朝鮮在制定一個足以打贏美國的核計劃
WASHINGTON — Under traditional understandings of North Korea, the country’s test launch of two medium-range ballistic missiles in late June should not have happened. Neither should its failed launch, on Saturday, of a submarine-based missile.
華盛頓——按照對朝鮮的傳統理解，在6月末試射兩枚中程彈道導彈的事情本不應發生，週六發射潛射導彈一事也一樣，雖然後者失敗了。
But they did. And that has brought new urgency to a growing conversation among many North Korea watchers: Is our understanding of this country fundamentally wrong?
但的確發生了。這讓很多朝鮮問題觀察人士之間日漸增多的討論變得更加緊迫：我們對這個國家的瞭解從根本上就是錯的嗎？
The country’s weapons programs have long been understood as meant not for immediate military purposes, but to rally North Koreans behind the leadership and extract concessions from foreign governments. North Korea’s bluster, in this view, is not sincere, but just another set piece in an elaborate, never-ending show.
外界長期認爲，該國的武器計劃不是出於直接的軍事目的，而是爲了將朝鮮民衆團結在領導人背後，並設法讓外國政府讓步。從這個觀點出發，朝鮮的叫囂並不是真的，只是其精心策劃、無休無止的表演中的一部分。
This does not, however, adequately explain North Korea’s recent flurry of weapons tests, often using unproven technology that tends to fail many times, bringing embarrassment to a government that prefers to project confidence, and that incurs heavy diplomatic and financial tolls the country cannot afford.
然而，這不足以解釋朝鮮近期一連串的武器試驗。這些測試使用的通常是未經驗證的技術，往往會多次失敗，讓一個更願意展現自信的政府處境尷尬，並給它帶來不可承受的外交和經濟損失。
Such tests, according to a growing chorus of experts, suggest that North Korea is now seeking, in a more focused and determined way, a real, functioning nuclear weapons program — and could be on the way to getting it.
專家日漸一致地認爲，這類試驗表明朝鮮目前正在以一種更專注、更堅定的方式，尋求一個真正的、能正常運轉的核武器計劃，並且這個目標可能即將實現。
“The conventional wisdom treats these tests and strategic programs as political tools,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “They’re more than that.”
“傳統觀點認爲這些試驗和戰略計劃是政治工具，”國際戰略研究所(International Institute for Strategic Studies)的學者馬克·菲茨帕特里克(Mark Fitzpatrick)說。“實際上它們不僅限於此。”
This realization is forcing analysts to rethink not just nuclear issues, but also the underlying goals and motivations of the North Korean state itself, with sweeping implications for how one of the world’s most secretive nations is understood.
這種認識正在迫使分析人士重新思考覈問題，以及朝鮮這個國家本身的根本目的和動機，從而廣泛地影響到外界如何看待這個堪稱全世界最神祕的國家。
A sudden change in 2014
2014年的突然轉變
North Korea has had only three leaders, each of whom has faced the same problem: governing a small country with few resources, outnumbered by powerful enemies.
朝鮮迄今只出現了三位領導人，三人都面臨同一個問題：統治一個幾乎沒有什麼資源、卻有着衆多強大敵人的小國。
Kim Il Sung, the nation’s founding leader, used diplomacy. By allying with the Soviet Union and China — and playing the two off each other — he secured protection and support.
朝鮮的開國領袖金日成(Kim Il Sung)利用的是外交手段。通過與蘇聯和中國結盟——並利用兩國之間的紛爭——他獲得了保護和支持。
His son Kim Jong Il came to power in the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed and China’s interest in backing a rogue nation waned. In response, he put the country on a permanent war footing. Kim Jong Il began developing missiles and nuclear weapons, periodically stirring up geopolitical crises that promoted nationalism at home and won international concessions abroad.
其子金正日(Kim Jong Il)在90年代初上臺。當時，蘇聯垮臺，中國對支持一個流氓國家的興趣逐漸減少。鑑於此，他讓朝鮮走上了永久性的備戰道路。金正日開始發展導彈和核武器，不時挑起地緣政治危機。這些危機在朝鮮國內促進了民族主義，在國外贏取了各國的讓步。
Foreign governments and analysts concluded that these programs, which North Korea tested erratically but with great fanfare, were meant primarily for political rather than military ends. The country’s leadership was seen as reactive and focused on preserving the status quo. State propaganda, warning endlessly of war with South Korea and the United States, was dismissed as merely a tool for internal control.
外國政府和分析人士的結論曾是，針對這些計劃，朝鮮之所以時不時大張旗鼓地展開試驗，主要是出於政治目的而非軍事目的。該國領導人被認爲處於被動地位，重點在保持現狀上。官方的宣傳沒完沒了地警告說要與韓國和美國開戰，但外界對其不予考慮，認爲這只是實現內部控制的伎倆。
That view has held for 20 years, through Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011 and the ascension of his son Kim Jong Un.
