爲什麼俄羅斯遠東地區對中國如此重要

VLADIVOSTOK -- Russia is seldom thought of as an Asia-Pacific country. Yet it is one -- thanks to its Far East. The Russian Far East is a huge area of northeastern Eurasia stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean. Allowing Russia direct access to the Asia-Pacific region, the RFE makes it a truly transcontinental nation, the only other such a country being the U.S.

符拉迪沃斯託克—俄羅斯很少被認爲是一個亞太國家，儘管它的確屬於亞太地區——多虧了它的遠東地區。俄遠東地區是亞歐大陸東北部的一大片區域，從貝加爾湖延伸到太平洋，使得俄羅斯名副其實的屬於亞太地區。遠東地區使俄羅斯成爲一個橫跨大陸的國家，除此之外唯一一個橫跨大陸的國家是美國。

The RFE contains all kinds of natural treasures -- oil and natural gas, iron ore and copper, diamonds and gold, pristine fresh water (Lake Baikal alone has 20 percent of the world's unfrozen surface freshwater), timber and fish stocks (for example, the Sea of Okhotsk is one of the most biologically productive areas of the world ocean).

遠東地區蘊含着豐富多樣的資源——石油、天然氣、鐵礦石、銅、鑽石、黃金、以及純淨的淡水（僅僅貝加爾湖就擁有世界上20%的融化的地表淡水）、木材、魚類資源（例如，鄂霍次克海是世界海洋中生物生產力最強的地區）

The entire vastness of the RFE contains just over 6 million residents. Being remote from, and having tenuous transportation links to, the country's European core, suffering from underdevelopment and the lack of infrastructure, the RFE is a source of constant concern for Moscow. Ever since Russia acquired these territories, there have been recurring worries that they are at the risk of being lost due to external aggression, foreign encroachment, internal separatism -- or a combination of the three.

偌大的遠東地區卻僅僅有600多萬居民。遠東地區距離俄羅斯歐洲核心地區遙遠，交通連接薄弱，飽受發展滯後和基礎設施匱乏之苦，遠東地區成了莫斯科一直以來的頭痛之源。自從獲得這部分領土之後，俄羅斯就就一直擔心它會因爲外部侵略、外國侵佔、內部分裂或者三者的綜合而失去遠東地區。

China's Looming Shadow

中國逼近的陰影

The RFE has historically had an ambivalent relationship with its giant neighbor, China. It is seen as an indispensable economic partner. Yet China is simultaneously a source of threat. After all, the southern part of what is now the Russian Far East used to be under the Qing's nominal sovereignty until the second half of the 19th century. Despite the fact that, at the official level, the border issue between Moscow and Beijing is fully settled by legal treaties, there are lingering concerns in Russia that China might in the future reclaim the land. This is not helped by the well-known sentiments of many in China who still see the 19th-century border treaties with the Russian Empire as "unfair" and count them as part of "the century of humiliation."

俄羅斯遠東地區在歷史上與它的強大的中國鄰居曾有過一段喜憂參半的時期。中國被俄視爲必不可少的經濟夥伴，儘管中國同時也是一個危險的根源。不過畢竟在19世紀後半葉以前，遠東地區的南部地區還是處於清朝的主權管轄範圍的。儘管莫斯科與北京關於邊界問題已經在官方層面上通過法律條文完全解決了，但是俄羅斯一直有人在擔心中國會在不遠的將來會重新索要回這片土地。許多中國人都認爲19世紀與沙皇俄國簽訂的條約是“不平等”的，並且認爲這些條約是“屈辱的世紀”的一部分，這種普遍的觀點又會助長俄羅斯的擔憂。

For the time being, Moscow and Beijing are "strategic partners," with the relationship increasingly resembling a quasi-alliance. One major reason China needs a strong bond with Russia lies in the Russian Far East.

