中國加入WTO十年得失

It is almost a decade since China joined the World Trade Organization. Back then, China imported "global order": it absorbed pre-existing, mainly U.S.-designed policies, rules and institutions. It acted rather like a small or medium-sized economy that could only adapt to the international terms of trade. Now China is one of the Big Three, alongside the U.S. and European Union. It is the world's second-largest economy and its leading exporter of goods. It is also the biggest post-crisis contributor to global growth.
中國加入世界貿易組織 (WTO)差不多已經有十年了。當初，中國是進口“全球秩序”：中國吸收了業已存在的、主要是由美國設計的政策、規則和制度。中國當時表現得更像是一箇中小型經濟體，只能去適應國際貿易條款。如今，中國已經與美國和歐盟比肩，躋身世界三大巨頭之列。中國目前是世界第二大經濟體，是世界頭號商品出口國。金融危機過後，中國還對全球經濟的增長作出了最大的貢獻。

In line with its growing economic size, Beijing wants to influence international prices and shape global rules. But that will require significant changes in the ways Beijing thinks about economic policy, and Beijing has resisted those changes to date. This creates uncertainty and instability for China and the rest of the world, and has implications for other leaders looking to China to play a constructive role in global economic matters.
爲了與中國不斷擴大的經濟規模相匹配，北京希望對國際價格施加影響，並決定國際規則。然而，這就需要北京對其考慮經濟政策的方式做出重大改變，而到目前爲止北京抵制做出這種改變。這就爲中國和世界其他國家創造了不確定性和不穩定性，並對那些希望中國在全球經濟事務中發揮建設性作用的其他國家領導人產生影響。

Global trade issues best reveal China's policy shift, and also its policy dilemma. China's membership of the WTO has been a resounding success. Access to the WTO's rules-based system and dispute-resolution process has defused manifold tensions and smoothed China's rapid integration into the global economy. Beijing also has negotiated bilateral or regional free-trade agreements such as the one with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
全球貿易問題最好地揭示了中國的政策轉變，也反映出中國的政策困境。中國加入世貿組織是一個令人矚目的成就。加入世貿組織以規則爲基礎的體系和爭端解決程序消除了多個方面的緊張關係，併爲中國迅速融入全球經濟鋪平了道路。北京還通過談判達成了雙邊或地區性的自由貿易協定，比如與東盟的自貿協定。

But China also has been a conspicuously passive and marginal player in the Doha Round of talks to further liberalize global trade. Its default position is still to react, leaving other big players to take initiatives. And its FTAs tend to be fairly weak. Whereas, for instance, South Korea's FTAs with the U.S. and EU represent comprehensive liberalization in trade between major partners, Beijing's pact with Asean only eliminates tariffs; it hardly, if at all, tackles regulatory barriers to trade in goods and services, investment and public procurement. Other Chinese FTAs, such as its agreement with Pakistan, don't even eliminate most tariffs.
中國領導人對自由化問題一直持更加謹慎的態度。在旨在進一步推動全球貿易自由化的多哈回合談判上，中國也一直是一個超級被動並且不起眼的參與者。被動等待是中國的默認立場，等着其他重要的參與者提出建議。此外，中國對自由貿易協定的政策力度往往也相當不夠。比如，韓國與美國和歐盟的白貿協定包括主要貿易伙伴之間的貿易完全自由化，而北京與東盟的協定只取消了關稅；這種程度的協定很難解決貨物和服務貿易、投資以及公共採購過程中存在的壁壘。中國其他的自貿協定，比如與巴基斯坦簽署的協定，甚至沒有取消絕大部分關稅。

Meanwhile, China's historic opening to the world economy has stalled since about 2006. There has been paltry unilateral liberalization beyond China's WTO commitments. Anti-liberalization interests—some ministries, regulatory agencies and resurgent state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—have grown more powerful. Despite, or perhaps because of, China's growing clout, it is unwilling to open markets unilaterally and haggles hard over reciprocal concessions.
與此同時，大約從2006年開始，中國具有歷史意義的向世界經濟開放的步伐一直停滯不前。除了中國加入世貿組織所作的承諾之外，中國幾乎沒有採取什麼單邊的自由化措施。反對自由化的利益集團——某些部委、監管機構和復甦的國有企業——已經變得更加強大。儘管可能是由於中國的影響力不斷增強，中國並不願單邊開放市場，一直在努力爭取到相互的讓步。Beijing's stalled liberalization is also of a piece with greater industrial-policy intervention, aimed to promote a core of about 50 SOEs, mainly in "strategic" manufacturing and resource-based sectors, and a handful of state-owned banks that dominate the financial system. China's response to the global financial crisis—a supercharged fiscal and monetary stimulus—bolstered the public sector and state power at the expense of the far-less-subsidized private sector. Beijing's frequent recourse to command-and-control mechanisms such as price controls to fight inflation makes market reform harder.
北京自由化進程的停滯不前也與更大力度的工業政策干預有關係，這種干預旨在推動大約由50家國有企業組成的“核心”的發展。這些企業主要屬於“戰略性”製造業和以資源爲基礎的部門，此外還有幾家主導着金融體系的國有銀行。中國應對全球金融危機的方式——動力超強的財政和貨幣刺激計劃——扶持了公共部門和政府的實力，卻讓私人部門爲此付出代價，後者得到的補貼要少得多。北京時常求助於“指令加控制”機制的這種做法，比如利用限價措施來抗擊通貨膨脹，增加了市場改革的難度。