這種觀點持續了20年。在這期間，金正日於2011年去世，其子金正恩(Kim Jong Un)上臺。
But, three years into the younger Kim’s reign, as he carried out a series of high-level political purges, something seemed to shift.
但在金正恩執政三年過後，隨着他在高層中進行一系列的清洗，情況似乎變了。
“In 2014, they started testing things like crazy,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California. The country also built a new underground nuclear testing facility.
“2014年，他們開始像瘋了一樣進行試驗，”加州明德大學蒙特雷國際研究學院(Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey)的核武器專家傑弗裏·劉易斯(Jeffrey Lewis)說。朝鮮還新建了一處地下核試驗場。
Because most of the tests failed — and because of popular depictions of the country as silly and backward — they were shrugged off as farce. It was “easy to kind of laugh at them,” Lewis said.
因爲大部分試驗失敗了——也因爲流行將該國描述成愚蠢和落後的樣子——外界滿不在乎，認爲它們純屬鬧劇。劉易斯說，“外界很容易去嘲笑貶損他們。”
Now, in retrospect, it seems that the tests indicated a change whose ramifications are only beginning to become clear to analysts.
現在回過頭去看，那些試驗似乎表明了一種變化。在分析人士看來，這種變化的後果纔剛開始變得清晰起來。
Targeting the United States
瞄準美國
Andrea Berger, a proliferation expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that for years she and some of her colleagues believed “that one of the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear development was to eventually sell it for the right price,” either in part or in full. Others, of course, thought North Korea was simply engaging in a game of cat and mouse, agreeing to freeze parts of the program in exchange for cash or food, only to unfreeze them later in hopes of making another deal on the same goods in another round of negotiations.
倫敦皇家聯合軍種國防研究所(Royal United Services Institute)研究武器擴散問題的專家安德麗亞·伯格(Andrea Berger)說，多年來，她和一些同事一直認爲，“朝鮮發展核武器背後的動機之一是最終賣個好價錢”，要麼是賣一部分，要麼是全部。當然，其他人則認爲朝鮮只是在玩一個貓捉老鼠的遊戲，同意凍結部分計劃以換取現金或糧食，結果後來又將其解凍，希望憑藉同樣的東西在下一輪談判中再達成一筆交易。
In any case, Berger said the country’s activity since 2014 had led to “growing sentiment, and I would go so far as to say it is now the majority view, that North Korea may not be willing to give up its nuclear program or missile programs at all.”
伯格認爲，無論如何，該國自2014年以來的活動都讓“人們越來越覺得，朝鮮可能根本不願意放棄其核計劃和導彈計劃。我甚至可以說，現在這已經是多數派的觀點了。”
The medium-range missile North Korea tested in late June, known as a Musudan, had failed in all five of its prior launches. Last month’s launch, while not a categorical success, showed progress — one of many hard-won breakthroughs.
朝鮮6月下旬進行了“舞水端”中程導彈測試。前五次測試均以失敗告終，不過6月這次測試雖不是徹底的成功，卻已經有所進步——這是諸多得來不易的突破之一。
“We are coming to the realization that North Korea is filling some of the technological gaps we thought they had and erasing some of the question marks quicker than we are comfortable with,” Berger said.
“我們逐漸認識到，朝鮮正在縮小一些我們認爲的技術差距，他們進步的速度也快到讓我們不安，”伯格說。
North Korea appears focused on acquiring key nuclear capabilities, including, Berger said, “a demonstrated ability to strike the continental United States.”
朝鮮似乎側重在獲取一些關鍵的核能力上，包括伯格所說的，“證明他們有能力襲擊美國本土。”
John Schilling, who tracks North Korea’s weapons programs at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, has concluded that within the next decade, North Korea will probably produce a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach parts of the West Coast of the United States.
約翰·霍普金斯大學美韓研究所(U.S.- Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University)研究朝鮮武器計劃的專家約翰·席林(John Schilling)認爲，在下個十年內，朝鮮研製的搭載核彈頭的洲際彈道導彈很可能就可以覆蓋到美國西海岸的部分地區。
The country is also developing multiple ways to deliver these missiles, as indicated by Saturday’s submarine test-launch.
該國還在開發多種用來發射這些導彈的方式，週六的潛射試驗就是一個證據。
An extreme solution
極端的解決方案
As analysts adjust their view of North Korea’s intentions, they are grappling with a much bigger question: Why is North Korea so bent on a program that brings economic sanctions, the risk of conflict and isolation even from China, its sole remaining ally and benefactor?
