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特朗普總統將帶來失序世界大綱

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Sometimes history jumps.

歷史有時會發生跳躍。

Think of the first world war, the Bolshevik revolution, the Great Depression, the election of Adolf Hitler, the second world war, the beginning of the cold war, the collapse of the European empires, Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up of China, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the financial crisis of 2007-09 and subsequent great recession.

想想第一次世界大戰、布爾什維克革命(Bolshevik Revolution,即俄國十月革命)、大蕭條、阿道夫•希特勒(Adolf Hitler)當選、第二次世界大戰、冷戰爆發、多個歐洲帝國的瓦解、鄧小平在中國實施的改革開放、蘇聯解體,以及2007-09年的金融危機和隨後的大衰退。

We may be on the brink of an event as transformative as many of these: the election of Donald Trump as US president.

我們或許即將面臨一起類似的轉折性事件:唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當選美國總統。

特朗普總統將帶來失序世界

This would mark the end of a US-led west as the central force in global affairs.

那將標誌着以美國爲首的西方在全球事務中擔當核心角色的時代就要終結。

The result would not be a new order. It would be perilous disorder.

其結果將不是形成新秩序,而是出現危險的失序。

The fact that Mr Trump can be a credible contender for the presidency is astounding.

特朗普能夠成爲一名有希望當選的總統競選者,這一事實令人咋舌。

In business, he is a serial defaulter and litigator turned reality TV star.

在商界,他從一個連續違約者和訴訟當事人轉型爲真人秀電視明星。

He is a peddler of falsehoods and conspiracy theories.

他兜售謊言和陰謀論。

He utters racist calumnies.

他進行種族主義誹謗。

He attacks the independence of the judiciary.

他抨擊司法機構的獨立性。

He refuses to reveal his taxes.

他拒絕披露自己的稅單。

He has no experience of political office, and incoherent policies.

他沒有從政經驗,沒有連貫的政策。

He glories in ignorance.

他以無知爲榮。

He even hints at a federal default.

他甚至暗示聯邦政府可以違約。

He undermines confidence in the US-created trade order, by threatening to tear up past agreements.

他威脅要撕毀過去達成的貿易協定,削弱了人們對美國創建的貿易秩序的信心。

He undermines confidence in US democracy by claiming the election will be rigged.

他聲稱大選將被操縱,削弱了人們對美國民主的信心。

He supports torture and the deliberate killing of the families of alleged terrorists.

他支持酷刑,支持故意殺死疑似恐怖分子的家人。

He admires the former KGB agent who runs Russia.

他欽佩正在掌管俄羅斯的那名前克格勃(KGB)特工。

Evidently, a huge number of US voters have lost confidence in the country’s political and economic systems.

顯然,數量衆多的美國選民已經對這個國家的政治經濟體系失去了信心。

This is so to an extent not seen even in the 1930s, when voters turned towards an established politician.

其程度之嚴重,即便是在上世紀30年代也未曾見過,當時選民們支持一位老牌政治家。

Yet, for all its challenges, the US is not in such terrible shape.

然而,儘管面臨各種挑戰,目前美國的情況並不是很糟。

It is the richest large country in the history of the world.

它是世界歷史上最富有的大國。

Growth is slow, but unemployment is low.

增長緩慢,但失業率低。

If voters were to choose Mr Trump — despite his failings, displayed again in the first presidential debate — this would tell us grim things about the health of the US.

如果選民們選擇了特朗普——儘管他有很多缺點並且在第一次競選辯論中再次暴露無遺——這將告訴我們美國健康狀況有多嚴峻。

It is the world’s leading power, so this is not just a domestic US concern.

美國是世界舞臺上處於領導地位的大國,所以這個問題不只是美國國內民衆會關心。

What might a Trump presidency mean? Forecasting the policies of someone so uNPRedictable is impossible.

特朗普當選總統可能意味着什麼?要預測一個如此難以預測之人的政策,是絕無可能的。

But a few things seem at least reasonably clear.

但有幾點至少是相當明確的。

The US and its allies remain immensely powerful.

美國及其盟友仍然非常強大。

But their economic dominance is in slow decline.

但它們的經濟主導地位正在緩慢下降。

According to the International Monetary Fund, the share of the high-income countries (essentially, the US and its chief allies) will fall from 64 per cent of global output (measured at purchasing power) in 1990 to 39 per cent in 2020, while the US share will fall from 22 per cent to 15 per cent over this period.

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)數據顯示,高收入國家(基本上就是美國及其主要盟友)佔全球產出的比例(按購買力計算)將從1990年的64%下降到2020年的39%,而同期美國的佔比將從22%下降至15%。

While the US military might is still huge, two caveats must be made.

儘管美國的軍力仍然強大,但有兩點需要說明。

One is that winning a conventional war is quite a different matter from achieving one’s aims on the ground, as the Viet-nam and Iraq wars showed.

一個是,正如越南戰爭和伊拉克戰爭所顯示的那樣,打贏一場常規戰爭與實現你在地面上的目標是完全不同的事情。

Furthermore, China’s rapidly rising defence spending could create serious military difficulties for the US in the Asia-Pacific region.

