中國金融外交面對高風險賭局(下)

‘We look forwards’

我們向前看

Venezuela may be an extreme case, but it is far from the only risky bet that China’s overseas development finance regime has become entangled with.

委內瑞拉或許是一個極端案例，但它絕非中國海外發展融資模式押下的唯一高風險賭注。

Six of the top 10 recipients of Chinese development finance commitments between 2013 and 2015 were classified alongside Venezuela in the highest category of default risk ranked by the Paris-based OECD.

2013年至2015年期間得到中國發展融資承諾的前10個接收國中，包括委內瑞拉有6個國家被總部位於巴黎的經合組織(OECD)列入了違約風險最大的國家之列。

By contrast, only two of the top 10 recipients of World Bank development finance fell into the same category.

相比之下，在世行發展融資的前10個接收國中，只有兩個國家處於同一風險級別。

A weighted average of the OECD risk ratings on the top 10 borrowers shows that the Chinese overseas development loan portfolio is about 20 per cent more risky than that of the World Bank, according to Financial Times calculations using figures from the World Bank and Grisons Peak, a boutique investment bank which compiles China data.

英國《金融時報》利用世行和Grisons Peak的數據，計算了中國和世行前十大借款國的OECD風險評估的加權平均值，結果表明中國海外發展貸款組合的風險比世行高20%。 Grisons Peak是一家彙編中國數據的專業投行。

Part of the reason for this comes down to a philosophical divergence.

造成這一現象的部分原因可歸結爲理念的不同。

We assess risk differently than western agencies because we look at the potential for development of a country, says an official at a Chinese policy bank.

我們評估風險的方式不同於西方機構，因爲我們看的是一個國家的發展潛力，中國某政策性銀行的一位官員表示。

They look backwards, we look forwards.

西方機構看過去，我們看未來。

We know that maybe all they need is infrastructure and if you build that infrastructure then their economy will grow, he added.

我們知道，或許他們需要的只是基礎設施，如果建好了基礎設施，他們的經濟就會增長，他補充說。

Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Beijing, buffeted by a mounting domestic debt problem and dwindling returns to state-owned enterprises, is starting to take a colder, harder approach to its overseas development agenda.

然而，有充分的證據表明，受日益嚴峻的國內債務問題及國企效益萎縮困擾的中國政府，已開始對其海外發展議程採取更冷靜、更嚴格的處理方式。

At the country level, some borrowers are seeing their credit lines curbed while, at the project level, Chinese institutions are driving a harder bargain to ensure a viable return.

在國家層面，一些債務國的貸款額度受到了限制，而在項目層面，中資機構正在極力討價還價，以確保經濟效益。

Russia, which with $15.7bn was the top recipient of loan commitments between 2013 and 2015, according to data compiled by Grisons Peak, is expected to see dwindling support from China.

Grisons Peak彙編的數據顯示，2013年至2015年，俄羅斯獲得了中國157億美元的貸款承諾，是所有接收國中最多的 但預計俄羅斯今後獲得來自中國的資金支持將逐漸減少。

Chinese lending this year and next is likely to fall off from the level of recent years because they are keen to keep their own resources and because they do not see so many attractive opportunities within Russia for their investment, says a senior Russian government official, who declined to be identified.

中國今明兩年發放的貸款很可能不如近幾年的水平，因爲他們急於保住自己的資源，也是因爲他們在俄羅斯看不到太多有吸引力的投資機會，一位不願透露姓名的俄羅斯高級官員表示。

In March, Chinese premier Li Keqiang stated that western sanctions had not deterred Chinese investment in Russia.

今年3月，中國國務院總理李克強稱，西方制裁並未阻礙中國在俄羅斯的投資。

But Chinese private businesses have been vocal about the difficulties of doing business in Russia, and even large state-to-state oil projects are still subject to intense talks long after official deals are signed.

但中國民營企業一直抱怨在俄羅斯做生意困難，而且即便是政府間的大型石油項目在正式協議簽署後也還要進行長時間的密集談判。

The weak rouble has also affected Chinese investment interest.

盧布貶值也影響了中國企業的投資興趣。

Zimbabwe and Sudan are two other important recipients encountering a cooling in support, according to the Chinese officials.

根據中國官員的說法，另外兩個遭遇中國減少資金支持的重要貸款接收國是津巴布韋和蘇丹。

Henry Tillman, chief executive of Grisons Peak, says China is starting to strike a balance between the strategic partnerships it forms with countries and the necessity to mitigate credit risk.

Grisons Peak首席執行官亨利•蒂爾曼(Henry Tillman)稱，中國正開始在建立戰略合作伙伴關係與降低信貸風險之間尋找平衡。

In some cases policy banks have been increasing proposed interest rates, in some cases shortening maturities [on loans], in some cases refusing to fund previously committed second tranches of loans, Mr Tillman says.

