“達沃斯人”不行了?

Does Donald Trump’s ascent to power in the US mark an end to the influence of Davos Man? This is a term invented by Samuel Huntington, the late political scientist, himself a participant at the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos, for a class of people he despised.

唐納德·特朗普(Donald Trump)在美國掌權，是否標誌着“達沃斯人”(Davos Man)的影響力不行了？“達沃斯人”這個詞語是已故政治學家塞繆爾?亨廷頓(Samuel Huntington)創造出來的，用來形容他所鄙視的一羣人。亨廷頓生前也出席在達沃斯舉行的世界經濟論壇(World Economic Forum at Davos)年度會議。

He argued that they “have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite’s global operations”.

亨廷頓認爲，這些人“基本不需要國家忠誠這種東西，把國家邊界視爲萬幸正在逐漸消失的障礙，把國家政府視爲歷史殘餘，唯一有用的職能是爲精英的全球活動提供便利”。

So are we about to witness a decisive shift away from the aspirations of the WEF’s members and, if so, is this desirable? The answers are “yes” and “no”.

那麼，我們現在將看到形勢明確朝着與“達沃斯人”願望相反的方向發展嗎？如果是的話，這種變化是人們想要的嗎？答案既肯定又否定。

Core beliefs of the Davos creed have been global co-operation and economic globalisation. But faith in the latter was shaken after the global financial crisis of 2007-09. The ratio of trade to global economic output has stagnated since then, after doubling between the early 1970s and 2007. The stock of foreign direct investment continues to rise relative to world output, albeit slowly. But the stock of cross-border financial assets has declined outright.

“達沃斯派”的核心信念是全球合作與經濟全球化。2007-2009年的全球金融危機之後，人們對後者的信念發生了動搖。上世紀70年代初至2007年期間，全球貿易與全球經濟產出的比例上升了一倍，但此後停滯不前。外國直接投資(FDI)存量相對於全球產出的比例繼續升高，只是增速緩慢。至於跨境金融資產存量就完全是下滑了。

This weakening of globalisation partly reflects the exhaustion of easy opportunities for global commerce and the feeble growth of demand since the crisis. But it also reflects shifts in policy: the post-crisis re-regulation of finance has had a pronounced home bias, with reduced support for cross-border activities. Trade liberalisation has stalled, while some studies already show a rise in protectionist measures.

這種全球化走下坡路的趨勢，部分反映了全球商業領域中唾手可得的機會已經沒有了，同時需求增長乏力。但這種趨勢也反映了政策的變化：危機後重新加強金融監管具有明顯的本土偏向，對跨境活動的支持減少了。貿易自由化停滯，同時一些研究表明保護主義措施增加。

Mr Trump’s inauguration as US president this week presages a marked tightening of the protectionist screws. The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiated under his predecessor Barack Obama seems dead. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is stillborn. More important, Mr Trump threatens to focus on bilateral deals, impose tariffs on imports from important partners, notably China and Mexico, and treat the World Trade Organisation with contempt. This approach could take us back to the kind of global trade-policy chaos that occurred between the first and second world wars.

本週特朗普就任美國總統預示着保護主義聲勢將明顯大漲。其前任巴拉克?奧巴馬(Barack Obama)主政下談成的《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(TPP)似乎死掉了。《跨大西洋貿易與投資夥伴關係協定》(TTIP)也是胎死腹中。更重要的是，特朗普威脅要把重點放在雙邊協議上，揚言對來自重要貿易伙伴——主要是中國和墨西哥——的進口商品徵收關稅，並藐視世界貿易組織(WTO)。這些做法可能會把我們帶回到兩次世界大戰之間那種全球貿易政策混亂的狀態。

At the same time, strangely, Mr Trump seems set on abolishing many of the regulations imposed on finance after the crisis. So Davos people could still take whatever financial risks they wanted but could no longer trade as freely in goods and services. Finding a rationale for this is impossible. It is a reflection of the intellectual incoherence characteristic of populism.

另一方面，奇怪的是，特朗普似乎決心廢除在危機之後實施的許多金融監管規定。因此，“達沃斯人”仍然可以在金融領域想怎麼冒險就怎麼冒險，但再也不能與之前同樣自由地交易商品和服務了。想找出這些做法的理論依據是不可能的。這反映出了民粹主義在思想方面缺乏連貫性的特點。

Yet make no mistake: Mr Trump could bring down the temple of world trade. If he were to impose punitive (and unjustifiable) tariffs on Chinese imports, the EU is likely to follow suit in order to protect its producers from a surge of Chinese imports. China would then feel obliged to retaliate. The system of trade rules could collapse.

