中國人口流動的決定因素大綱

Planned economies attempt to control not only the “commanding heights” of industry, but also the movement of their people. The transformation of China’s economy into the powerhouse it is today came about only after Chinese were allowed to leave subsistence farms for factories and cities.
實行計劃經濟的國家不僅試圖控制產業“制高點”，還試圖控制本國人民的流動。中國轉變成如今的經濟強國，是在國人被准許離開只夠維持溫飽的農田、進入工廠和城市之後才實現的。

Two big developments in China in the last few weeks show that the planners’ instinct to channel population flows and the labour force has not disappeared, despite the power of market forces in the world’s largest economy.
過去幾週中國發生的兩大事件表明，在這個世界最大的經濟體，儘管市場力量很強大，規劃者們想要引導人口流動和勞動力的本能仍沒有消失。

Apple’s primary manufacturer Foxconn last week announced it would take “immediate action” to stop students working overtime to produce the iPhone X after a Financial Times investigation revealed the practice in its vast factory in the interior city of Zhengzhou.
蘋果(Apple)的主要代工商富士康(Foxconn)最近宣佈，將“立即採取行動”停止讓學生加班生產iPhone X的做法，英國《金融時報》此前的一項調查曝光了富士康位於中國內陸城市鄭州的一家大型工廠的這一行爲。

This is not the first time this has happened. Five years ago, under nearly identical circumstances, Foxconn was criticised for pulling in students to work overtime at Zhengzhou and other plants to produce the iPhone 5. In both cases, cheap overtime labour was needed to get Apple’s hot new product into stores before Christmas.
這種事情不是第一次發生。五年前就出現過幾乎同樣的一幕：富士康因在鄭州等地的工廠使用學生加班生產iPhone 5而受到指責。在這兩起事件中，爲了趕在聖誕節前將蘋果熱銷的新產品送上貨架，富士康需要廉價且願意加班的勞動力。

Foxconn opened the Zhengzhou plant in part because the Henan provincial government promised lower wage costs. No-one considered that workers had already left for places where wages are higher. When Foxconn and other manufacturers require sudden production peaks inland China’s lower wages do not attract enough temporary workers. Luckily for the companies, they can turn to the vocational technology schools, which function as concentrated pools of low-cost labour. Students can be paid less than the adult workforce. Moreover, students can be returned to “school” without an expensive lay-off process, since they were never formally “employees”.
富士康之所以在鄭州開設工廠，部分原因是河南省政府承諾讓其工資成本保持在較低水平。但沒人想到，工人們大多都去了工資更高的地方。當富士康等製造商驟然需要達到生產峯值時，中國內陸地區較低的工資水平無法吸引到足夠多的臨時勞動力。幸運的是，這些企業可以從職業技術學校招人，那裏是低成本勞動力的集中地。學生拿的工資低於成年勞動力。此外，企業無需支付高昂遣散費就可以讓學生們返回“學校”，因爲他們不是正式“僱員”。

If students refuse “work experience” on assembly lines, schools can withhold graduation certificates. Not graduating would be a terrible waste of tuition paid by parents hoping the qualification will put their children in better jobs than assembly line work. It is a credible threat for teenagers who have already disappointed family hopes by failing tough high school or college entrance exams.
如果學生們拒絕在裝配線上積累“工作經驗”，學校可以不發給他們畢業證書。無法畢業就白白浪費了學費，花錢供子女上學的父母希望有張文憑孩子能找到比裝配線崗位更好的工作。對於那些已經因在殘酷的高中或大學入學考試中落榜而令家人失望的青少年學生而言，這是一個確實有效的威脅。

Essentially, the vocational technology schools allow China to keep manufacturing wages lower for longer, despite demographic shifts that would otherwise make its products more expensive.
實際上，雖然人口結構變化本應推高中國製造的成本，但職業技術學校使得中國可以在更長時間內將製造業工資維持在較低水平。

One shift that has drawn cheap casual labor away from inland manufacturing bases such as Zhengzhou is that China’s growing prosperity has created a vibrant service industry. In wealthy cities like Beijing and Shanghai, a comfortable middle class now depends on nannies, rapid home deliveries and $4 lattes served by chic baristas.
將廉價臨時勞動力從鄭州等內陸製造業基地吸引走的一大轉變是，中國日益繁榮的社會創造了一個充滿活力的服務業。在北京、上海等富裕城市，一個生活舒適的中產家庭如今離不開保姆、送貨上門的快遞服務以及由穿着光鮮的侍者奉上的一杯4美元的拿鐵咖啡。

These booming services have lured an army of migrants to the slums that ring Beijing. Others cram into basement rooms underneath expensive apartment blocks and shopping malls. But the city government regards them as “low-level people” who are a drag on public services, like transportation, schools and hospitals. It wants to move them out and limit the population to 23m.
欣欣向榮的服務業吸引了大批外來務工人員搬進環繞北京的廉價住宅區。還有一些人擠在昂貴公寓樓和購物中心的地下室居住。但市政府將他們視爲“低端人口”，認爲他們增加了交通、學校、醫院等公共服務的負擔。政府希望把他們清走，將北京的人口限制在2300萬。

For two years the city has made it harder for migrant children to attend school and demolished cheap housing. This month, a fire in an over-crowded building killed 19 people, including children. That tragedy triggered a massive slum clearance campaign, displacing tens of thousands into the winter cold. The idea is clearly that they will just “go home”.
兩年來，北京市提高了外來務工人員的子女入學的難度，並不停拆除廉價住房。本月，一棟擁擠不堪的建築發生火災，導致包括兒童在內的19人死亡。這起悲劇引發了一場對羣租房的大規模清理行動，導致數萬人在嚴冬中流離失所。此舉發出的信號很明確，他們只能“回老家”。

But home to where? Most migrants under the age of 35 have no idea how to farm, and anyway, the farms are being reconsolidated into agribusinesses.
但回老家能幹什麼？35歲以下的外出務工者大多不懂耕種，再說農地已被整合用於發展農業綜合企業。

Instead China’s new plan is to keep its vast population out of the biggest, wealthiest cities, and encourage them to settle in small provincial cities. But public resources are concentrated in the main cities. Provincial towns and cities do not have a surfeit of decent jobs. What they have is over-crowded, underfunded schools and sub-standard hospitals — and assembly-line manufacturers assured of plentiful cheap labour in the hinterland.
中國的新計劃是讓大批人口離開一線城市，鼓勵他們到各省較小的城市定居下來。但中國的公共資源主要集中在大城市。一般的城鎮沒有太多好工作，有的只是學生數量過多經費卻不足的學校、條件簡陋的醫院，以及在內陸地區被保證能獲得充足廉價勞動力的從事裝配業務的製造商。