目前莫斯科與北京是“戰略合作伙伴”，並且二者的關係正逐步向準聯盟靠近。中國需要同俄羅斯維持緊密關係的一個重要原因就是遠東地區。

First, Beijing wants to have a secure and peaceful northern border with Russia, so that it can concentrate its military resources and planning on other strategic theaters, above all in the Western Pacific. The memories of confrontation with the Soviet Union, when China had to expend enormous efforts on reinforcing its frontiers with a hostile neighbor to the north, have not yet faded away.

首先，北京想同俄羅斯維持一個穩定和平的北方邊界，這樣它就可以集中他的軍事資源應對其他的戰略地區，主要是西太平洋地區。與前蘇聯的對抗，中國不得不花費巨大的精力來加強他同北方敵人的邊界（防衛力量），而中國對此還記憶猶新。

Second, China's voracious economy needs the RFE's natural resources, which makes sense not only economically but also, at least as much, strategically. There are signs that China is beginning to see Eastern Russia as an important "strategic rear area", a proximate overland supplier of a range of vital primary commodities. This is directly related to China's intensifying contest with the U.S. for primacy in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing is increasingly worried that, if this rivalry comes to a head, Washington may use its trump card -- launching a naval blockade of the sea lanes through which China receives most of its imported primary growing dependence on imported raw materials and rising concerns about the fraught relations with the U.S., and it's Indo-Pacific allies, seem to have resulted in Beijing's attaching much greater priority to the RFE than was the case five or 10 years ago.

第二點 中國經濟增長的巨大需求需要俄羅斯遠東地區的自然資源，這在經濟和至少戰略上都說得通。有跡象表明中國開始將俄羅斯遠東地區視作重要的後方戰略區域；一個多樣且重要的初級產品（未經加工或因銷售習慣而略作加工的產品）的內陸直接供應地。這直接和中國強化同美國在亞太地區的主導權的競爭有關。北京愈來越擔憂如果這場競爭激化，華盛頓可能使用其殺手鐗-對中國海上通道進行封鎖。中國大多數初級產品進口依賴於海上通道。對原材料進口不斷加強的的獨立性和對對美關係極其印度洋盟友的擔憂似乎已經使北京，相比5年10年以來，將俄羅斯遠東地區視作重要目標

Until recently, the Chinese economic presence in the RFE was quite limited. The number of Chinese migrants in the RFE has also been modest -- no more than 300,000 -- most of them as sojourners rather than permanent residents. There are, however, indications that China's footprint in the RFE is about to grow. China's interest in the RFE has coincided with Moscow's hour of need. Although just a few years ago the Kremlin was reluctant to allow the Chinese direct access to the most valuable industries of the Far East, it had to change its mind when faced with Western isolation over Ukraine and now having few alternatives but China. Moving, or rather being pushed, closer to China amidst confrontation with the West, Moscow has lifted formal and informal restrictions on Chinese investments that existed hitherto and begun to actively court Chinese capitals.

直到最近，中國在遠東地區的經濟存在還很有限。遠東地區中國移民的數量也不是很多—不超過300000—大部分都只是暫住居民而不是永久居民。然而有跡象表明中國在遠東地區的存在感將要加強，中國在遠東地區的利益正好與莫斯科的需求一致。儘管幾年前克里姆林宮還是不情願中國直接插手遠東地區最有價值的產業，但是現在俄由於烏克蘭問題而受到西方的孤立，它不得不改變想法了，並且除了中國它也沒有多少備選的國家。莫斯科在於西方的對抗中，更接近或者說被迫接近中國，它已經放寬了目前對中國投資的正式或非正式的限制，並且開始積極尋求中方的投資。

The main thrust has been in the hydrocarbon sector, epitomized by the gargantuan 400 billion, 30-year contract signed in May 2014 by Gazprom and CNPC to supply the RFE's gas to China. In other landmark developments, focused on eastern Russia, Moscow agreed to sell Chinese companies stakes in the country's most lucrative oil field and the world's third biggest copper field.