Protectionist trade policy and dirigiste industrial policy meet at several junctions. Export restrictions—most conspicuously on rare-earth metals—have increased. Tax incentives, subsidies and price controls, as well as administrative "guidance" on investment decisions, are used to favor domestic goods over imports. China-specific standards, such as on third-generation mobile phones, can create high compliance costs for foreign enterprises. Services barriers, notably in financial and telecommunication services, have come down very slowly, if at all.
保護主義的貿易政策和計劃經濟式的工業政策在幾個點上匯合到了一起。出口限制——最突出的就是對稀土的出口限制——有所增強。稅收獎勵、補貼和限價措施以及對投資決定的行政“引導”，都被用於幫助國內產品抵禦進口產品。中國特有的標準，比如有關第三代手機的標準，爲外國企業創造出高昂的成本。中國消除服務業壁壘的速度假如不是零的話，也是非常緩慢的，特別是在金融業和電信服務業。

Foreign-investment restrictions have been tightened in a range of sectors where SOEs operate, such as iron and steel, petrochemicals, coal, biofuels, news websites, audiovisual and Internet services. Discriminatory government procurement, in the guise of promoting "indigenous innovation," favors domestic companies. Joint-venture and technology-transfer requirements on foreign companies promote national champions in high-speed rail, electric cars and renewable-energy sectors. Finally, "investment nationalism" extends to China's Go Out policy: Resource-based SOEs in particular are buying up foreign assets with cheap capital provided by state-owned banks.
在有國有企業經營的一系列部門，比如鋼鐵、石化、煤炭、生物燃料、新聞網站、視聽和互聯網服務部門，針對外國投資的限制有所收緊。差別性的政府採購打着推動“自主創新”的旗號偏袒國內公司。外國企業受到的合資和技術轉讓的要求導致本土企業在高速鐵路、電力汽車和可再生能源部門拔得頭籌。最終， “投資民族主義”延伸到中國的“走出去”戰略中：尤其是以資源爲基礎的國有企業，它們正在利用國有銀行提供的廉價資本大量買入外國資產。

The problem is that this policy mix is incompatible with global economic leadership at a time when China has little choice but to become a global leader. Beijing can't expect its trading partners to accept indefinitely a flood of Chinese exports without opening its own market to their goods. Hence it is in China's own interests to restrain industrial-policy activism and its protectionist spillover. And it should proceed with "WTO-plus" reforms that move beyond the letter of its accession commitments. It could further reduce applied import tariffs, especially on industrial goods. It should reverse export controls on raw materials and agricultural commodities.
問題在於，中國的這種政策組合與其全球經濟領導地位是不協調的，中國目前幾乎別無選擇，只能成爲全球領導者。北京不能指望其貿易伙伴無止境地接受中國出口商品的大量涌入，而中國並不向它們的商品開放市場。因此，遏制工業政策中存在的激進主義和貿易保護主義所帶來的副作用是符合中國自身利益的。而且，中國應當繼續推進 “超WTO”改革，不僅僅侷限於當初加入世貿時所做的承諾。中國可以進一步降低已經實施的進口稅，尤其是對工業產品所徵收的進口稅。中國應當取消對原材料和農業初級產品的出口控制。

China's more substantial challenge is to tackle high trade-related domestic regulatory barriers in goods, services, investment and public procurement. These measures should be hitched firmly to domestic reforms to improve the business climate and to "rebalance" the economy—to make it more consumption- and less investment-oriented, with more freedom for the private sector and less public-sector control.
中國面臨的更加重大的挑戰在於，中國需要解決商品、服務、投資和公共採購領域存在的與貿易相關的國內監管的高壁壘。這些措施應當與改善商業氛圍、 “調整”經濟的國內改革密切結合起來——以使經濟變得更加註重消費，減少對投資的依賴，同時給予私人部門更多的自由，減少對公共部門的控制。

Most of this wish list is not on Beijing's agenda. Leaders are not minded to curtail industrial policy and proceed with reforms beyond their WTO commitments. The latter would mean not merely liberalizing product markets but also reforming highly controlled markets for factors of production like land and capital and for energy inputs like oil, water and electricity. Those lie at the heart of domestic economics and politics. The reforms China most needs now cut to the core of the Communist Party-government-public sector nexus and its grip on power. It is unlikely to happen soon.
上述意願中的絕大部分並不在北京的政治議程之上。領導人並不想調整工業政策以及繼續推進超出WTO承諾的改革。後者不僅僅意味着放開產品市場，還意味着要改革受到高度控制的生產要素市場（比如土地和資本）和能源市場（比如石油、水資源和電力）。這些市場在國內經濟和政治中處於核心位置。這種改革在短期內是不大可能發生的。

The story is not necessarily as grim as might at first appear. Earlier liberalization has left China so deeply integrated into global supply chains that it can't afford to move too far backward on reforms, and Beijing increasingly can't afford to stand still either as it endeavors to deliver steadily rising prosperity. But until it finds a way to break this impasse, China will be limited in its ability to exercise meaningful global leadership. This fact calls for some humility from Chinese leaders who otherwise appear increasingly assertive on the world stage, and for realism from foreign leaders who wish China would exercise a greater leadership role at international forums like the International Monetary Fund, the WTO and the G-20.
情況並不一定會像乍看之下的那麼嚴酷。早期的自由化進程已經使中國深深地融入全球供給鏈，因此中國無法承受改革的大步倒退。而隨着北京力圖保持經濟穩步持續的繁榮，北京也越來越無法承受停滯不前所要付出的代價。然而，在找到擺脫這種僵局的方法之前，中國擔任全球領導者的能力將受到限制。這樣的事實要求中國領導人表現出一絲謙遜，否則他們在世界舞臺上將被認爲越來越武斷；而希望中國在國際貨幣基金組織、世貿組織和20國集團中發揮更重要的領導作用的外國領導人也要現實一些。