量化寬鬆是歐洲重振經濟最後希望

The program to try to jolt the European economy out of its doldrums that Mario Draghi unveiled Thursday is several months late, timid compared with its counterparts in the United States and Japan, and full of complexity aimed at satisfying his political constituents.

馬里奧·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)週四公佈的計劃旨在讓歐洲經濟擺脫低迷。這一計劃不僅遲到了好幾個月，而且與美國和日本的同類計劃相比缺乏魄力，爲了讓政治支持者滿意，也平添了複雜性。

It may also be the last, best hope to prevent Western Europe from sliding toward another lost economic decade, with the high unemployment and geopolitical strains that would imply.

考慮到當前的高失業率，以及它可能帶來的地緣政治壓力，該計劃或許是防止西歐經濟滑進另一個“失去的十年”的最後希望，同時也是最大的希望。

The program is bigger than analysts were expecting, and its details show a commitment by the E.C.B. not to bend to political pressure (particularly from Germany) to hold its fire for fear of the monetary authority subsidizing reckless borrowing by Southern European countries. The action was enough to drive European stocks up and the euro currency down, just the market reaction that Mr. Draghi was surely hoping for.

該計劃的規模大於分析人士的預期，其細節展示出了歐洲央行(European Central Bank)不屈從於政治壓力（尤其是來自德國的政治壓力）的決心。後者害怕歐洲央行爲南歐國家不計後果的借貸提供補貼，於是向其施壓，試圖阻止它採取行動。該計劃足以驅動歐洲股價上漲，歐元匯率下降，當然這正是德拉吉所期待的市場反應。

There’s no question that Mr. Draghi showed guile and savvy in guiding a fractious committee of central bankers to a bigger and more aggressive program than seemed plausible even a few weeks ago. The trillion-euro question is whether it will be enough, and that’s where the finer details come into play. The program’s success or failure will depend on whether the compromises needed to gain agreement will prove minor enough not to undermine its goals — and whether they have succeeded in shocking decision makers across Europe into a belief that it is riskier to hoard money than to spend and invest it.

毫無疑問，德拉吉展示出了智慧和精明，他引導着一個由各國央行行長組成的難以駕馭的委員會，達成了一份不光是似乎可行，而且規模和力度都更大的計劃。問題在於，幾萬億歐元是否夠用，這也是那些更爲微觀的細節發揮作用的地方。該計劃的成敗，取決於達成共識所要做出的妥協是否能小到不足以影響目標的實現，以及是否成功地讓歐洲的決策者在衝擊之下相信，囤積資金比消費和投資更有風險。

Mr. Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, announced plans to buy 60 billion euros’ worth of bonds per month through at least September 2016, which would imply 1.1 trillion euros ($1.3 trillion) in new money injected into the European financial system. The plan is to continue until the central bank’s leaders judge that inflation is returning toward the goal of below but close to 2 percent. For the year ended in December, prices actually fell 0.2 percent in the 19 countries using the euro currency.

歐洲央行行長德拉吉宣佈了每月購買600億歐元債券的計劃，該做法將至少持續到2016年9月，這意味着將有1.1萬億歐元（約合8萬億元人民幣）的新資金注入歐洲的金融系統。該計劃將一直持續下去，直到歐洲央行的官員們認爲通脹水平回到了接近但低於2%的目標。在截至去年12月的一年時間裏，19個使用歐元的國家裏，物價實際上降低了0.2%。

At first glance, Mr. Draghi’s plan emulates the Federal Reserve’s QE3 program: the third round of quantitative easing, or bond buying, announced in the United States in September 2012 and which most likely helped the acceleration in the American economy over the last two years. Both programs were open-ended in size, with billions in monthly bond purchases paired with a pledge to continue until some goal is met (for the Fed, it was substantial improvement in the job market, for the European Central Bank, returning inflation toward its target).

從表面上看，德拉吉的計劃似乎效仿了美聯儲(Federal Reserve)的QE3：也就是美國在2012年9月宣佈的第三輪量化寬鬆(quantitative easing)，或者說債券購買計劃。這一行動在過去兩年裏，極有可能爲美國經濟的加速提供了助力。兩個計劃在規模上都沒有限制，每月的購債規模達數十億美元，並承諾將一直如此，直到實現某個目標（對於美聯儲來說，這個目標是就業市場出現實質性改善，對於歐洲央行來說，是讓通脹回到目標水平）。

There are two big differences.

但它們有兩個主要區別。

First, it is late. When the Fed pulled the trigger on its open-ended bond buying, in 2012, annual inflation was running at 1.6 percent in the United States, not far below its 2 percent target. The economy was growing at a steady if unexceptional rate. The Fed was looking to get ahead of its problem of sluggish growth.

