漫長經濟衰退毫無起色 普京時代走向沒落2

The new frugality is pushing private clinics into fierce competition. Over the past six months, a smattering of deals websites especially for private clinics have sprung up. On sites like Medbooking or DocDoc, which negotiate discounts with certain clinics, patients can find the lowest price for any given treatment in their city that day.

這種新出現的節儉正促使私立診所之間展開激烈的競爭。過去6個月，一些針對私立診所的交易網站應運而生。在Medbooking或DocDoc等網站（它們與某些診所談判價格折扣）上，患者可以找到所在城市當天某一治療方案的最低價格。

Experts warn that such approaches will not be enough. Ms Maleva’s institute recently found that households were still struggling to adapt to the economic crisis and failing to balance their budgets.

專家們警告稱，這些方法還不夠。馬列娃所在的研究所最近發現，俄羅斯家庭仍難以適應這場經濟危機，家庭財務捉襟見肘。

“The kind of socio-economic development Russia has seen in the past decade and a half has not created any meaningful safety reserves,” Ms Maleva says.

馬列娃表示：“過去15年俄羅斯實現的社會經濟發展沒有帶來有意義的安全儲備。”

The working poor

“窮忙族”

During Russia’s last economic downturn, a deep but short recession in 2009, the government cushioned the fallout with social support handouts. Now, as plummeting oil prices cut deeply into budget revenues and more than half of the country’s regions run deficits, there is not enough money for that.

在俄羅斯上一次經濟低迷（2009年發生的嚴重但短暫的衰退）期間，俄羅斯政府通過發放社會救濟減緩了危機造成的影響。如今，隨着油價暴跌造成預算收入銳減、以及超過一半的地區運行財政赤字，政府沒有足夠的資金髮放社會救濟。

According to Russia’s Federal Statistics Agency, 14 per cent of the population lived below the official poverty line in 2015, up from 11 per cent in 2014, and the highest percentage since 2006. Sociologists from the Russian Academy of Sciences, however, believe the situation is worse. They estimate that the number of poor has doubled since 2013 to hit one-quarter of the population.

根據俄羅斯聯邦統計局(Federal Statistics Agency)的數據，2015年有14%的人口生活在官方貧困線以下，高於2014年的11%，爲自2006年以來最高。然而，俄羅斯科學院(Russian Academy of Sciences)的社會學家認爲，實際情況更糟。他們估計，自2013年以來窮人數量翻了一番，達到總人口的四分之一。

Moreover, despite many years of economic growth, the country has failed to prepare its pension system for a rapidly ageing population. This year, the government raised pensions by 4 per cent to make up for rising consumer prices, but as the inflation rate was more than double that last month, real pension incomes are falling.

另外，儘管經歷了多年的經濟增長，但俄羅斯未能在養老金體系方面爲快速老齡化的人口做好準備。今年，俄羅斯政府將養老金上調4%，以彌補消費物價上漲，但上月的通脹率是這個數字的兩倍多，因此實際養老金收入正在下降。

Pensioners already have disproportionately low incomes and account for one-third of the population. That number is forecast to equal the size of the working-age population — which is shrinking by 1m a year — by 2030. Independent economists argue that as pensions are often a cornerstone of family income, up to half of the population is at threat of sliding into poverty.

養老金領取者的收入過低，而且這部分人佔到總人口的三分之一。根據預測，到2030年，養老金領取者的人數將與工作年齡人口相當，後者每年縮減100萬人。獨立經濟學家認爲，由於養老金經常是家庭收入的基石，因此多達一半的人口面臨陷入貧困的威脅。

Others warn that if the economy continues to stagnate for five years or longer, more of the gains of the Putin years will be lost, and Russian society may get closer to the mirror image of the 1990s with its social stress, endemic alcoholism and falling life expectancy.

還有一些人警告稱，如果俄羅斯經濟繼續停滯5年或更久，普京時代曾經取得的社會收益將喪失更多；社會壓力、普遍酗酒以及預期壽命下滑意味着，俄羅斯社會可能變得更接近上世紀90年代的樣子。

For many, the threat of poverty can emerge even if they have a job. As Russia’s working population is shrinking, employers hold on to as many of their staff as they can even during crises, but they cut salaries, send workers on unpaid holidays, delay wage payments or hold off on social allowances.

對於很多人而言，即便有工作也可能面臨貧困威脅。由於俄羅斯工作人口在縮減，甚至在危機期間，僱主也會留住儘可能多的員工，但它們會降低薪資、讓員工停薪留職、延遲發放工資或拖欠社會保險費。

“Our people are being squeezed, and our entire region with them,” says Alexander Alexeenko, a retired truck driver from Ivanovo, a rural region east of Moscow whose fortunes have been deteriorating alongside the decline of its once huge textile plant. An estimated 70 per cent of the local working-age population is now employed in the capital, mostly in low-end service jobs.

伊凡諾弗(Ivanovo)是莫斯科以東的一個鄉村地區，當地退休卡車司機亞歷山大•亞力琴科(Alexander Alexeenko)表示：“我們的人民受到擠壓，整個地區都在受苦。”隨着其一度龐大的紡織廠陷入衰落，該地區的經濟不斷惡化。在當地勞動年齡人口當中，據估計有70%現在在莫斯科就業，大多在低端服務業崗位。

The 63-year-old Mr Alexeenko has gained some local notoriety by blasting the government for incompetent economic policies. He also called for Mr Putin’s resignation at a recent rally of truck drivers, organised to protest against an electronic road toll system run by a friend of the president.

