of the EU turning a blind eye.

不應任由北溪-2項目事件成爲一個歐盟故意失明的例子。

We should instead be able to hold it up as proof that the EU will act when needed to defend the rules on which it was founded.

相反，這一事件應該成爲一項證據，表明歐盟將在需要維護其所基於的規則時採取行動。