社會頂級精英該如何面對民怨

For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple and wrong.” HL Mencken could have been thinking of today’s politics. The western world undoubtedly confronts complex problems, notably, the dissatisfaction of so many citizens. Equally, aspirants to power, such as Donald Trump in the US and Marine Le Pen in France, offer clear, simple and wrong solutions — notably, nationalism, nativism and protectionism.

“對於每一個複雜的問題，都有一個明確、簡單和錯誤的答案。”H•L•門肯(ken)這句話完全適用於今天的政治。西方世界無疑面臨着複雜的問題，尤其是許多公民的不滿情緒。同樣的，權力的追求者，比如美國的唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)和法國的馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)，提供了明確、簡單和錯誤的解決方案——尤其是民族主義、本土主義和保護主義。

The remedies they offer are bogus. But the illnesses are real. If governing elites continue to fail to offer convincing cures, they might soon be swept away and, with them, the effort to marry democratic self-government with an open and co-operative world order.

他們提供的療法是虛假的。但這些疾病是真實的。如果執政精英還無法提供令人信服的療法，他們可能很快就會被掃地出門，民主自治政府融入開放和合作的世界秩序的努力也會隨之付諸東流。

What is the explanation for this backlash? A large part of the answer must be economic. Rising prosperity is a good in itself. But it also creates the possibility of positive-sum politics. This underpins democracy because it is then feasible for everybody to become better off at the same time. Rising prosperity reconciles people to economic and social disruption. Its absence foments rage.

如何解釋這種反彈呢？答案的很大一部分必定是經濟方面的。經濟日益繁榮本身是一件好事，而且它還使正和（positive-sum）政治成爲可能。這構成了民主的基礎，因爲在這種情況下，有可能使所有人的境況同時變好。經濟日益繁榮讓人們願意接受經濟和社會的擾亂，反之將激起憤怒。

The McKinsey Global Institute sheds powerful light on what has been happening in a report entitled, tellingly, Poorer than their Parents?, which demonstrates how many households have been suffering from stagnant or falling real incomes. On average between 65 and 70 per cent of households in 25 high-income economies experienced this between 2005 and 2014. In the period between 1993 and 2005, however, only

麥肯錫全球研究院(McKinsey Global Institute)的一份報告強有力地說明了目前正在發生的情況。這份報告有一個很能說明問題的標題《比他們的父母更窮？》(Poorer than their Parents?)，報告展示了有多少家庭的實際收入出現了停滯或者下降。2005年至2014年，25個高收入經濟體中平均65%到70%的家庭出現了這樣的情況。然而，在1993年到2005年，只有2%的家庭出現了這種情況。這一點也適用於市場收入。由於財政再分配，實際可支配收入停滯或者下降的家庭比例在20%到25%之間。（見圖）

2 per cent of households suffered stagnant or declining real incomes. This applies to market income. Because of fiscal redistribution, the proportion suffering from stagnant real disposable incomes was between 20 and 25 per cent. (See charts.)

麥肯錫通過對6000名法國人、英國人和美國人的調查，對個人滿意度進行了研究。諮詢師們發現，個人滿意度更多取決於人們的境況相對於過去和他們境況相似的人而言是否在改善，而非他們的境況相對於今天比他們更富裕的人而言是否在改善。因此，人們更滿意於境況的上升，即使他們未能追上更爲富裕的同時代人。比起不平等的加劇，收入停滯更讓人們感到煩惱。

McKinsey has examined personal satisfaction through a survey of 6,000 French, British and Americans. The consultants found that satisfaction depended more on whether people were advancing relative to others like them in the past than whether they were improving relative to those better off than themselves today. Thus people preferred becoming better off, even if they were not catching up with contemporaries better off still. Stagnant incomes bother people more than rising inequality. The main explanation for the prolonged stagnation in real incomes is the financial crises and subsequent weak recovery. These experiences have destroyed popular confidence in the competence and probity of business, administrative and political elites. But other shifts have also been adverse. Among these are ageing (particularly important in Italy) and declining shares of wages in national income (particularly important in the US, UK and Netherlands).

實際收入長期停滯的主要解釋是金融危機和之後的復甦乏力。這些經歷摧毀了公衆對於商業、行政和政治精英的能力和誠信的信心。然而，其他一些變化也是不利的，比如老齡化（這一點在意大利尤爲重要）和國民收入中工資比例下降（這一點在美國、英國和荷蘭尤爲重要）。

Real income stagnation over a far longer period than any since the second world war is a fundamental political fact. But it cannot be the only driver of discontent. For many of those in the middle of the income distribution, cultural changes also appear threatening. So, too, does immigration — globalisation made flesh. Citizenship of their nations is the most valuable asset owned by most people in wealthy countries. They will resent sharing this with outsiders. Britain’s vote to leave the EU was a warning.

