美國下一步對朝鮮的三個選項

Victor Cha, a White House adviser on North Korea during the George W Bush administration, described the reclusive nation as “the land of lousy options”. It is a reality the Trump administration is now facing weeks after it ordered a review of its strategy toward the aggressive, isolated country.

曾在小布什(George W Bush)政府期間擔任白宮朝鮮事務顧問的維克托?查(Victor Cha)，把朝鮮這個封閉的國家描述爲“艱難選擇之地”。這是特朗普(Trump)政府下令重審美國對這個充滿侵略性、與世隔絕的國家的戰略幾周之後所面臨的現實。

Rex Tillerson, US secretary of state, will visit Asia next week in an attempt to “try and generate a new approach to North Korea”. The former Exxon chief may struggle to find fresh ideas. Here are his options:

國務卿雷克斯?蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)將於下週出訪亞洲，試圖“嘗試和形成一種新的對朝策略”。這位前埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)掌舵人也許很難找到新想法。這裏是他的幾個選項：

Cut a deal

達成協議

On the campaign trail last year, Donald Trump said he would be willing to sit down for a burger with Kim Jong Un.

在去年的競選中，唐納德?特朗普(Donald Trump)表示，他願意和金正恩(Kim Jong Un)一起坐下來吃漢堡。

The suggestion, while unlikely given North Korea’s supreme leader has not ventured past his own borders since he ascended to power, raised the prospect that the US under a self-professed dealmaker president could strike a landmark agreement.

鑑於朝鮮最高領導人自上臺後從未冒險離開本國，這一提議不大可能實現，但它增加了自封爲交易撮合者的總統領導下的美國與朝鮮達成一項里程碑式協議的可能性。

The notion has some currency among North Korea watchers, who believe the country would be more inclined to negotiate on its nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes if its back was not against the wall.

這個想法在一定程度上獲得了朝鮮觀察家的支持。他們認爲，如果不是毫無退路，朝鮮將更願意就其核武器和彈道武器計劃展開談判。

“If the US really hopes to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula, it should stop looking for ways to stifle North Korea’s economy and undermine Kim Jong Un’s regime and start finding ways to make Pyongyang feel more secure,” wrote John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University, in a recent Foreign Affairs article.

不久前，延世大學(Yonsei University)教授魯樂漢(John Delury)在《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)撰文稱：“如果美國真的希望實現朝鮮半島的和平，那麼就應該停止想方設法扼殺朝鮮的經濟和破壞金正恩政權，而要開始想辦法使平壤方面感到更安全。”

“This might sound counterintuitive. But consider this: North Korea will start focusing on its prosperity instead of its self-preservation only once it no longer has to worry about its own destruction.”

“這聽起來可能違反直覺，但請考慮一點，朝鮮只有不再擔心自己被摧毀，纔會開始關注其國內繁榮，而不是自衛。”

Such a deal might entail the cancellation of US-South Korea military drills or even the prospect of an official peace treaty on the Korean peninsula in exchange for a moratorium on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development.

這樣的協議也許包括取消美韓軍事演習，甚至包括就朝鮮半島問題簽署正式和平條約、換取朝鮮暫停開發核武器的可能性。

On Monday Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said such a “dual suspension” would help break the security dilemma. Beijing, a long-time ally of Pyongyang, is widely seen as pivotal player in any scenario.

中國外長王毅週一表示，這種“雙暫停”將有助於擺脫安全困境。外界廣泛認爲，朝鮮的長期盟友中國在任何解決方案中都是一個關鍵角色。

The carrot and stick

胡蘿蔔加大棒

For most officials and experts, including former US director of national intelligence James Clapper, the possibility of voluntary de-nuclearisation is a lost cause.

對於包括前美國國家情報總監(DNI)詹姆斯?克拉珀(James Clapper)在內的大多數官員和專家而言，朝鮮自願棄核的可能性根本不存在。

Yet for others it must be the first step. Without it, the world is simply “borrowing tomorrow’s peace”, according to Chun Yung-woo, a former leader of South Korean negotiations with the North.