最主要的推動力是在油氣方面，集中體現在2014年5月俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司（Gazprom）與中國石油天然氣公司（CNPC）簽訂的遠東地區向中國提供天然氣的協議，總額達極其龐大的4000億美元，時間長達30年。其他具有里程碑意義的進展方面，集中在俄東部地區，莫斯科同意出售給中方公司俄羅斯最賺錢的油田和世界上第三大銅礦的股票。

Recent Russo-Chinese deals in the RFE have not been limited to resource-extraction industries. In 2014, Russian and Chinese government-affiliated companies announced they would jointly develop Zarubino port, strategically located in the south of the RFE at the junction of Russian, North Korean and Chinese borders. The port at Zarubino will give China direct access to the Sea of Japan, which it has long coveted. The port, with the expected throughput capacity of 100 million tons, will mostly handle Chinese cargoes. Chinese companies have also become the principal investors in a large-scale integrated casino resort near Vladivostok, which is slated to open in 2015 and aims to service mostly visitors from China.

最近中俄在遠東地區的貿易不再僅限於資源開採業。2014年中俄政府的附屬公司宣佈他們將共同開發扎魯比諾港，這個港口位於遠東地區南部，是中朝俄三國交界的地方，極具戰略意義。中國可以通過位於扎魯比諾的港口直接進入日本海，這時中國覬覦已久的。這個港口，預期有一億噸的吞吐量，將主要裝卸中國的貨物。中國企業也是一個位於符拉迪沃斯託克附近的大興綜合性賭場度假村的主要投資者，該度假村預定在2015年開業並且服務對象主要是中國遊客。

Speaking at Saint Petersburg's Economic Forum in May 2014, Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao called for the linking up of the RFE with northeast China in order to "turn the two into a big market -- a new economic bloc in Asia." In dealing with the RFE, Beijing can deploy its giant state-owned corporations, which boast some of the deepest pockets in the world and are driven by the government's strategic calculations as much as by purely commercial considerations. Compared to Western companies with shareholder responsibility, they can make hefty investments with much longer planning horizons and without expecting short-term returns. This gives China a significant advantage in the RFE, where business projects often require massive financial outlays, are accompanied with significant risks, and do not promise quick profits.

在2014年5月的聖彼得堡經濟論壇上，中國國家副主席李源潮發表講話並呼籲加強遠東地區與中國東北部地區的銜接，爲了“是這兩個地區合成爲一個大市場——一個亞洲的新的經濟聯盟”。在對待遠東地區方面，北京可以部署他的龐大的國有企業，其中一些是世界上經濟實力最雄厚的企業，國企以此爲傲。這些企業是爲了國家戰略計劃服務並且純粹的爲了追求經濟利益。和西方股份制的公司相比，它們可以用更加長遠的目光進行大型的投資，並且不要求短期的回報，這使得中國在遠東地區有了一個極其重要的優勢。（因爲）遠東地區的投資經常是需要數額龐大的支出並且伴隨着明顯的風險，而這些投資也不一定能獲得快速的收益。

The RFE is one piece in China's long-term geopolitical game aimed at creating zones of influence along its continental frontiers in Eurasia. Two other major areas, where Beijing pursues similar goals of securing its borders, getting preferential access to rich natural resources, and probably gaining there a degree of political control in the future, are continental Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Incidentally, large parts of these regions, like the RFE, were in the past under China's sovereignty or suzerainty. Another common feature of Beijing's policy toward the "rear areas" is to bind them up with the neighboring regions of China: southwestern China (especially Yunnan province) for Southeast Asia, western China (Xinjiang) for Central Asia, and northeastern China (Heilongjiang) for the RFE.