分析人士在調整他們對朝鮮意圖的看法，他們也隨之面臨一個大得多的問題：爲什麼朝鮮如此堅決地開展這個計劃，不怕經濟制裁，不惜冒着和中國發生衝突，甚至斷交的風險呢？中國是朝鮮僅剩的盟友，爲其提供援助。
Put another way: What does North Korea believe it will gain from nuclear weapons that is worth these costs?
換一種說法：朝鮮爲什麼覺得擁有核武器值得付出這麼大的代價呢？
Experts have not settled on a consensus answer, but offer a range of possible explanations. What these theories share is a sense that North Korea’s leadership believes it is facing a potentially existential crisis and is willing to take extreme steps to survive.
對於這個問題，專家莫衷一是，但他們提供了一系列可能的解釋。這些解釋的共通點在於，朝鮮領導層認爲該國面臨着潛在的生存危機，因此不惜採取極端措施來求取生機。
Some analysts say the North Korean warnings of a looming conflict with the United States and South Korea might not just be for show, but rather indicate that the country’s leaders earnestly believe war could be coming.
一些分析人士表示，朝鮮此前警告美國和韓國即將與之發生衝突，或許不只是說說而已，而是表明該國領導層真的認爲戰爭有可能到來。
In this view, the country would need more than just a single bomb to deter its enemies. It would require a nuclear program large enough to make such a war winnable.
依照這種觀點，朝鮮要威懾敵人，將需要不止一枚炸彈。它需要一個大到足以贏得這場戰爭的核計劃。
Details about North Korea’s advances suggest the outlines of a war plan, Lewis said. The country seems to be building the capability to launch rapid nuclear strikes against nearby military targets, such as U.S. military bases on Guam and the Japanese island of Okinawa, as well as South Korean ports where any U.S. invasion force would land.
劉易斯表示，有關朝鮮取得進步的細節顯示出一個戰爭計劃的輪廓。朝鮮似乎在打造能對附近軍事目標進行快速核打擊的能力，比如美國在關島和日本沖繩島的軍事基地，以及美國部隊一旦出兵將要藉以登陸的韓國港口。
“I think their hope is that the shock of that will cause us to stop,” Lewis said. “Then the whole point of the ICBMs is that there is something in reserve” to threaten West Coast U.S. cities, in theory forcing the United States to stand down.
“我認爲，他們的希望是由此帶來的衝擊會讓我們停止行動，”劉易斯說。“那麼洲際彈道導彈的全部意義就在於，朝鮮有東西可以”威脅美國西海岸城市的安全，在理論上迫使美國做出退讓。
Fitzpatrick argued that even if North Korea does not intend to carry out such a plan, it hopes that raising concerns of a nuclear conflict will “drive a wedge between the United States and its allies,” particularly South Korea.
菲茨帕特里克則認爲，就算朝鮮無意實施這一計劃，它也希望對可能發生核衝突日漸增長的擔憂可以“在美國及其盟友之間製造隔閡”，尤其是與韓國。
Should North Korea acquire a nuclear-capable missile that could hit Washington state, some Americans might well question the value of continuing to guarantee South Korea’s security.
倘若朝鮮研製出可以發射至華盛頓州的可攜帶核彈頭的導彈，一些美國人可能也會對美國持續保障韓國安全的價值提出質疑。
“The North Koreans would like people to doubt that the United States would trade Seattle for Seoul,” Fitzpatrick said, referring to a Cold War adage that the United States accepted risks to its own cities so as to defend those of its allies.
“朝鮮樂見有人懷疑美國不應拿西雅圖換首爾，”菲茨帕特里克說。這裏借用了冷戰中的一句話，意爲美國讓本國城市蒙受風險，以維護盟國的安全。
B.R. Myers, a North Korea scholar at Dongseo University in South Korea, takes this theory one step further. The nuclear program, he believes, is meant not only to scare off the United States, but to one day coerce the South into accepting the North’s long-stated demand: reunification on its own terms.
在韓國東西大學(Dongseo University)研究朝鮮問題的學者B·R·邁爾斯(B.R. Myers)將這一理論做了進一步的發揮。他認爲，朝鮮實施核計劃不只是爲威懾美國，也是爲了有朝一日能迫使韓國接受朝鮮長期以來的要求：按照它的條件實現統一。
“It is the only goal big enough to make sense of a nuclear program that has made the DPRK less secure than it was 10 years ago,” Myers said, using the abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name.
“只有這麼大的目標才說得通，才足以讓人理解爲何朝鮮民主主義人民共和國要實施一個讓自身比10年前更加不安全的核計劃，”邁爾斯說。