首先，歐洲央行的計劃來得太晚。當美聯儲2012年啓動無上限的購債行動時，美國的年度通脹率爲1.6%，並沒有遠遠低於2%的目標水平。經濟增長儘管緩慢，但是很穩定。美聯儲當時正在尋求克服增長乏力的問題。

The European Central Bank, by contrast, has spent the last two and a half years seemingly looking for any excuse not to take the action announced Thursday, with a series of half-measures. The difference has its roots in differing economic analysis about the dangers of deflation and complex political factors, in particular the aversion of Europe’s central bankers and German political leaders to use the common central bank to share risk among different countries.

相比之下，在過去兩年半時間裏，歐洲央行似乎一直在找各種藉口，避免採取週四宣佈的這種行動，並推出了一系列權宜之計。這一差異的根源包括對通貨緊縮危險的經濟分析存在的分歧，以及複雜的政治因素，尤其是歐洲各國央行行長和德國領導人不願用共同的中央銀行分擔各國的風險。

The second big difference with the American program is that the E.C.B. is only dabbling with risk-sharing across Europe.

與美國的計劃相比，第二大不同是，在讓整個歐洲共同承擔風險方面，歐洲央行只是淺嘗輒止。

The European Central Bank in Frankfurt administers its policies through national central banks across the eurozone: the Bundesbank in Germany, the Banca d’Italia in Italy, and so on. A big question has been whether any losses due to government defaults or restructurings on bonds bought through this quantitative easing program would be borne by Europe as a whole or the specific national bank that bought the bonds.

位於法蘭克福的歐洲央行是通過歐元區內各國的央行，如德國聯邦銀行(Bundesbank)和意大利銀行(Banca d’Italia)等來執行其政策的。一個重要的問題是，因爲政府違約而造成的損失，以及量化寬鬆計劃所購債券發生重組時造成的損失，該由整個歐洲，還是由購買債券的具體某國央行來承擔。

The German government would strongly prefer the risks stay on national books. Why, they reason, should Germany’s central bank pay the bill if Portugal defaults on its obligations?

德國政府會強烈贊成各國央行承擔風險。他們的理由是，如果葡萄牙違約了，德國央行爲什麼應該買單？

The problem is that doing this eliminates one of the crucial ways that a central bank can act as guarantor of a nation’s economy. The European Central Bank isn’t much of a lender of last resort if each country within the eurozone is on its own when things turn bad. It would be as if the Federal Reserve system as a whole had refused to stand behind the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta when it was making emergency loans to failing banks in Florida during the financial crisis; part of the strength of the system is that the entirety of the United States government, and its central bank, stood behind each component part.

問題是，這麼做就減少了中央銀行作爲一國經濟的擔保機構，所能採取的一種關鍵舉措。如果形勢惡化時，歐元區各國都各自爲戰，歐洲央行就算不上是“最後貸款人”。這就好比金融危機期間，亞特蘭大聯邦儲備銀行(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta)向佛羅里達州瀕臨倒閉的銀行提供緊急貸款時，整個美聯儲系統拒絕充當後盾一樣。美聯儲系統的實力，部分來源於各個成員背後，都有整個美國政府及其央行的支持。

Mr. Draghi was dismissive of the importance of this risk mutualization debate in his news conference Thursday, but the plan he unveiled shows the hallmarks of an intricate negotiation to have some elements of risk sharing and some risk remaining on the books of individual national banks.

在週四的新聞發佈會上，德拉吉對於風險共擔討論的重要性不屑一顧。但在他宣佈的計劃中，有跡象顯示，各方進行了一場繁瑣的談判，使其包含了一些風險共擔的成分，同時各國央行也要自行承擔部分風險。

For nearly eight years, since the first tremors of what would become the global financial crisis were felt, global central banks have been the first responders, for better and worse, to a rolling series of panics and disappointing economic results. (The better: They have often moved more decisively and powerfully than elected officials. The worse: Their tools are often ill-suited for the challenges their economies have faced, and created dangerous ripple effects).

在全球金融危機的影響開始顯現後的近八年時間裏，面對一波接一波的恐慌和欠佳的經濟指標，各國央行一直都能率先做出應對，無論效果好壞。（好的方面：它們的行動通常都比民選官員更果斷、更有力。不好的方面：它們的工具常常無法適應所在經濟體面臨的挑戰，並且造成了危險的漣漪效應。）

Mr. Draghi’s move is firmly within this tradition. We don’t know how it will end, only that he has shown the determination to recognize that the status quo, for Europe and the world, was no good.

德拉吉的舉措完全遵循了這一傳統。我們不知道結果會如何，只知道他已表現出了決心，承認對歐洲和全世界來說，現狀都不好。