海國百態:年的巴西何去何從

When I began to train as a diplomatic historian of Brazil, friends and family worried that my life was bound to be dull and lonely in the dusty archives. Before the millennium, nobody cared or worried about Brazilian foreign Policy.

當我開始接受巴西外交歷史學教育、以期在該領域成爲一名專家的時候，朋友和家人都擔心，我的人生註定會在沉悶與孤獨中度過、整日與塵封的檔案爲伴。在本世紀之前，沒有誰會在意或擔心巴西的外交政策。

But then the world changed. The US went to war in the Middle East, Europe faltered, Asia rose, and the institutions that governed the world were evidently no longer up to the task. Unsettling as they were, these transformations opened up a new world of opportunities. Brazil responded accordingly.

但本世紀以來，世界發生了改變。美國在中東發動了戰爭，歐洲的發展步履蹣跚，亞洲實現了崛起，全球治理機構顯然已不再勝任自己的工作。儘管這些變化令人感到不安，但它們卻帶來了一個充滿機會的新世界。巴西也作出了相應的反應。

It sponsored a web of regional institutions in South America, dished out aid and assistance to Africa, flexed its muscles in the World Trade Organisation, and pushed to make organisations such as the G20 and the Brics new fixtures in the international landscape. By the time the world financial crisis hit in 2007, in capitals around the globe everyone was asking: what does Brazil want?

巴西向南美的一系列地區性機構提供了資助，向非洲慷慨地提供援助和幫助，在世貿組織(WTO)中展現了自己的實力，努力推動20國集團(G20)和金磚國家（巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國和南非，簡稱Brics）等組織成爲國際舞臺上的新角色。到了2007年全球金融危機爆發的時候，世界各國的政界人士都在問：巴西這次想要什麼？

The typical answers were inauspicious. In Foreign Affairs magazine you could read that Brazil was an “irresponsible stakeholder”, and in Foreign Policy that its aid policies would make the world more “corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian”. A piece in Global Governance portrays the country as “the most revisionist of all emerging powers... a rising spoiler”.

我看到的答案一般是負面的。在《外交》(Foreign Affairs)雜誌上，你可以讀到，巴西是一個“不負責任的利益攸關者”。《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)雜誌則認爲，巴西的援助政策會讓世界變得更加“腐敗、混亂和專制”。《全球治理》(Global Governance)期刊中的一篇文章，將巴西描述爲“所有新興大國中修正主義傾向最強的國家……一個崛起中的搗亂者。”

To my mind, such criticisms miss a subtle point. The Brazilian establishment does not see itself as a challenger of the global order, even if in its eyes the world remains a nasty place dominated by a handful of powerful nations that will do what they can to keep the likes of Brazil in their place. The solution, it says, lies in piecemeal reforms to mitigate existing inequalities of power. Nobody in Brasilia wants to rock the boat - just to make it bigger and more balanced.

在我看來，這種批評忽略了很微妙的一點。巴西當局並不認爲自己是全球秩序的挑戰者，儘管在其眼中這個世界仍是由少數強國主導的“骯髒之地”（這些強國會盡其所能讓巴西這樣的國家“保持本分”）。巴西當局表示，爲了解決世界面臨的問題，應推進漸進的改革，以緩解目前存在的權力不平等。沒有哪位巴西政界人士想把船弄翻，他們只是想把船變大、並讓它變得更加平衡。

Thus Brazil says that cherishing non-proliferation is one thing, but sanctioning Iran while rewarding nuclear-armed Israel or India is counterproductive. It also argues that you can be a lover of democracy, just like the US, but this ideal is better served by lifting a 50-year embargo on Cuba. And while Brasilia argues that it is right and proper to suspend a country's sovereign rights when rulers sponsor mass atrocities against their own people, it also insists that Nato's behaviour in Libya smacked of neocolonialism.

因此巴西才表示，核不擴散確實應該得到重視，但在制裁伊朗的同時獎賞擁有核武裝的以色列和印度只能起到反效果。巴西還認爲，你可以像美國那樣推崇民主，但這種理想最好通過取消對古巴長達50年的禁運來體現。此外，雖然巴西當局認爲，當一國統治者在背後支持針對本國人民的大規模暴行時，中止該國的主權是正確和適當的，但它同時也堅持認爲，北約(NATO)在利比亞的所作所爲有一絲新殖民主義的味道。

Yet, when push comes to shove, Brazil struggles to explain what the more balanced world of its dreams would look like. Securing itself a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council, or enjoying a few extra perks in the Bretton Woods institutions, does not add up to a compelling vision that others can share. Nor do platitudes about South America as a space of peace and co-operation, which fail to address the many worries of Brazil's neighbours, some of whom see it, sometimes, as an unaccommodating regional hegemon.