不過，千真萬確：特朗普可能會推倒世界貿易的神殿。如果他對中國進口產品強制徵收懲罰性的（和無正當理由的）關稅，那麼在面對大量涌來的中國進口產品，歐盟(EU)爲保護本國生產商可能會仿效美國。接着，中國就會覺得必須進行報復。貿易規則體系可能會就此崩潰。

So, too, could the very idea of a co-operative global system. Trade could be just one aspect of a bigger shift. If the US administration adopts the mindset of Vladimir Putin’s Russia — inward looking, narrowly self-interested and indifferent to moral norms in international relations — even a minimally co-operative global system could disappear.

合作性全球體系的概念也可能隨之崩潰。貿易可能只是更宏大變化趨勢中的一個方面。如果美國政府採納了弗拉基米爾?普京(Vladimir Putin)治下俄羅斯的思維方式——向內看、狹隘地只關注自身利益和對國際關係中的道義準則漠不關心——那麼就連最低限度合作的全球體系也沒有立身之地。

This would be the end of the Pax Americana — the period of US hegemony since the end of the second world war. The world will not easily or quickly find a replacement for the US, particularly when similar populist and protectionist forces are at work elsewhere, notably Europe. Much of the work that countries still need to do together — tackling climate change or challenges of economic development — would become impossible.

這可能導致“美國治下的和平”(Pax Americana)——指二戰結束以來的美國全球霸權時期——的終結。世界將不會輕易或很快找到替代美國的角色，尤其是當其他地區、尤其是歐洲的類似民粹和保護主義勢力正得勢的情況下。各國仍需合作完成的大部分任務——應對氣候變化或經濟發展中的挑戰——將不可能完成。

This, then, could also be the end of a world managed for — and often by — Davos man and woman. Many will feel that might be no bad thing. But they should be careful what they wish for.

接着，這也可能導致順應“達沃斯男”與“達沃斯女”理念進行管理、也常常由他們管理的世界走向終結。很多人會覺得那或許不是壞事。但他們應該當心自己的願望成爲現實。

As has happened so often before, hubris led to over-reach. Davos people underplayed the role of legitimate and potent states in underpinning the global system. They forgot the need for the successful to recognise their responsibilities to the societies that had made their success possible. They ignored, above all, the obligation to share the gains of globalisation with its losers. The enthusiasm with which many of them seized opportunities to avoid paying taxes was disgraceful.

正如以往經常發生的那樣，狂妄自大會讓人失了分寸。“達沃斯人”忽視了合法的、強有力的政府在支持全球體系方面的作用。他們忘了，成功人士有必要承擔起他們對社會的責任，正是社會讓他們的成功成爲可能。特別是，他們忽視了應當與輸家分享全球化成果的責任。他們中許多人孜孜以求的是抓住一切機會避免納稅，這是可恥的。

Some of the projects of the age of global economic liberalisation also went too far — notably heedless financial liberalisation, the imprudent expansion of the eurozone and encouragement of large-scale immigration. Citizenship might not matter that much to many Davos people, but it matters very much to many of their fellow citizens.

全球經濟自由化時代在一些方面也走得太遠——尤其是冒失的金融自由化、歐元區的魯莽擴張和對大規模移民的鼓勵。公民身份對許多“達沃斯人”或許並不重要，但對他們的很多國人來說非常重要。

These mistakes, however, are not nearly as bad as those likely to be made by the new populists. Davos people are in business: they do not wield the instruments of mass coercion, but rather seek to engage in mutually enriching commercial transactions and believe in the desirability of a peaceful and essentially co-operative world. Elites far more brutal, stupid and damaging than this can all too easily be imagined.

然而，這些錯誤不會像新崛起的民粹主義者們可能犯下的錯誤那麼嚴重。“達沃斯人”身在商界：他們不會使用政治強制工具，而是尋求開展互利的商業交易，並相信和平與大體合作的世界是值得期望的。一個殘酷及愚蠢程度和破壞性遠甚於此的精英階層是完全可以想象的。

The populist reaction might have become inevitable. But it will not lead to a better world, even for those who support it. Yes, policymakers should have paid more attention to what was happening to ordinary citizens, but the simple-minded populism now on the rise will soon prove far worse than the hubris of the Davos elite.

民粹主義的反應或許已是不可避免。但它不會通往一個更好的世界，甚至對於民粹主義支持者而言也是如此。是的，政策制定者們本應對普通民衆的境遇給予更多關注，但如今勢頭上升的思想簡單的民粹主義，不久之後就將被證明比達沃斯精英的狂妄自大要糟糕得多。