莫迪的非自由主義傾向威脅印度民主

As India completes 70 years of its independence, the nation’s democracy is becoming Janus-faced. Its electoral vibrancy is not in doubt, but the polity’s performance between elections is acquiring profoundly illiberal traits.

在剛剛慶祝完獨立70週年的印度，民主制度正在顯示出兩面性。印度選舉制度的活力是毋庸置疑的，但在介於兩次選舉之間的時間，印度政治制度開始表現出極度非自由主義民主的特徵。

In political theory, an illiberal democracy is defined as one that only pays attention to elections, while it violates, in the years between elections, some core democratic principles, especially freedom of expression.

在政治學理論中，非自由主義民主指的是這樣一種民主：只關注選舉，而在介於兩次選舉之間的那幾年，卻違背一些民主制度的核心原則，特別是言論自由。

It views elections as the only measure of democracy and once elected, it seeks unrestrained power, often on behalf of the majority community. The India of Narendra Modi, prime minister, is beginning to resemble this description.

這種民主制度將選舉視爲民主的唯一尺度，而某一政黨一旦當選，通常就會代表多數團體尋求不受制約的權力。納倫德拉?莫迪(Narendra Modi)總理領導下的印度，已經顯示出這種跡象。

The electoral vigour of Indian democracy is well known. Since 1952, there have been 16 national and 362 state elections, mostly free and fair. Power has peacefully changed hands eight times in Delhi and so often at the state level that scholars have stopped counting.

印度民主制度在選舉上的活力衆所周知。自1952年以來，印度已經進行過16次全國大選和362次邦一級選舉，其中大部分是自由、公正的。印度中央政府已經實現了8次和平的權力移交，地方一級的權力更迭更不勝枚舉。

In 1992, a third tier of local elected governments was added.

1992年，印度在原有的兩級民選地方政府之外，又增設了一級民選地方政府。

Since then, roughly 3m local legislators have been elected every five years.

自那以後，每隔5年，就有約300萬地方議員通過選舉產生。

Over the past three decades, defying western democratic experience, the poor and the less educated have voted as much as, if not more than, the richer and more educated classes. Elections have become civic festivals.

過去30年，與西方民主經驗不同的是，印度的貧民階層、及受教育程度較低的民衆，和富裕、及接受過良好教育的階層一樣多、甚至更多地行使投票權。選舉已成爲公民的節日。

Comparative evidence shows that democracies can be established at any level of income, but their mortality rate is very high at lower levels of income. The longevity of Indian democracy, a lower middle income country even after four decades of high economic growth, is thus remarkable and receives a lot of plaudits.

有可比證據顯示，民主政體可以建立在任何經濟發展水平之上，但當建立在較低經濟發展水平上時，民主政體崩潰的機率非常高。即使經過40年的高速經濟增長，印度仍是一箇中低等收入水平國家，因此，印度能夠長久維持民主體制，尤顯矚目並享譽全球。

But its increasing illiberalism is also worthy of critical attention. Especially alarming is how the Modi government has dealt with freedom of expression. Previous governments, too, faltered on this issue.

但印度與日俱增的非自由主義也有必要以批判的眼光關注。尤其令人擔憂的是莫迪政府對言論自由的處理方式。印度以往歷屆政府在這個問題上也同樣做得不好。

Books, for example, were often banned, when some group claimed they were offended by novels or treatises. Individuals or organisations that took sharp anti-government stands were also harassed.

例如，當一些羣體聲稱某些小說或專著冒犯了他們時，這些圖書就常常遭到封禁。那些持激烈反政府立場的個人或組織也常被找麻煩。

But this process has now reached qualitatively different proportions. Often equating dissent with lack of patriotism, the government has created a regime of fear, hysteria and retribution.