遠東地區是中國長遠的地緣政治策略的一部分，目的是爲了在亞歐大陸上創造一個沿着中國大陸邊界的勢力範圍。另外兩個主要的地區是東南亞和中亞，在這些地方中國想達到類似的目的，即保衛邊疆，獲得對豐富得然資源的優先開採權，並且將來可能對這些地方擁有一定程度上的政治控制。順便說一下，在過去，中國對這些地方都曾經擁有主權或宗主權。北京對於他的“後方”地區的政策的一個共同的特點是把這些地區同他們相鄰的地區捆綁在一塊：中國西南部（尤其是雲南省）和東南亞，中國西部（新疆）和中亞，中國東北部（黑龍江）和遠東地區。

Despite its seeming enthusiasm about the growing intimacy with Beijing, Moscow is aware of the costs and risks of embracing China. China's privileged access to the RFE could lead to Chinese economic dominion which would not only exclude other foreign competitors but can also begin to squeeze Russian companies out of the RFE. Economic sinicization may, sooner or later, set the stage for the erosion of sovereign control

儘管莫斯科和中國好像打得火熱，它也清楚向中國靠近的代價。中國在遠東地區的特權可能會確立中國在該地區經濟上的統治地位。這不僅會趕走其他國家的競爭者也會把俄羅斯的企業從遠東地區排擠出去。經濟上的中國化,遲早都會爲弱化（俄羅斯在該地區的）主權控制打好基礎。

There is a probability that China's exclusive economic penetration of the RFE would eventually be followed by a rising degree of geopolitical control, ultimately jeopardizing Russian sovereignty and threatening to turn the RFE into not just a raw material appendix but also a military-strategic base for China in the North Pacific, especially if Moscow enters a full-fledged alliance with Beijing. The RFE could become exactly what some Chinese prefer to call it -- "Outer Manchuria," a territory where Russian sovereignty is getting increasingly tenuous and where matters are decided in Beijing and Harbin rather than Moscow or Vladivostok.

中國在遠東地區的排他性的經濟滲透很有可能最終會導致一個（對該地區）更高程度的地緣政治控制，到最後會危機俄羅斯的主權，並且有把遠東地區不僅當做他的原材料提供地而且還是一個太平洋北部的的中國的軍事基地的威脅，尤其是如果俄羅斯成了中國的一個全面的盟友。遠東地區有可能真的成爲一些中國人稱呼它的那樣—“外滿洲里”，在該地區俄羅斯的控制力正在減弱並且（關於它的）重大事項是由北京和哈爾濱決定而不是莫斯科和符拉迪沃斯託克。

Some security experts in Russia even discuss a scenario in which China moves to annex the RFE by a surprise attack. This is not to say that such an invasion is imminent or likely. However, it cannot be ruled out, if Russia becomes too weak -- particularly if it descends into chaos due to a severe political or economic crisis. If China tries to grab the RFE, this may draw in other players Would the U.S. pre-emptively occupy Chukotka, Magadan, Kamchatka and the Arctic shore of Yakutia before Chinese enter these territories? And would Japan, in turn, take control of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands?

俄羅斯的一些安全部門專家甚至討論了一種情景——中國通過突襲來奪取遠東地區。這並不是說這種侵略即將發生或者有可能發生。但是如果俄羅斯變得很薄弱——尤其是當它由於一些政治或者經濟危機而突然陷入混亂的時候，並不排除有這種可能。如果中國奪取遠東地區，這可能會招來其他國家。美國會先發制人的搶在中國前面佔領楚科奇，勘察加，馬加丹和雅庫特的北極海岸嗎？並且日本會隨後佔領庫頁島和千島羣島嗎？

The United States and the Russian Far East

美國和俄羅斯遠東地區

Sarah Palin may not have been too far from the truth when she said that she could see Russia from her backyard. In fact, Alaska's Little Diomede Island sits just over two miles from Russia's Big Diomede Island in the middle of the Bering Strait.

Sarah Palin說她在她的後院裏能夠看見俄羅斯，這可能真不是在說謊。實際上，阿拉斯加的小代奧米德島僅僅距離俄羅斯的白令海峽中心的大代奧米德島兩英里開外。

The RFE's may not at present have a major economic importance for the U.S., as America has its own abundant supply of many of the natural resources the RFE has to offer. However, from a geopolitical perspective, the RFE's significance for the U.S. is only growing, as Sino-American rivalry in the Asia-Pacific shows no signs of abatement.