比二戰以來任何時候持續時間都要長得多的實際收入停滯是一個基本的政治事實。但這不可能是不滿情緒唯一的驅動因素。對很多處於收入分配中段的人來說，文化上的改變看起來也很危險。移民也令他們感到危險——全球化讓他們毛骨悚然。對富裕國家的多數人來說，公民身份是他們擁有的最寶貴的資產。和外人分享這種資產會讓他們憤怒。英國投票決定退出歐盟(EU)是一個警告。

So what is to be done? If Mr Trump were to become president of the US, it might already be too late. But suppose that this does not happen or, if it does, that the result is not as dire as I fear. What then might be done?

那麼，應該做些什麼？如果特朗普當上美國總統，也許就太遲了。但假如這種情況不會發生，或者就算髮生了，結果也不如我擔憂的那樣嚴重。那時我們應該做些什麼呢？

First, understand that we depend on one another for our prosperity. It is essential to balance assertions of sovereignty with the requirements of global co-operation. Global governance, while essential, must be oriented towards doing things countries cannot do for themselves. It must focus on providing the essential global public goods. Today this means climate change is a higher priority than further opening of world trade or capital flows.

第一，理解我們的繁榮是相互依賴的。在主權主張和全球合作的必要之間取得平衡至關重要。全球治理儘管極其重要，但必須以做國家無法獨立進行的事情爲導向。全球治理必須專注於提供必不可少的全球公共產品。今天，這意味着氣候變化是比進一步開放世界貿易或者資本流動更優先的事項。

Second, reform capitalism. The role of finance is excessive. The stability of the financial system has improved. But it remains riddled with perverse incentives. The interests of shareholders are given excessive weight over those of other stakeholders in corporations.

第二，改革資本主義。金融的作用過大。金融系統的穩定性有所改善，但依然充滿了不合常理的激勵措施。比起公司內其他利益相關者的利益，股東利益被賦予了過度的重要性。

Third, focus international co-operation where it will help governments achieve significant domestic objectives. Perhaps the most important is taxation. Wealth owners, who depend on the security created by legitimate democracies, should not escape taxation.

第三，專注於能夠幫助政府實現重要的國內目標的國際合作。其中最重要的可能是稅收。財富擁有者依賴合法的民主政府所提供的安全，他們不應逃稅。

Fourth, accelerate economic growth and improve opportunities. Part of the answer is stronger support for aggregate demand, particularly in the eurozone. But it is also essential to promote investment and innovation. It may be impossible to transform economic prospects. But higher minimum wages and generous tax credits for working people are effective tools for raising incomes at the bottom of the distribution.

第四，加快經濟增長，增多機會。這個問題的部分答案在於對總需求提供更有力的支持，尤其是在歐元區。但改善投資和創新也至關重要。改變經濟前景也許是不可能的，但爲工薪階層提高最低工資和提供慷慨的稅收優惠，是爲處於收入分配底層的人提高收入的有效辦法。

Fifth, fight the quacks. It is impossible to resist pressure to control flows of un-skilled workers into advanced economies. But this will not transform wages. Equally, protection against imports is costly and will also fail to raise the share of manufacturing in employment significantly. True, that share is far higher in Germany than in the US or UK. But Germany runs a huge trade surplus and has a strong comparative ad-vantage in manufactures. This is not a generalisable state of affairs. (See chart.)

第五，打擊“庸醫”。人們要求控制沒有一技之長的勞動者流入發達經濟體，這種壓力是不可能抵抗的。但這並不會改變工資。同樣的，反對進口的保護主義措施代價高昂，並且無法顯著提高製造業在總就業中的比例。的確，德國的這一比例比英美要高得多。但德國有高額的貿易順差，在製造業有很強的比較優勢。這並不是一種能夠一般化的情況。（見圖）

Above all, recognise the challenge. Prolonged stagnation, cultural upheavals and policy failures are combining to shake the balance between democratic legitimacy and global order. The candidacy of Mr Trump is a result. Those who reject the chauvinist response must come forward with imaginative and ambitious ideas aimed at re-establishing that balance. It is not going to be easy. But failure must not be accepted. Our civilisation itself is at stake.

最重要的是，要認識到挑戰。長期停滯、文化顛覆、政策失敗正在共同動搖民主合法性和全球秩序之間的平衡。特朗普成爲共和黨總統候選人就是一個結果。那些反對沙文主義反應的人必須提出有想象力、有抱負、旨在重建這一平衡的想法。這不會是一件容易的事情。但我們不可能接受失敗。面臨威脅的正是我們的文明本身。