Not all Germans believe in God,” said Jacques Delors, former European Commission president, “but they all believe in the Bundesbank.” There is some truth to this, which is why it is not hard to understand the humiliation felt by the economically orthodox citizens of the bloc’s leading nation, as common policies come under attack from national capitals and even from Europe’s own institutions. Talk in German media is of deception, abuse and exploitation, with Berlin losing every battle and its citizens paying a hefty price to keep the eurozone intact. Pressure is mounting at home to push back, to score points in the national interest. Berlin’s ability to resist will be crucial to Europe’s fate. First, it is important to understand why so many Germans feel victimised. The revered Bundesbank has been repeatedly outvoted at the European Central Bank. Until the euro’s introduction in 1999, it in effect conducted monetary policy for the entire bloc. Today, in the popular view, it is ignored, its stability-oriented approach replaced by an ECB policy that tries to compensate for failures in other policy areas. For Germans, the victory of the anti-austerity Syriza party in Greece shows Europe’s approach to the debt-racked nation has failed. Despite generous official help, it looks ever more unlikely that the loans will be repaid in full. There is also anger at last week’s ECB decision to engage in quantitative easing. If monetary policy were conducted for Germany alone, such a stimulatory asset-purchase programme would be neither necessary nor desirable — indeed, low interest rates harm many German savers. Many Germans feel they no longer have reliable European partners. Paris and Rome are ignoring the hard-won fiscal compact. The UK is pursuing self-interest on integration. Syriza wants further second world war reparations. And France has declared that, as a big nation, it is not subject to Europe’s rules. To be fair, the German government — in particular Angela Merkel, chancellor, and Wolfgang Schäuble, finance minister — deserve credit for their handling of the crisis. They have taken responsibility for the bloc, making big financial commitments and supporting institutional reform. They have also steered their own nation and Europe as a whole in a pragmatic direction. Yet, with anti-European public opinion mounting at home, it is harder to stay on such a path. Berlin faces three challenges. First, it must convince voters that what is good for crisis-hit countries is good for them. Two-thirds of German exports go to the EU, and a similar proportion of foreign investment, so only as part of a dynamic Europe can they prosper long term. In the short run, this means structural re¬form of labour and product markets is needed. But so are expansionary policies such as the QE scheme, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s 315bn investment fund and a sufficiently flexible fiscal policy to stabilise demand in hard-hit nations. The second challenge is to convince Germans to be more patient and more humble. Complaints that neighbours avoid reforms are misguided; most have taken steps that surpass those of Germany’s Agenda 2010 a decade ago. Germany should remember from its own stint as the “sick man of Europe” that structural reforms take time to work. Germany’s third challenge is to take a stronger leadership role; its political and economic stability impose a particular responsibility to do so. Europe needs to pursue more institutional reforms to deepen integration and strengthen co-ordination on fiscal rules and structural policies, which will require Germany to build a closer partnership with other Europeans and to convince France to become a strong partner once more. Domestic politics make it tempting for Berlin, like its neighbours, to pursue a self-interested national policy. That would impose a great economic and political cost, on Europe as a whole but especially on Germany itself. The government needs to explain why a more integrated Europe is in the nation’s own best interests. Germans need to accept that they are not Europe’s victims but, rather, destined to be among its leaders. “不是所有德國人都信仰上帝，”前歐盟委員會(European Commission)主席雅克•德洛爾(Jacques Delors)說，“但他們都信仰德國央行(Bundesbank)。” 這句話道出了部分事實。在歐元區共同政策受到成員國政府乃至歐洲自身機構抨擊之際，我們之所以不難理解這個歐元區經濟領頭羊國家秉持正統經濟觀的公民感覺受到羞辱，原因也在於此。由於柏林方面在每一場鬥爭中均成爲輸家、而德國公民爲保持歐元區的完整又付出了高昂代價，德國媒體上充斥着關於欺騙、濫用和剝削的討論。德國國內要求政府進行反擊以維護國家利益的壓力正在增大。柏林方面抵禦這種壓力的能力，將對歐洲的命運起到至關重要的影響。 首先，有必要弄明白爲什麼如此多的德國人感覺利益受損。備受尊敬的德國央行歐洲央行(ECB)的表決中多次淪爲少數派。1999年歐元問世前，德國央行實際上主導着後來的所有歐元區國家的貨幣政策。如今，人們普遍認爲它被忽略了，其以穩定爲導向的方針被歐洲央行一項旨在彌補其他政策領域失誤的政策所取代。 對德國人來說，希臘反緊縮的激進左翼聯盟黨(Syriza)的勝選證明，歐洲對這個債務纏身國家的應對之策已經失敗。儘管得到了慷慨的官方援助，但希臘全額償還貸款的可能性看起來越來越低。 德國人還對上週歐洲央行決定實施量化寬鬆感到憤怒。如果貨幣政策只爲德國實施，那麼這種刺激性的資產購買計劃將是既無必要也不可取的——實際上，低利率損害了許多德國儲戶的利益。 許多德國人認爲，他們再也沒有可靠的歐洲夥伴了。法國和意大利不再理睬來之不易的財政契約。英國在一體化上只追求自身利益。希臘激進左翼聯盟希望進一步向德國追討二戰賠款。法國已宣佈，它作爲一個大國不受制於歐洲的規則。 公平地說，德國政府——尤其是總理安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)和財長沃夫岡•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble)——處理此次危機的做法值得稱讚。他們擔負起了對歐元區的責任，承諾提供大量資金並支持機構改革。他們還將本國及整個歐洲引向了務實的方向。然而，隨着國內反歐洲輿論的興起，維持這一路線變得更加困難。 德國政府面臨三大挑戰。首先，它必須說服選民相信，有利於那些受危機打擊國家的措施對他們自己也是有利的。德國三分之二的出口進入歐盟市場，對外投資的比例也大致如此，因此，只有成爲充滿活力的歐洲的一部分，德國人才能享有長期繁榮。在短期內，這意味着需要對勞動力市場和產品市場進行結構性改革。但同時也需要實施量化寬鬆等擴張性政策，建立歐盟委員會主席讓-克洛德•容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)提議的3150億歐元投資基金，並採取能穩定受危機打擊國家需求的、足夠靈活的財政政策。 第二大挑戰是說服德國人要更有耐心、更加謙虛。有些德國人抱怨鄰國逃避改革，這些怨言是錯誤的；大多數國家已經採取行動，其力度超過了10年前德國的“2010議程”(Agenda 2010)。德國應該記得自己還是“歐洲病夫”的那段歲月，並回憶起結構性改革要發揮作用是需要時間的。 德國的第三大挑戰是發揮更強大的領導作用；其政治和經濟穩定性使得它對此負有特別的責任。歐洲需要進行更多的機構改革，以深化一體化並加強對財政規則和結構性政策的協調，這就需要德國與其他歐洲國家建立更緊密的合作關係，並說服法國再次成爲其強大的合作伙伴。 國內政治使得德國像其鄰國一樣，忍不住想追求一種自利的國家政策。那將對整個歐洲、尤其是德國自身造成巨大的經濟和政治代價。德國政府需要解釋爲何更加一體化的歐洲才最符合德國自身的利益。德國人需要接受一點：他們不是歐洲的受害者，恰恰相反，他們註定會成爲歐洲的領導者之一。