蒂爾曼表示：在某些情況下，政策性銀行要求更高的利率，在某些情況下縮短（貸款）期限，還有些情況則拒絕發放先前承諾的第二期貸款。

In tandem, the newly launched China-led multilateral development banks and funds such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank are spreading risk by lending alongside partners such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, he says.

他表示，新成立的亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(AIIB)等中國主導的多邊開發銀行和基金正在通過與世行、亞洲開發銀行(ADB)、歐洲復興開發銀行(EBRD)等夥伴合作放貸來分散風險。

Continental shift

整個非洲大陸都感受到變化

In Africa, the chill in China’s embrace is evident.

在非洲，中國的態度降溫是很明顯的。

A cancellation by the Ghanaian government last year of half a $3bn loan extended in 2010 was the result of CDB tightening terms on the loan.

由於國開行收緊了貸款條件，加納政府去年叫停了2010年一項30億美元貸款協議中的半數貸款。

The bank raised the volume of oil it demanded as payment for the loan from 13,000 to 15,000 barrels a day, making it uneconomic, according to a paper by Thomas Chen, former economic officer at the US Embassy in Ghana.

美國駐加納大使館前經濟官員Thomas Chen在一篇文章中稱，該行要求用於償還貸款的石油數量從每天1.3萬桶提高至1.5萬桶，導致這筆交易對加納而言變得不划算。

Shades of Ghana’s experience are being felt elsewhere on the continent.

非洲大陸其他國家對加納經歷的問題也感同身受。

Countries that once saw China as a cash cow are starting to return to other sources of global capital due to a rise in Chinese interest rates, says Tang Xiaoyang, a China-Africa scholar at Tsinghua University.

清華大學(Tsinghua University)中非關係學者唐曉陽表示，由於中資機構貸款利率提高，曾把中國視爲搖錢樹的非洲國家開始轉向其他全球資本來源。

A lot of China’s newly pledged loans are not [official development assistance loans] but are rather market activity, so African governments are less interested in taking them if they can find other better sources, Mr Tang says.

中國新承諾的很多貸款並非（官方發展援助貸款），而是市場活動，因此，非洲各國政府對這些貸款不那麼感興趣了，如果他們能找到其他更好資金來源的話，唐曉陽說。

Another factor in the flagging popularity of Chinese finance is that it is often tied to the execution of an infrastructure project by Chinese companies sourcing Chinese equipment and employing mostly Chinese workers.

中國融資受歡迎程度下降的另一個因素是，貸款經常捆綁基建工程，而這些基建工程要由中國公司採購中國設備、主要僱傭中國工人實施。

For as long as the costs of such projects were far lower than competitors, recipient countries were willing to accept such terms.

只要這些工程的成本遠低於競爭對手，接收國就願意接受這樣的條件。

But recent examples of white elephants are forcing them to rethink.

但是近期一些工程中斷的例子正在迫使他們進行反思。

High-speed railway diplomacy is a case in point.

高鐵外交就是一個例子。

Agatha Kratz, associate policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, says such projects are rarely commercially viable because of the technology and construction costs involved.

歐洲對外關係委員會(European Council on Foreign Relations)副政策研究員阿加莎•克拉茨(Agatha Kratz)說，考慮到技術和建設成本，此類項目很少具有商業可行性。

Even though about 20 Chinese high-speed rail projects are officially under discussion around the world, only one in Turkey is operational outside China, Ms Kratz says.

克拉茨表示，雖然全球範圍內正式討論的中國高鐵項目有20來個，但在中國之外只有一個在土耳其的項目已經投入運營。

It is not only the railways that have deviated from the original plan.

不僅僅是高鐵項目偏離了最初規劃。

As part of celebrations to mark the 67th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China at the end of last month, Venezuelan and Chinese government officials gathered with foreign diplomats at a reception in Caracas.

在上月底爲慶祝中華人民共和國成立67週年而舉辦的活動中，中委兩國官員及外交官出席了在加拉加斯舉行的招待會。

When the time came for speeches, according to one of those present, the Chinese side talked of joint investments to build a better future.

據一位到過現場的人士透露，發表演講時，中方談到了共同投資建設更美好未來。

In response, the Venezuelan side waved socialist flags and called for the two nations to join together to smash global capitalism, one small example of how China and its beneficiaries have lost touch with one another.

作爲迴應，委內瑞拉方面揮舞社會主義旗幟，呼籲兩國聯手粉碎全球資本主義。從這件小事可以看出，中國與其受惠國之間脫節多麼嚴重。