關注社會:財政緊縮不宜"一刀切"

The policies of fiscal austerity now being pursued throughout Europe have come under their strongest attack yet. Double-dip recession is eroding voters’ confidence that belt-tightening is the best way to recover prosperity. Elections in France and political upheavals elsewhere are tilting the balance of opinion among policy makers away from unwavering commitments to deficit cuts. More than ever, clarity is needed about where and which kind of austerity is needed.

整個歐洲現在推行的財政緊縮政策面臨着迄今最爲強大的攻擊。雙底衰退正在侵蝕選民的信心，使他們不再相信勒緊腰帶是恢復繁榮的最佳方式。法國的大選和其它國家的政治動盪，正使某些政策制定者本來堅定的減赤承諾出現動搖。對於哪些領域需要緊縮以及需要哪種緊縮，人們迫切需要清晰度。

Many forces buffet the world’s economies, and economic policies must be correspondingly nuanced. Simple-minded approaches to deficit-cutting will not do, and no single austerity policy is right for all countries. This is why the Financial Times has consistently given qualified support to the British government’s fiscal strategy while criticising the excessive zeal for deficit-cutting in some eurozone states and in the US policy debate.

很多因素在打擊全球經濟，因此經濟政策必須相應圓滑。簡單化的減赤是不夠的，沒有一種緊縮政策適合所有國家。這就是爲什麼英國《金融時報》一直對英國政府的財政戰略表示有所保留的支持，同時批評一些歐元區國家（以及美國的政策辯論中）對減赤的過分熱情。

Some commentators – many of them American, such as the economist Paul Krugman – condemn Europe’s fiscal consolidation strategies indiscriminately. There is no doubt that the direct effect of tightening fiscal balances is contractionary. But quite apart from the fact that long-term growth requires sound public finances, a lax fiscal policy also has two negative effects on short-term growth.

一些評論人士——其中很多是美國人，例如經濟學家保羅?克魯格曼(Paul Krugman)——不分青紅皁白地抨擊歐洲的財政整固戰略。毫無疑問，收緊財政平衡的直接影響是緊縮性的。然而，除了長期增長需要穩健的公共財政這個事實以外，寬鬆的財政政策對短期增長還有兩種負面影響。

One is the risk of self-fulfilling panics in bond markets, with the crippling effect on both the public and the private sector that we see in affected countries. The other, more slow-burning but just as corrosive of growth, is that sustained large deficits and rapidly mounting debt can chill the animal spirits of business. Any good done by deficit spending can be lost to retrenchment by private employers.

首先是債市出現自我實現的恐慌的風險，這對公共和私營部門都會造成嚴重影響，我們在一些受影響的國家已看到這種影響。另一種負面影響的作用更加緩慢，但同樣損害增長，那就是持續的鉅額赤字和迅速增多的債務可能抑制企業的“動物精神”。赤字支出帶來的任何好處，都可能被私營企業的緊縮所抵消。

Economic research can tell us something about the direct effect of fiscal stimuli on growth. It has less to say about the consequences for bond-market psychology – self-reinforcing and thus inherently unpredictable – or business confidence. What is certain is that whether the negative effects will outweigh a fiscal boost to growth varies from country to country.

經濟研究能夠告訴我們一些關於財政刺激對於增長的直接影響的事情。但對於債市心理（自我強化因而在本質上不可預測）或企業信心遭受的後果，就沒有那麼多啓示了。可以肯定的是，對於這些負面影響會否壓倒旨在促進增長的財政刺激，要看各國的國情而定。

In the US, the case for fiscal stimulus is strong. In a relatively closed economy government spending lifts domestic demand without much leakage. The $10tn Treasury market is also so big that it is largely a captive one. It is virtually impossible for investors to abandon it, as their equanimity towards last summer’s downgrade showed. An accommodating central bank helps. Similar considerations apply to Japan, if to a lesser degree.