63歲的亞力琴科因炮轟政府經濟政策不稱職而在當地有點小名氣。他還在最近的一場卡車司機集會上呼籲普京辭職——這場集會的目的是抗議由普京的一位朋友執掌的電子道路收費系統。

According to VCIOM, public satisfaction with the economic and social policies of the government is at its lowest level since 2011. In January, 32 per cent of respondents said they might participate if there were protests over economic or social issues in their home town, the highest proportion measured by VCIOM during the Putin era. The numbers have since levelled off but are still higher than at any time since autumn 2011 — when Moscow saw mass demonstrations against Mr Putin.

VCIOM的民調顯示，公衆對普京政府的經濟和社會政策的滿意度處於2011年以來的最低水平。今年1月，32%的受訪者表示，如果在家鄉發生圍繞經濟或社會問題的抗議活動，他們可能會參與，這是該調查在普京時代的最高比例。自那以來數據有所企穩，但仍高於自2011年秋季以來的任何時期——當時莫斯科發生了反對普京的大規模示威活動。

In Togliatti, Yaroslav’s home town, the anger is palpable. A city of 712,000 people, 600 miles south-east of Moscow, it has been hit hard by the decline of the vast Lada car plant around which it was built. Sergei, a 40-year-old taxi driver, blames Mr Putin for the fact that his grocery shop went bankrupt a few years ago. “It’s some kind of plot of his,” he fumes. “I don’t believe Putin, and I don’t believe anyone in government. In fact, I’ll sell this country to anyone who wants it for 10 kopecks.”

在雅羅斯拉夫的家鄉陶里亞蒂，憤怒清晰可見。陶里亞蒂人口71.2萬，位於莫斯科東南方向600英里處，因當地龐大的拉達汽車廠的衰落而遭受重創——當年陶里亞蒂就是圍繞拉達汽車廠建設起來的。40歲的出租車司機謝爾蓋(Sergei)將數年前其雜貨店破產歸咎於普京。他生氣地說道：“我不相信普京，我不相信政府的任何人。實際上，我會賣掉這個國家，誰想出價10戈比都可以拿走。”

Observers are, however, sceptical about the possibility of large-scale revolt. Mr Muslimov says he senses a wariness among Muscovites, with fewer showing an interest in politics.

然而，觀察家們懷疑爆發大規模騷亂的可能性。診所老闆穆斯利莫夫表示，他覺得莫斯科人非常謹慎，對政治感興趣的人較少。

Even those social segments and age groups that are generally more likely to protest are holding back.

即便那些通常更有可能舉行抗議活動的社會階層和年齡段人羣也在保持克制。

To Mr Alexeenko’s exasperation, neither the truck drivers nor the Ivanovo proletariat nor the Moscow middle class are ready to transform their dissatisfaction into political action. “When Putin started, they all put great hopes into him and they continued to believe in him for a long time. Now nobody believes any more,” he says. “And yet, for the sake of so-called stability, people will put up with anything.”

讓亞力琴科感到憤怒的是，無論是卡車司機、伊凡諾弗的無產階級，還是莫斯科的中產階層都不準備將自己的不滿轉變爲政治行動。他說：“當普京上臺的時候，他們全都寄予厚望，他們相信他很久。現在沒人再相信他了。然而，爲了所謂的穩定，大家準備忍受一切。”

Growing income gap

逐漸加大的收入差距

Mr Alexeenko, who calls himself a Communist and has been organising protests for more than 30 years, says his compatriots should follow the example of French farmers who pour milk into the streets to protest at the drop in prices for their produce. “But no. The people here, they bow, they buckle. I wouldn’t say they are afraid. I think they just don’t believe that they can change something,” he says.

亞力琴科自稱是一位共產主義者，30多年來一直組織抗議活動。他說，俄羅斯人應該效仿法國農民，後者將牛奶倒在街道上以抗議農產品價格下跌。他說：“但是這裏的人不願這麼做，他們卑躬屈膝。我不會說他們害怕，我認爲他們只是不相信自己可以改變任何事。”

One factor is that the middle class, historically an agent of change in other societies, has barely grown in 16 years under Mr Putin. According to Ranepa data, it has been stable at about 20 per cent of Russian society since 2000.

一個因素是，中產階層（歷史上在其他社會是改革的推動者）在普京主政的16年間幾乎沒有壯大。RANEPA的數據顯示，自2000年以來，中產階層在俄羅斯社會所佔的比例一直穩定在20%左右。

Moreover, despite the country’s overall wealth gains during the Putin years, the income gap has widened. The country’s Gini coefficient — a widely recognised measure of inequality — rose from 37 in 2000 to 41.6 in 2012, suggesting a less equal distribution of income, which sociologists believe would lessen the effect of political empowerment.

此外，儘管俄羅斯在普京時代的財富整體而言出現增長，但收入差距擴大。2012年，該國的基尼係數（廣泛認可的衡量不平等程度的指標）從2000年的37升至41.6，表明收入分配更加不平等，社會學家相信這將降低政治賦權的效果。

Other forces vital to a vibrant economic future, such as scientists and multilingual talent, have left the country amid rising political pressures and a weaker rouble. According to the Levada Center, Russia’s only independent pollster, the most financially secure and best-educated are likely to emigrate.

對充滿活力的經濟未來至關重要的其他力量，比如科學家和多語人才，已經在政治壓力日益加大和盧布貶值的背景下離開俄羅斯。俄羅斯唯一的獨立民調機構——俄羅斯勒瓦達中心(Levada Center)的數據顯示，財務上最安全且教育程度最高的俄羅斯人可能移民海外。

“Some people fear social unrest. What I fear more is social apathy, infantilism, indifference,” says Ms Maleva. “With a society like that, it will be even more difficult to lift ourselves out of crisis, and it will be impossible to make a new start.”

馬列娃表示：“一些人擔心社會動亂。我更擔心的是社會冷漠、幼稚和漠不關心。在這樣的社會裏，我們更難擺脫危機，也不可能從頭再來。”