此外,中國的國防開支迅速增加,可能會使美國在亞太地區面臨嚴重的軍事難題。

It follows that the ability of the US to shape the world to its liking will rest increasingly on its influence over the global economic and political systems.

由此可見,美國按照自己意願塑造世界的能力,將越來越多地依賴於其對全球經濟和政治體系的影響力。

Indeed, this is not new.

事實上,這並不是什麼新鮮事。

It has been a feature of US hegemony since the 1940s.

這已成爲自1940年以來美國霸權的一個特點。

But this is even more important today.

但在今天,這一點顯得更重要。

The alliances the US creates, the institutions it supports and the prestige it possesses are truly invaluable assets.

美國創建的聯盟、支持的機構和擁有的聲望,是真正無價的資產。

All such strategic assets would be in grave peril if Mr Trump were to be president.

如果特朗普成爲總統,所有這些戰略性資產都將面臨嚴重危險。

The biggest contrast between the US and China is that the former has so many powerful allies.

美國和中國的最大不同在於,前者有衆多強大盟友。

Even Vladimir Putin is not a reliable ally for China.

而對中國來說,即便普京也非可靠盟友。

America’s allies support the US largely because they trust it.

美國的盟友支持美國,主要是因爲它們信任美國。

That trust is based on its perceived commitment to predictable, values-based behaviour.

這種信任是基於它們認爲,美國會採取的行動是可以預測、以價值觀爲基礎的。

Its alliances have not been problem-free, far from it.

美國的聯盟關係並非毫無問題,遠非如此。

But they have worked.

但是,這些聯盟是起作用的。

Mr Trump’s cherished uNPRedictability and transactional approach to partnerships would damage the alliances irreparably.

特朗普所重視的不可預測性,以及把夥伴關係當成交易處理的做法,將會對聯盟關係造成不可挽回的損害。

A vital feature of the US-led global order has been the role of multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation.

美國領導下的全球秩序的一個重要特徵是多邊機構——如國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行(World Bank)和世界貿易組織(WTO)——所扮演的角色。

In binding itself by the rules of an open economic system, the US has encouraged others to do the same.

通過以開放經濟體系的規則約束自己,美國也鼓勵了其他國家這麼做。

The result has been extraordinary growth in prosperity: between 1950 and 2015, average global real output per head rose sixfold.

其結果就是經濟的快速繁榮:1950年至2015年間,全球人均實際產出增長了6倍。

Mr Trump does not understand this system.

特朗普不理解這種開放經濟體系。

The results of repudiation could be calamitous for all.

拋棄這種體系,可能給所有人帶來災難性的後果。

The Iraq war has damaged trust in US wisdom and competence.

伊拉克戰爭損害了世人對美國智慧和能力的信心。

But the global financial crisis has been even more destructive.

但是,全球金融危機產生了更大的破壞效果。

Many have long suspected US motives.

許多人一直懷疑美國的動機。

But they thought it knew how to manage a capitalist system.

但他們曾認爲美國懂得如何管理一個資本主義體系。

The crisis devastated that confidence.

危機已摧毀了這種信心。

After all this damage, election of a man as unqualified as Mr Trump would call into question something even more fundamental: belief in the capacity of the US to choose reasonably well-informed and competent leaders.

在遭受這一切損害之後,把特朗普這樣一個不稱職的人選上臺,將使一種更根本的東西遭到質疑:那就是人們對於美國有能力選出見多識廣、能幹的領導人的信心。

Under a President Trump, the democratic system would lose much of its credibility as a model for the organisation of a civilised political life.

如果特朗普當上總統,民主制度作爲文明政治生活組織制度之典範的信譽將損失大半。

Mr Putin and other actual or would-be despots would cheer.

普京和其他當前的獨裁者以及未來的準獨裁者將會歡呼。

Their belief that talk of western values is just hypocrisy would be vindicated.

他們認爲談論西方價值觀只是虛僞作派的觀點將被證明是正確的。

But those who see the US as a bastion of democracy would despair.

但是,那些把美國視爲民主堡壘的人會感到絕望。

If Mr Trump were to win, it would be a regime change for the world.

如果特朗普獲勝,這將是整個世界都要面對的一場政權更迭。

It would, for example, end efforts to manage the threat of climate change, possibly forever.

比如,應對氣候變化威脅的努力大概將從此不了了之。

But even his candidacy suggests that the US role in the global order risks undergoing a transformation.

但是,他成爲總統候選人就已表明,美國在全球秩序中的角色可能經歷一場轉變。

That role depended not only on American economic and military prowess, but also on the values it represented.

這個角色不僅依賴於美國的經濟和軍事實力,也依賴於它所代表的價值觀。

For all its mistakes, the ideal of a law-governed democratic republic remained visible.

儘管有許多錯誤,一個法治的民主共和國的理想依然明顯可見。

Hillary Clinton is an imperfect candidate.

希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)是一個不完美的候選人。

Mr Trump is something else altogether.

特朗普則完全是另類。

Far from making America great, his presidency might unravel the world.

他若成爲美國總統,非但不能讓美國變得偉大,還可能讓世界分崩離析。