在美國，財政刺激的理由很有說服力。在一個相對封閉的經濟中，政府支出能夠提振內需，而不致大量滲漏。10萬億美元的美國國債市場規模巨大，在很大程度上是一個支配性的市場。投資者幾乎不可能拋棄它，就像去年夏天美國國債被降級而投資者表現鎮定所顯示的那樣。央行的配合也有幫助。類似的考量也適用於日本，即便程度較小。

In contrast, small and middling countries, including all European states, face a different trade-off. They would only enjoy a muted demand stimulus from unilateral fiscal relaxation; so enmeshed are they in international trade, much of the effect would seep across their borders. Size also makes bond investors a greater flight risk. Even the Italian sovereign bond market – well supported by domestic investors and the world’s third-largest – is, it turns out, easy to exit en masse.

與美日形成反差的是，中小國家（包括所有歐洲國家）面臨着不同的取捨。單邊財政放鬆只會帶來溫和的需求刺激；由於它們深度參與國際貿易，因此很多刺激效果將滲漏到國界之外。此外，它們的規模意味着債券投資者逃離的風險更大。事實證明，就連意大利主權債券市場（受到國內投資者的大力支持，並且是全球第三大國債市場）也很容易大舉撤出。

This does not justify the eurozone’s official ideology of universal austerity. Many euro countries have ample fiscal space and should wield deficit spending as a tool to counter slow growth or recession. Only those with very large deficits, huge debt burdens or both have no choice but to cut, and cut hard. That includes the three states with rescue programmes, but not Spain.

這說明歐元區普遍緊縮的官方理念是不合理的。很多歐元區國家擁有充足的財政空間，應當將赤字開支當作一種工具，以遏制緩慢增長或衰退。只有那些擁有鉅額赤字、揹負沉重債務負擔（或二者兼有）的國家纔沒有選擇，只能削減赤字，而且要大力削減。這包括3個正在實施紓困計劃的國家，但不包括西班牙。

In Britain, fiscal laxity would do more harm than good (though how the cuts fall could be improved). Its structural deficit is exceeded only by the US, Japan and Ireland among advanced countries. Investors who take fright can easily shift money abroad. Critics of the ruling coalition’s policy say low gilt yields mean investors want the government to borrow more. But this treats markets’ welcome of a multiyear deficit reduction plan as if it were a prayer for the high deficit to be maintained.

在英國，財政放鬆弊大於利（儘管在如何削減的問題上存在改進空間）。在發達國家中，英國的結構性赤字僅次於美國、日本和愛爾蘭。恐慌的投資者可以輕易把資金轉移到海外。對英國聯合政府的政策提出批評的人士表示，英國國債的低收益率意味着，投資者希望政府借貸更多。但這話就像把市場對多年減赤計劃的歡迎，看成是在祈禱保持高水平赤字。

They also say the Bank of England, unlike the European Central Bank, can be trusted to keep gilt yields low. But the BoE is independent. It would take a true catastrophe for it to be willing to buy as many gilts as it takes to guarantee the government low borrowing costs. Even if it did fill the shoes of panicking gilt investors, such a scenario would hardly contain funding costs for UK banks abroad or make British businesses eager to invest and employ.

批評人士還表示，與歐洲央行(ECB)不同，人們可以相信英國央行(Bank of England)會讓英國國債收益率維持低位。但英國央行是獨立的。要讓英國央行願意爲了壓低政府借款成本而無止境地購買英國國債，那就需要發生一場真正的大災難。即便它果真代替了恐慌的英國國債投資者，這種情景也很難抑制英國各銀行在海外的融資成本，也不會讓英國企業積極投資和招聘。

Only globally co-ordinated fiscal policy can improve the trade-off faced by small and middling economies. A true growth compact – which should be global, not just European – could let risky states run a slightly less tight ship if safe states bore the brunt of boosting demand. This would take greater leadership than we have yet seen.

只有經過全球協調的財政政策，才能改善中小經濟體面對的取捨權衡。一項真正的增長契約——它應當是全球性的，而不僅僅是歐洲範圍的——可以讓有風險的國家多一點回旋空間，而讓穩健的國家承擔提振需求的主要負擔。這將需要比我們迄今見到的更大的領導力。譯者:樑豔裳