德國是歐洲經濟停滯的罪魁

THE U.S. economy finally seems to be climbing out of the deep hole it entered during the global financial crisis. Unfortunately, Europe, the other epicenter of crisis, can’t say the same. Unemployment in the euro area is stalled at almost twice the U.S. level, while inflation is far below both the official target and outright deflation has become a looming risk.

美國經濟在全球金融危機期間掉進深淵，現在似乎終於要爬出來了。不幸的是，歐洲作爲危機的另一個重災區，卻講不出同樣的話。歐元區的失業率停留在了幾乎兩倍於美國的水平，通脹水平遠低於官方目標，完全陷入通縮的危險近在眼前。

Investors have taken notice: European interest rates have plunged, with German long-term bonds yielding just 0.7 percent. That’s the kind of yield we used to associate with Japanese deflation, and markets are indeed signaling that they expect Europe to experience its own lost decade.

投資者也注意到了：歐洲國家的利率大幅下降，德國長期國債收益率僅爲0.7%。這種水平的收益率數字，類似於日本通貨緊縮的情形，市場也的確傳達出了歐洲將會經歷“失去的十年”的信號。

Why is Europe in such dire straits? The conventional wisdom among European policy makers is that we’re looking at the price of irresponsibility: some governments have failed to behave with the prudence a shared currency requires, choosing instead to pander to misguided voters and cling to failed economic doctrines. And if you ask me (and a number of other economists who have looked hard at the issue), this analysis is essentially right, except for one thing: They’ve got the identity of the bad actors wrong.

爲什麼歐洲會陷入如此艱難的處境？歐洲政策制定者當中的慣常思維是，我們看到的是不負責任態度的代價：一些國家的政府採取的行動，並未體現出共同貨幣所需要的審慎，而是選擇迎合受到誤導的選民，堅持已經失敗的經濟理念。如果你問我（或者其他一些嚴肅對待這個問題的經濟學家），這種分析基本上是正確的，只有一點例外：他們把做壞事的是誰給搞錯了。

For the bad behavior at the core of Europe’s slow-motion disaster isn’t coming from Greece, or Italy, or France. It’s coming from Germany.

導致歐洲經濟陷於停頓的最關鍵的惡劣行爲，並非來自希臘、意大利或法國，而是來自德國。

I’m not denying that the Greek government behaved irresponsibly before the crisis, or that Italy has a big problem with stagnating productivity. But Greece is a small country whose fiscal mess is unique, while Italy’s long-run problems aren’t the source of Europe’s deflationary downdraft. If you try to identify countries whose policies were way out of line before the crisis, have hurt Europe since the crisis, and refuse to learn from experience, everything points to Germany as the worst actor.

我並不否認希臘政府在危機之前的行爲很不負責任，也不否認意大利生產力停滯是一個大問題。但是希臘是一個具有獨特財政問題的小國，而意大利的長期問題也並不是歐洲滑向通縮的根源。如果你想要找出哪些國家的政策在危機之前就已經出問題、在危機發生以來傷害歐洲經濟、而且還拒絕吸取教訓，那麼所有的證據都說明，德國是行爲最惡劣的國家。

Consider, in particular, the comparison between Germany and France.

請着重考慮一下德國和法國之間的差異。

France gets a lot of bad press, with much talk in particular about its supposed loss in competitiveness. Such talk greatly exaggerates the reality; you’d never know from most media reports that France runs only a small trade deficit. Still, to the extent that there is an issue here, where does it come from? Has French competitiveness been eroded by excessive growth in costs and prices?

關於法國的負面媒體報道不少，尤其是很多人的說法都宣稱它喪失了競爭力。這樣的說法極大地誇大了事實，從大多數媒體報道中，你永遠也不會知道法國只有很小的貿易逆差。此外，即使法國的確存在這樣的問題，問題的來源在哪裏呢，法國的競爭力是被成本和物價的增長侵蝕了嗎？

No, not at all. Since the euro came into existence in 1999, France’s G.D.P. deflator (the average price of French-produced goods and services) has risen 1.7 percent per year, while its unit labor costs have risen 1.9 percent annually. Both numbers are right in line with the European Central Bank’s target of slightly under 2 percent inflation, and similar to what has happened in the United States. Germany, on the other hand, is way out of line, with price and labor-cost growth of 1 and 0.5 percent, respectively.