現在遠東地區對美國來說可能並沒有重要的經濟價值，因爲許多遠東地區能夠提供的自然資源美國都有他自己的充足的來源。然而從地緣角度上看，遠東地區對於美國的重要性正在增加，因爲中美在亞太地區的對抗絲毫沒有減弱的跡象。

"The greater involvement of Asia's developed economies, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, would help offset China's rising economic influence in the RFE and contribute to a more stable equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific."

“亞洲發達經濟體，像是日本、韓國、新加坡（在遠東地區的）更多的參與，會幫助抵消中國在遠東地區的逐漸增加的經濟影響，並且有助於亞太地區的更加穩定的（勢力）平衡”

As previously noted, China seeks to secure "rear areas" along its continental periphery -- in mainland Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the RFE. Control over them would greatly expand Beijing's sway in Eurasia and make it feel more confident vis-à-vis Washington. Of the three mentioned areas, the RFE carries an added significance because of its adjacency to North America as well as fronting the ever more significant Arctic. The higher the level of Chinese penetration of the RFE, the more risks it poses potentially for the U.S.

正如之前提到過的，中國試圖把它的“後方”同其相鄰地區（東南亞大陸、中亞和遠東地區）捆綁在一塊，對這些地區的控制會大大擴大北京在亞歐大陸的影響並且使北京在與華盛頓的角力中更加自信。在上面提到的三個地區中，遠東地區更加重要，因爲它與美國相鄰並且正對着一直以來極具戰略意義的北冰洋。中國對遠東地區的滲透越深入，對美國的威脅就越大。

American interest in the fate of the RFE would not be without historical precedent: it was partly thanks to the U.S. diplomatic intervention that the Russian Far East remained Russian, when in the early 1920s Washington successfully pressed Japan, America's main geopolitical opponent at the time, to pull out its troops from the region.

美國對於遠東地區命運的關注並不是沒有先例：這一定程度上多虧了20世紀20年代美國政治上的干預，成功迫使日本撤回了在該地區的軍隊，使俄羅斯遠東地區仍屬於俄羅斯，這時候日本還是美國主要的地緣政治上的對手。

The goal of the U.S. should not be to keep China out of the RFE, for it is neither possible nor desirable. Rather, it should work toward enabling the RFE to integrate with the Asia-Pacific economies, so that China does not become the predominant player. Russia would definitely welcome such a strategy, as it fully corresponds with its own strong interest in having economic alternatives to China. Moreover, Russians are aware that China will not provide the RFE with what it needs, no less than cash, advanced technologies and expertise. This is precisely where America and other developed economies retain a remarkable edge over China.

美國的目標不應該是把中國從遠東地區的排擠出去，因爲這不可能也是不可取的。相反，美國要確保使遠東地區整合到亞太經濟體中，這樣中國對於遠東地區就不能佔領導地爲了。俄羅斯肯定會對這個戰略表示歡迎，因爲這正好滿足它的強烈需求——找到俄羅斯在經濟方面中國的替代者。並且俄羅斯知道中國提供不了遠東地區需要的東西——不僅僅是投資，還有先進的技術和專業知識。在這些方面美國和其他發達經濟體相比與中國擁有很大的優勢

Of course, the Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia now make it difficult for the U.S. to invest in the RFE. However, Washington would be well-advised to at least let the Asians do business with the RFE rather than pressuring them into joining Western anti-Russia sanctions. The greater involvement of Asia's developed economies, such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, would help offset China's rising economic influence in the RFE and contribute to a more stable equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific.

當然，美國因爲烏克蘭問題而對俄羅斯的制裁使得它很難向遠東地區投資。然而，華盛頓也會被建議至少要讓亞洲國家在遠東地區貿易而不是迫使他們加入西方的反俄製裁中來。亞洲的發達經濟體，像是日本、韓國、新加坡，在遠東地區的更多的參與，會有助於抵消中國對於遠東地區逐漸增長的經濟影響同時也有助於建立亞太地區更加穩定的平衡。

Artyom Lukin：Professor Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia

Artyom Lukin：俄羅斯符拉迪沃斯託克的遠東聯邦大學教授。