勿高估TPP《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》的作用

When leaders from throughout the Asia-Pacific region met in Lima last weekend, one topic dominated the gathering: Donald Trump’s threat to ditch the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

當亞太各國領導人上週末匯聚利馬開會時，籠罩一切的一個話題是：唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)威脅拋棄12個國家簽署的《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(TPP)。

The president-elect says he will begin his administration by serving notice of US withdrawal from the trade deal, which he labels a disaster for our country.

這位當選總統表示，他一上任就將宣佈美國撤出該貿易協議。他認爲，TPP對我國而言是一場災難。

His plans have stoked fears throughout the region that the era of Washington’s hegemony over trade, and its geopolitical influence more generally, is coming to an end.

他的計劃加劇了整個亞太的恐懼：華盛頓方面在貿易事務上發揮領導作用，以及在更廣泛意義上發揮地緣政治影響力的時代正在走向終結。

In Lima, a clearly delighted China signalled it was more than happy to take over as the main driver of trade policy.

明顯興高采烈的中國方面在利馬錶示，它非常樂於接替美國，承擔起貿易政策主要推動國的角色。

But while Mr Trump could do serious damage with another of his threats — huge import tariffs on China and Mexico — history suggests the importance of bilateral or regional deals in shaping world trade is often overstated.

但是，儘管特朗普的另一項威脅——對中國和墨西哥徵收高額關稅——可能帶來嚴重損害，然而歷史似乎表明，雙邊或地區協議對於塑造世界貿易的重要性經常是被誇大的。

Nor does it appear that trade agreements are necessarily a cause rather than a consequence of geopolitical influence.

貿易協定必然是地緣政治影響力的因（而不是果）的觀點看來也不正確。

The fear that a state-of-the-art US model will be replaced by an inferior Chinese system of rules looks overdone.

對於先進的美國模式將被落後的中國規則體系取代的擔憂，看來有點過頭。

Beijing does not have an extensive rival set of laws to propagate.

北京方面拿不出一整套與美國構成競爭的法律來推廣。

Its favoured trade pact, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, is known to negotiators as the stapler.

中國支持的《區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定》(RCEP)被談判代表們稱爲訂書機。

It does little more than gather together existing bilateral and regional agreements and has little content beyond cuts in goods tariffs.

它只不過是彙集現有的雙邊和地區協定，除了削減商品關稅之外，幾乎沒有什麼內容。

The China model is not a disturbing diversion from a move towards deeper economic integration: it is essentially the status quo.

中國模式並沒有令人不安地偏離深化經濟一體化的努力：它其實就是現狀。

If TPP fails, the US will have fumbled a chance to liberalise some trade in services and restrain state-owned enterprises from distorting markets.

如果TPP夭折了，美國將錯過一個推動一部分服務貿易自由化、阻止國有企業扭曲市場的機會。

But that is a missed opportunity, not a catastrophe.

但這畢竟將是一個錯失的機會，而不是一場大災難。

More generally, eliding the difference between official agreements and real cross-border commerce in goods and services leads to overestimating the importance of what officials say as opposed to what business people do.

在更爲普遍的意義上，忽略官方協定與實際的跨境商品服務貿易之間的差別，導致人們高估官員言論（而不是商人的實際行爲）的重要性。

The rapid integration of Asian markets over the past 25 years, often to join US-oriented supply chains, was driven mainly by technical improvements in communication and digitisation, not formal reciprocal bilateral or regional trade pacts.

過去25年裏亞洲市場的快速一體化（往往是爲了加入面向美國的供應鏈）的主要推動力是通信與數字化方面的技術進步，而不是互惠平等的正式雙邊和地區貿易協定。

The US has signed no large trade deal in Asia since the Uruguay Round of multilateral talks was completed in 1994, apart from bilaterals with South Korea and Singapore.

自1994年烏拉圭回合多邊談判結束後，除了與韓國和新加坡簽署雙邊協定，美國並未在亞洲簽署大型貿易協議。

Its influence has come from American businesses and consumers, not bureaucrats.

美國的影響力來自美國企業和消費者，並非美國官員。

Instead, the most important liberalisation was a wave of unilateral tariff-cutting by emerging economies in the early 1990s, followed by a voluntary open agreement on information technology goods, not a conventional trade deal.

相反，最重要的自由化是新興經濟體在1990年代初發起的一波單邊削減關稅行動，以及後來圍繞IT產品達成的自願開放協議，而不是常規的貿易協定。

Governments that want to open their markets will continue to do so, even without the TPP to coerce them.

想要放開本國市場的政府將繼續這麼做，即使沒有TPP強迫它們也是如此。

As for the geopolitical role of trade deals, they may act as symbolic consummations of a foreign policy relationship, but do not necessarily deepen ties by themselves.

至於貿易協議的地緣政治角色，它們或許象徵着外交政策關係達到圓滿境界，但本身未必能深化雙邊關係。

For example, Washington showed solidarity with market-oriented Mexican governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s by including Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement.

比如，在1980年代末和1990年代初，華盛頓方面爲了同以市場爲導向的墨西哥政府展現團結，把墨西哥納入了北美自由貿易協定(NAFTA)。

Two decades later, Nafta is not visibly bolstering ties.

20年後，看不出NAFTA對兩國關係有支撐作用。

Instead, it has, perhaps unfairly, become a reviled symbol of American deindustrialisation.

相反，（這一點也許不公平）NAFTA成了飽受詬病的美國去工業化象徵。

This is not to play down concerns about the US’s future in the Asia Pacific.

這不是要淡化美國在亞太未來的擔憂。

If the US decides to draw back from its security role in the region, it would undermine the country’s prestige as the indispensable nation.

如果美國決定不再在亞太發揮安全保障角色，那將破壞美國作爲不可或缺的國家的威望。

But that is almost entirely unconnected with whether a particular trade deal succeeds or not.

但是，這跟某項特定的貿易協議成功與否幾乎毫無關係。

There are many other worries about Mr Trump’s trade policies, notably his calls for tariffs that could set off destructive trade wars.

特朗普的貿易政策還引起其他方面的擔憂——尤其是他的關稅呼籲可能引發毀滅性的貿易戰。

But the history of trade pacts as an instrument of foreign policy suggests the US role in Asia, and Chinese ambitions to replace it, will be determined by far more than just TPP.

但是，貿易協定作爲一種外交政策工具的歷史似乎表明，美國在亞洲的角色、以及中國在亞洲取代美國的雄心，都將遠遠不是一個TPP所能決定的。