不，完全不是。自歐元在1999年誕生以來，法國的GDP平減指數（即法國商品和服務的平均價格的走勢）每年提高了1.7%，而該國單位勞動力的成本則每年提高1.9%。兩個數字都符合歐洲央行(European Central Bank)略低於2%的通脹目標，這與美國發生的情形相似。與法國相對比，德國的數據就非常不妥了，物價和勞動力成本的增長分別是1%和0.5%。

And it’s not just France whose costs are just about where they ought to be. Spain saw rising costs and prices during the housing bubble, but at this point all the excess has been eliminated through years of crushing unemployment and wage restraint. Italian cost growth has arguably been a bit too high, but it’s not nearly as far out of line as Germany is on the low side.

成本大體符合應有水平的不僅僅是法國。西班牙在房地產泡沫期間，成本和物價曾大幅提高，但由於嚴峻的失業率和工資限制持續多年，如今所有揮霍無度的跡象都已不復存在。可以說意大利的成本增長有點太高了，但它偏離正軌的程度，遠沒有德國成本過低的問題嚴重。

In other words, to the extent that there’s anything like a competitiveness problem in Europe, it’s overwhelmingly caused by Germany’s beggar-thy-neighbor policies, which are in effect exporting deflation to its neighbors.

換句話說，即使歐洲真的存在某種競爭力問題，其最主要的原因也是德國以鄰爲壑的政策。這些政策實際上將通貨緊縮輸出到了鄰國。

But what about debt? Isn’t non-German Europe paying the price for past fiscal irresponsibility? Actually, that’s a story about Greece and nobody else. And it’s especially wrong in the case of France, which isn’t facing a fiscal crisis at all; France can currently borrow long-term at a record low interest rate of less than 1 percent, only slightly above the German rate.

那麼債務呢？德國之外的其他歐洲國家難道不是在爲過去不負責任的財政政策付出代價嗎？實際上這種說法只適用於希臘，而非其他國家。對法國來說尤其不成立，該國根本沒有面臨財政危機；法國現在還能以創紀錄的低利率（不到1%）借入長期國債，僅僅略高於德國的水平。

Yet European policy makers seem determined to blame the wrong countries and the wrong policies for their plight. True, the European Commission has floated a plan to stimulate the economy with public investment — but the public outlay is so tiny compared with the problem that the plan is almost a joke. And meanwhile, the commission is warning France, which has the lowest borrowing costs in its history, that it may face fines for not cutting its budget deficit enough.

然而歐洲的政策制定者，似乎下定決心要把自己的困境歸咎於錯誤的對象和錯誤的政策。的確，歐盟委員會(European Commission)提出了一項用公共投資來刺激經濟的方案，然而相對於問題的規模，公共開支如此之小，簡直像個笑話。與此同時，儘管法國現在的舉債成本達到了歷史最低，但歐委會還是警告法國，如果削減財政赤字的力度不足，就會受到罰款。

What about resolving the problem of too little inflation in Germany? Very aggressive monetary policy might do the trick (although I wouldn’t count on it), but German monetary officials are warning against such policies because they might let debtors off the hook.

那麼解決德國通脹水平過低的問題怎麼樣？採取激進的貨幣政策或許能達到這種目的（不過我不敢保證），但是德國負責貨幣政策的官員卻對這種政策提出了警告，因爲這樣債務人就可以擺脫負擔。

What we’re seeing, then, is the immensely destructive power of bad ideas. It’s not entirely Germany’s fault — Germany is a big player in Europe, but it’s only able to impose deflationary policies because so much of the European elite has bought into the same false narrative. And you have to wonder what will cause reality to break in.

這麼說來，我們見到的就是壞主意產生的巨大破壞力量。並非完全要怪德國，儘管德國在歐洲是一個重要的角色，但是它之所以能夠實行通縮性的政策，是因爲有太多數歐洲精英，接受了相同的錯誤論述。這讓人不禁開始思索，要怎樣才能讓他們認清現實。