但這種狀況現已變質。常常把異見等同於不愛國的印度政府，創造了一個製造恐懼、歇斯底里和實施懲罰的政權。

Civil society organisations have been threatened and writers attacked. Independent voices in the press are noticeably declining. Many journalists are afraid to criticise Mr Modi for fear of reprisal. Business executives say they cannot openly criticise economic policies, such as demonetisation, for fear of retribution. Scholars watch what they say or write. The famously argumentative Indian is now being silenced and turned into a consenting Indian.

民間團體遭到威脅，作家遭到攻擊。媒體中獨立的聲音明顯減弱。許多記者因爲擔心遭到報復不敢批評莫迪。企業高管們說，由於害怕受到懲罰，他們無法公開批評經濟政策，例如廢止兩種大鈔的政策。學者們也不敢亂說話或亂寫文章。以喜歡爭辯著稱的印度現在被迫噤聲，變成了一個唯唯諾諾的國家。

Freedom of expression, as an idea, also covers what citizens eat and the trade they legally engage in. Under the slogan of cow protection, vigilante groups, with impunity, punish beef eating, the trade in cattle and ownership of slaughter houses.

言論自由，作爲一種理念，也包括公民的飲食習慣及合法的交易活動。在保護聖牛的口號下，糾察隊對食用牛肉者、交易活牛者及屠宰場所有者處以私刑，而這種私刑行爲不受法律制裁。

Such vigilante action is integrally connected to the ideology of Hindu nationalism, which animates Mr Modi’s organisational base. Their belief is that cow protection is central to Hinduism, and Hinduism is the core of Indian nationhood, even though the constitution says that India as a nation belongs to all religious groups. Cow protection and nationalism have got intertwined.

這些“護牛”私刑行動與印度民族主義的意識形態有內在聯繫，印度民族主義正是莫迪的基層感召力之源。這些基層選民相信，保護聖牛是印度教的核心教規，而印度教是印度國家認同的核心——儘管印度憲法規定印度是一個屬於所有宗教團體的國家。保護聖牛和民族主義已經密不可分。

Mob violence especially targets Muslims, who eat beef, own a lot of slaughter houses, and are among the biggest practitioners of the trade in cattle. A government that should be committed to the security of all its citizens is failing the nation’s largest minority. On completing his term, India’s vice-president, a Muslim, recently argued that Muslims are feeling increasingly insecure.

這些暴行尤其將穆斯林作爲攻擊目標，穆斯林吃牛肉，擁有許多屠宰場，而且從事與牛相關行業的人數極多。一個本該致力於保護全體公民安全的政府，正在辜負這個國家最大的少數羣體。印度的一位穆斯林副總統最近在任期結束時稱，穆斯林感到越來越沒有安全感。

Mr Modi has criticised vigilantism, but not strongly enough. More importantly, in March, he picked as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, the largest Indian state, a politician-monk, who heads a private vigilante force that has become many times larger since he rose to power, and is known for cow protection and anti-Muslim fervour.

莫迪對“暴力護牛”表示了譴責，但不夠強烈。更重要的是，今年三月，他將一個當過印度教祭司的政客任命爲印度最大邦北方邦(Uttar Pradesh)的首席部長，此人領導着一支私人糾察隊（自他上臺以來該組織壯大了數倍），並以高漲的“護牛”及反穆斯林熱情聞名。

The practice and rhetoric of Mr Modi, thus, clearly diverge. Unsurprisingly, his base has turned a blind eye to his words. His criticism of mob violence was again perfunctory in his independence day speech.

因此，莫迪的言與行明顯大相徑庭。不出所料，擁護他的選民對他話置若罔聞。他在獨立日演講中對暴行的譴責又是一次表面文章。

It will indeed be sad if the largest democracy of the developing world turns into a polity that mainly works for its Hindu majority and targets the minorities and government critics. Unless free expression is restored and vigilante violence checked, that is where India’s democracy is headed.

如果發展中世界最大的民主國家變成一個主要服務於多數印度教徒，同時處處針對少數民族和政府批評者的國家，那就太悲哀了。印度民主制度恰恰就正在朝這個方面前進——除非恢復言論自由並制止暴力私刑。