跨太平洋夥伴關係協定已然處於困境
Donald Trump was elected US president on a platform of anti-globalism and, in particular, on a promise to change or withdraw from America’s existing trade agreements and kill the ones in the pipeline.
唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)以反對全球化、特別是承諾改變或是退出美國現有貿易協定、並且扼殺籌備中貿易協定的競選綱領，當選了美國總統。
The Trans-Pacific Partnership was already in trouble before the election; Trump’s victory seems to have given it the coup de grace.
在大選開始前，《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(TPP)已然處於困境之中；特朗普的獲勝似乎給了它致命一擊。
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, meanwhile, now looks set to be stillborn.
與此同時，《跨大西洋貿易與投資夥伴關係協定》(TTIP)如今似乎也將胎死腹中。
That is, as far as US participation goes.
準確的說，是如果只考慮美國的參與程度的話。
What the American turn inwards means for the rest of the world is an open question.
美國人把重心轉向國內對世界其他地區意味着什麼，目前不得而知。
There are those who think the loss of US leadership on international economic integration will embolden protectionism elsewhere — especially as it comes on the heels of the protectionist vandalism that is Brexit — and sap the will of those who want to keep their economies open or even open them further.
有人認爲，缺少美國對國際經濟一體化的領導，將助長各地保護主義——特別是在英國退歐造成保護主義破壞性影響之後——並削弱那些希望保持經濟開放、甚至進一步開放經濟的人的意願。
They will point to Europe, whose free-trade deal with Canada was passed by a whisker last month, and that only conditionally.
他們將以歐洲爲例——歐洲與加拿大的自由貿易協定上個月勉強通過，而且是帶有條件的。
But there is another possibility, which is that victory of anti-globalism in the US and the UK galvanises others to fight harder for the continued lowering of national barriers.
但是，還有另一種可能，美國和英國反全球化的勝利，會刺激其他人更加努力地繼續降低國家貿易壁壘。
Cue John Key, the prime minister of New Zealand.
比如新西蘭總理約翰.基(John Key)。
At the Apec (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Lima last week, he defiantly vowed to push ahead with trade integration in the Pacific.
在上週於利馬召開的亞太經合組織(APEC)峯會上，他公開發誓要推進太平洋地區的貿易一體化。
He suggested tweaking the deal to make it more attractive to the Trump administration — including, jokingly, by naming it the Trump-Pacific Partnership — but, more importantly, made clear that the other TPP partners should seriously consider going ahead with the deal even without US participation.
他建議，調整協定內容以增加對特朗普政府的吸引力——包括，開玩笑地，把該協定命名爲《特朗普太平洋夥伴關係協定》(Trump-Pacific Partnership)——但更重要的是，他明確表示TPP其他夥伴國應該認真考慮，在沒有美國參與的情況下繼續推進該協定。
Peru’s president, too, warned against protectionism and against giving up on the TPP.
祕魯總統也告誡不要實行保護主義和放棄TPP。
Meanwhile, Beijing has responded nimbly to Trump’s election by encouraging America’s likely-to-be-spurned TPP partners to join it in building a free-trade area including China instead.
與此同時，北京方面對特朗普當選美國總統作出機敏的反應——鼓勵有可能被特朗普一腳踢開的TPP夥伴國跟中國一道建立一個包括中國在內的自貿區。
The world’s second-largest economy is already involved in several regional trade initiatives that are beginning to be touted as alternatives to TPP.
這個世界第二大經濟體已經加入了多個區域貿易計劃，這些計劃正開始被吹捧爲TPP的替代品。
Australia is showing interest in the move, which would sideline the US.
澳大利亞對這一將美國剔除在外的舉動表示出了興趣。
It is a strange world when China becomes the champion of global economic openness.
中國成爲全球經濟開放的領頭羊，這着實是個奇怪的世界。
But it is an entirely logical one, if the US does indeed decide to abdicate leadership.
但如果美國確實決定放棄領導權，這個世界完全符合邏輯。
As the FT’s Shawn Donnan puts it, when outgoing President Barack Obama met his counterparts at the Apec summit, he may have felt he is handing the Chinese leader the keys to the global economy.
正如英國《金融時報》的肖恩.唐南(Shawn Donnan)指出的那樣，在即將離任的美國總統巴拉克.奧巴馬(Barack Obama)在APEC峯會上與其他領導人會面時，他可能覺得他正在把全球經濟的鑰匙交給中國領導人。
He quotes the Peterson Institute’s Adam Posen as pointing out that: You can’t beat something with nothing, and the Chinese are offering something.
他援引彼得森國際經濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的亞當.波森(Adam Posen)的話指出：你不能兩手空空地打敗對方，而中國人在拿出一點東西。
To anyone who cares to notice, this brings home the continued importance of global integration but also who, in particular, leads the integration effort.