然而，到了關鍵時刻，巴西還是很難解釋其夢想中的更爲平衡的世界究竟是什麼樣的。在改革後的聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)斬獲一個永久席位，或在佈雷頓森林(Bretton Woods)機構中享有少許額外特權，並不意味着擁有一個其他國家都認同的誘人願景——有關南美是和平與合作之地的陳詞濫調也是如此，因爲這種說法並沒有化解巴西鄰國的很多擔憂。有時候，這些鄰國還將巴西視爲一個不友好的地區霸主。

Brazil is sharing the burden of global governance more than before - for example with peace-keeping troops in Haiti. But while its diplomatic service has expanded rapidly over the past decade, it remains too small and underfunded for the country to truly project itself abroad.

巴西目前分擔的全球治理責任要超過以往，它派駐海地的維和部隊就是一例。不過，儘管過去十年裏巴西的外交服務發展得很迅速，但這種服務的規模依然太小、支撐這種服務的資金也嚴重不足，這使得巴西難以真正在海外發揮自己的影響力。

Some say that Brazil is exceptionally equipped to bridge the world's rich and poor, black and white, and Arabs and Jews because its ethnically mixed society is living proof of reconciled national contradictions. But its record in international mediation is not impressive.

有人認爲，在彌合世上的富人與窮人、黑人與白人、阿拉伯人與猶太人之間的鴻溝方面，巴西有着獨特的優勢，因爲其由各種族混合而成的社會能夠生動地證明，民族矛盾是可以調和的。但巴西在國際調解方面的往績卻並不出色。

Others argue that Brazil represents the voice of the global disfranchised. Yet, for all the rhetoric of “development”, Brazilian foreign policy promotes big business abroad rather than seriously working to improve the lot of the Brazilian majority, who remain either poor or very poor.

還有人認爲，巴西代表着全球弱勢羣體的聲音。然而，儘管巴西高舉“發展”旗幟，其對外政策仍是促進大企業在海外的發展，而不是真正努力去改善大多數巴西人的命運——這些人仍處在貧窮或非常貧困的境地。

No wonder some have construed Brazil's quest for greater status as little more than an exercise in national vanity and pride, a sense of entitlement based on the country's belief in its own exceptionalism. Exceptionalist accounts are common to all major powers. It is a rather aristocratic quality, which rests on the assumption that nations can operate on the basis of who they are rather than what they do (a more bourgeois ideal).

難怪一些人認爲，巴西提高自身地位的努力純粹出於民族虛榮心和自豪感，也就是一種因信仰本國例外論而產生的優越感。對所有主要大國來說，本國例外論的觀點都很常見。這是一種相當貴族化的品質，它基於一個假設，即各國的運行可以“它們是誰”、而非以“它們做什麼”爲基礎（一種有資產階級傾向的理想）。

Perhaps Brazil's pride is understandable in view of its long history of imperialism under the French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British and Americans. Only 40 years ago, for example, this is what the British ambassador in Rio de Janeiro had to say: “The Brazilians are still a tremendously second-rate people: but it is equally obvious that they are on their way to a first-rate future.” Today it is only natural that Brazilians should stand up to the hegemonic presumptions that they see as still prevalent in the world.

考慮到巴西在法國人、西班牙人、葡萄牙人、荷蘭人、英國人和美洲人治下的悠久帝國主義歷史，它的自豪感或許是可以理解的。比如說，就在40年前，英國駐里約熱內盧大使還不得不這麼說，“巴西人現在顯然仍是二等人，但同樣顯然的是，他們正走在成爲一等人的道路上”。今天，巴西人應該站起來對這種他們認爲仍盛行於世界的霸權推定說不——這是再自然不過的事情。

As I watch Brazil's current rise from the dusty safety of the archives, my hope is that it will take part in the global conversation.

從塵封的檔案中，我目睹了巴西崛起的過程。我的希望是，巴西能夠加入到全球對話中。

It would be a shame if policymakers east and west dismissed what Brazilian leaders had to say as too disruptive or irrelevant without first giving them the benefit of the doubt. And it would be a self-inflicted wound if Brazilian statesmen were to walk away, blinded by an overly fervent sense of national pride.

如果東西方政策制定者對巴西領導人不得不說的話不作任何善意理解、就認定這些說法純屬搗亂或毫不重要，那就太令人遺憾了。另一方面，如果巴西政治家面對這種局面、被一種過於強烈的民族自豪感矇蔽了雙眼而選擇背身而去，那將讓巴西蒙受自找的傷害。

After all, Brazil's trajectory from colony to economic powerhouse, from stale dictatorship to vibrant democracy, is simply spectacular. There's a powerful message there.

畢竟，巴西從殖民地到經濟強國、從腐朽的獨裁製度到生機勃勃的民主制度的轉變是一件了不起的事情。這件事傳遞出了強有力的信號。

Matias Spektor is the 2013 Rio Branco Chair in International Relations at King’s College London, and an associate professor at Funda??o Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro

本文作者爲倫敦國王學院(King's College London) 2013屆“里奧?布蘭科”國際關係學教授(the 2013 Rio Branco Chair in International Relations)、里約熱內盧“熱圖利奧?瓦爾加斯基金會”(Funda??o Getulio Vargas)副教授