但對於其他人來說，棄核必須是第一步。曾任韓國對朝談判主要代表的千英宇(Chun Yung-woo)表示，沒有這一步，世界只是在“透支明天的和平”。

Previous deals with North Korea have been undercut by mutual distrust and a lack of transparency in Pyongyang. The breathing space gained from reduced tensions ultimately helped the regime propel its weapons programmes.

以前與朝鮮達成的協議，因彼此猜忌和平壤方面缺乏透明度而受到削弱。從緊張減輕中獲得的喘息空間，最終幫助朝鮮政權加快了其武器研發計劃。

Critics of a deal scenario, including Mr Chun, argue that sanctions must be ratcheted up to the point where the Kim regime is on the edge of collapse. Then aggressive diplomacy must be enacted to force Mr Kim to abandon his nuclear ambitions.

包括千英宇在內的對達成協議的前景持批評態度的人認爲，必須加大制裁力度，直到金正恩政權走到崩潰邊緣。接着，必須啓動強勢的外交攻勢，迫使金正恩放棄他的核野心。

Such experts believe the young marshal will only negotiate when faced with overthrow at home borne out of economic turmoil.

這些專家認爲，只有在國內面對經濟動盪引發的政權被推翻危險時，這位年輕元帥纔會進行談判。

“Sanctions should be a tool to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table,” said Yang Moo-jin from the University of North Korean studies in Seoul.

“制裁應該成爲使朝鮮回到談判桌的工具，”首爾朝鮮研究大學(University of North Korean Studies)的楊武仁(Yang Moo-jin)表示。

This line of reasoning, however, is undermined by the ineffectiveness of the current round of sanctions, the most severe yet.

然而，當前這一輪制裁未奏效，削弱了這種推理思路。這輪制裁是迄今最嚴厲的一輪。

The US could bolster these measures with a secondary boycott of Chinese companies doing business with North Korea, said Kim Jaechun, a professor at Sogang University, but that “would do irreparable harm to its ties with China”.

西江大學(Sogang University)教授金宰春(Kim Jae-chun)說，美國可以通過抵制跟朝鮮做生意的中國企業，加大制裁力度，但這“將給美中關係造成不可挽回的損害”。

Another option would be to freeze North Korea out of the international banking system — a possibility that gained ground on Wednesday with reports that Swift, the financial messaging service, had banned three North Korean banks.

另一個選項是把朝鮮趕出國際銀行體系——週三，這種可能性有所加大，有報道稱，金融通訊服務商Swift已禁止三家朝鮮銀行使用其系統。

Pre-emptive strike

先發制人的打擊

The likely consequences of an attack on North Korea would be so catastrophic the option is rarely discussed seriously.

攻擊朝鮮造成的可能後果將極爲慘重，以至於這一選項很少被認真討論。

In the 1990s US President Bill Clinton considered it, only to be dissuaded by estimates of 1m South Korean casualties in retaliatory strikes from Pyongyang.

在20世紀90年代，美國總統比爾?克林頓(Bill Clinton)考慮過該選項，但朝鮮的報復性打擊可能給韓國造成100萬傷亡，令他放棄了。

The South Korean capital, Seoul, sits a little more than a marathon-run from the border between the two countries — the most militarised zone on earth.

韓國首都首爾與朝韓邊境的距離略大於馬拉松跑的全程長度。朝韓邊境是世界上軍事化程度最高的區域。

Mr Cha on Wednesday said the chances of a strike were “not high because the North Koreans are now getting more and more sophisticated”.

維克托?查週三表示，軍事打擊的可能性“不太大，因爲朝鮮軍隊的能力越來越強”。

“In the end the North Korean actions are going to predetermine the outcome of the [US] policy review?.?.?.?The North Koreans are really not giving Trump any room on this.”

“最終，朝鮮的行動將預先決定（美國）政策審查的結果……朝鮮人在這方面真的沒給特朗普留下任何空間。”