對於所有對此留心的人來說，這不僅清楚說明了全球一體化的持續重要性，還特別說明了誰在領導一體化努力。
The something that China offers is much less ambitious than the TPP — in particular, it will not include that deal’s seminal provisions on labour and environmental standards.
中國拿出的那點東西遠沒有TPP那麼有野心——特別是它不會包括TPP在勞動力和環境標準方面具有重大影響的條款。
Moreover, trade integration led by Beijing instead of the US will mean trade integration on terms more suitable to China.
此外，由中國代替美國領導的貿易一體化將意味着，這種貿易一體化的條款將更適合中國。
That must surely be inferior — for the US and its allies — to the US-led terms and standards for Asia-Pacific economic integration to which China would eventually have to adapt, which was the big strategic prize of the TPP.
對於美國及其盟友來說，這必然不如由美國領導的亞太經濟一體化的條款和標準（中國原本最終不得不適應這些條款和標準，這本是TPP的一項重大戰略獎品）。
That makes Pacific trade one aspect of the bigger picture of America’s interest in the rules-based global order that it has built and maintained since the second world war — which has served it and its allies better than the alternatives of international anarchy or an order designed by its big power rivals.
這使得太平洋貿易成了美國在基於規則的全球秩序中的整體利益的一個方面（這個全球秩序由美國自二戰後逐漸建立並維持，相比國際無政府狀態或由美國的強大對手設計的秩序等其他選擇而言，該秩序更有利於美國及其盟友）。
America first, in global politics, could quickly reveal itself as America last.
在全球政治中，美國領頭可能會很快變成美國最後。
And, as Leonard Cohen, the late poet of an imperfect world, said in an interview a few years ago: you will not like what comes after America.
同時，正如抒寫不完美世界的已故詩人萊昂納德.科恩(Leonard Cohen)在多年前接受採訪時說的：你不會喜歡失去美國後的樣子。
America’s choice is ultimately the most consequential.
最終而言美國的選擇是影響最重大的。
But the more immediate battles between openness and withdrawal from the global economy are taking place in Europe.
但開放與從全球經濟中退出之間更直接的鬥爭正在歐洲上演。
Partly, of course, in the process of Brexit, where the fight is on over how much to raise trade barriers between the UK and its biggest trading partner.
當然，鬥爭部分是因爲英國退歐進程，鬥爭的焦點是，在英國與其最大的貿易伙伴之間應該豎起多高的貿易壁壘。
But also because the EU itself is actually contributing to the cause of trade openness through two substantial deals.
但鬥爭也是因爲歐盟本身通過兩個重要協議推動貿易開放。
One is Ceta, the fraught EU-Canada trade and investment agreement that is finally passed, at least conditionally, after a Walloon hold-up.
一個是命運多舛的《綜合經濟與貿易協定》(CETA)。該協定是歐盟與加拿大之間的貿易和投資協定，曾因比利時瓦隆地方議會的反對而擱淺，最終得以通過（至少是有條件通過）。
That was widely seen as an embarrassment for Europe.
瓦隆插曲被廣泛視爲歐洲的尷尬。
But we should be clear about what the final result involved: that a big trade liberalisation package was exposed to real and messy democratic scrutiny — and that it survived the exposure.
但是我們應該明白最終結果的含義：一項重大貿易自由化方案受到真正而且複雜的民主審視，並且經受住了這種審視。
In these times, where democracy is seen as antagonistic to economic openness, that is something to celebrate.
在當前這個民主被視爲與經濟開放對立的時代，這一點值得慶賀。
The other, much less talked about, effort is the EU-Japan free-trade deal.
另一項很少被談及的努力是歐盟與日本之間的自由貿易協定。
Mysteriously absent from the headlines, negotiations have been taking place for three and a half years and are nearing completion.
有關該協定的談判已經進行了三年半，目前已接近尾聲，但卻令人費解地從未登上過頭條。
Some think that, in pure economic terms, the prospective gains are bigger than could be had from TTIP.
一些人認爲，單純以經濟條件來看，該協定的未來好處超過TTIP。
The two sides have still to agree on phasing out protection of Europe’s car market against lower barriers in food and agriculture in Japan.
雙方仍然需要就逐步解除歐洲汽車市場保護以及削減日本食品與農業方面的壁壘達成一致。
Brexit focused minds; Trump’s victory must have focused them further.
英國退歐引起人們高度關注；特朗普獲勝更是如此。
It is in Japan’s and the EU’s narrow self-interest to conclude the deal.
達成該協議符合日本和歐盟的自身利益。
But it is also in the broader defence of their values, and the liberal global order, that they do so with confidence and without further delay.
但他們滿懷信心、不再遲疑地敲定該協議，也是對其價值觀以及全球自由秩序的維護。
