奧威爾會怎麼看特朗普

The Munich Security Conference used to be the place where western leaders talked about bad and dangerous things happening elsewhere in the world. This year the conversation was all about bad and dangerous things imperilling democracy at home. Donald Trump topped everyone’s threat list. The Europeans were alarmed by the US president’s opening weeks; the Americans promised to do their best to hold him in check.

過去，西方領導人在慕尼黑安全會議(Munich Security Conference)上一般談論世界其他地區發生的糟糕、危險的事情。今年會議上談論的全是危及西方民主的糟糕、危險的事情。唐納德?特朗普(Donald Trump)排在所有人的威脅清單上的首位。歐洲人對特朗普上任頭幾周的表現感到不安；美國人承諾盡力控制住他。

Some things do not change. Sergei Lavrov, the veteran Russian foreign minister, turned up to deliver his ritual charge of Nato perfidy. The Kremlin, though, has lost some spring from its step since Russophile-leaning Michael Flynn was forced out as Mr Trump’s national security adviser. The terrible conflict in Syria had western heads shaking in knowing powerlessness. Many warned of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist ambitions.

有些事情沒有改變。資深的俄羅斯外長謝爾蓋?拉夫羅夫(Sergei Lavrov)出席了會議，例行公事地指責北約背信棄義。然而，有親俄傾向的邁克爾?弗林(Michael Flynn)被迫辭去總統國家安全顧問一職以後，克林姆林宮就有些底氣不足。敘利亞的可怕衝突讓西方領導人不由得搖頭，他們知道自己對此無能爲力。許多人警告俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾?普京(Vladimir Putin)抱有復仇主義野心。

As for Mr Trump, stories abounded of a dysfunctional administration, eccentric working habits and power struggles between inner circle ideologues and the president’s more orthodox cabinet choices. Everyone despaired of the vanishing border between truth and lies.

關於特朗普，人們談論的全是無法正常運轉的政府、古怪的工作習慣以及核心圈子裏的理論家與更爲正統的內閣人選之間的權力爭鬥。所有人都對真相與謊言之間的界限日趨消亡感到絕望。

The Republican contingent, led by Senator John McCain, predicted bruising encounters ahead. Mike Pence, the vice-president, pulled off, just, the feat of sounding loyal to Mr Trump while discarding his foreign policy.

以參議員約翰?麥凱恩(John McCain)爲首的共和黨人預計未來會有激烈交鋒。副總統邁克?彭斯(Mike Pence)剛乾了件了不起的事，他在拋棄特朗普外交政策的同時，聽上去還在對特朗普大表忠誠。

The really gloomy talk, though, was not so much about the fact of Mr Trump as about the fact that voters had put him in the White House. Like demagogues through time, he had seized the opportunity presented by a deeper malaise.

然而，真正令人沮喪的談話，更多是關於選民把他選上臺的事實，而不是關於特朗普其人其事。與歷史上的煽動家一樣，他抓住了一個更深層的問題帶來的機會。

The political classes are some way off an agreed diagnosis of this sickness, let alone a prescription for its cure. Sure, the Republican establishment’s “containment strategy” could blunt the worst instincts of the president, but what then for his “movement”? These days, the dispossessed carry automatic weapons in preference to pitchforks.

政治階層仍未就這個問題的診斷達成一致，更別提開出解決問題的處方了。當然，共和黨建制派的“遏制戰略”可能削弱特朗普最糟糕的本能，但是他的“運動”呢？如今，赤貧者帶着自動武器而非乾草叉。

In any event, the insurgency is not confined to the US. It played a part in Britain’s vote on the EU referendum. It is fuelling far-right nationalism across Europe. If events go badly wrong, it could put Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s xenophobic National Front, into the Elysée Palace. The French presidential contest will probably be the most consequential political event of 2017. Mr Trump’s disdain for the Atlantic community’s postwar architecture is worrying. Ms Le Pen would tear it down.

不管怎樣，反叛不只發生在美國。它在英國退歐公投中也有一定影響。它正在助長歐洲各地的極右翼民族主義。如果形勢嚴重惡化，它還可能讓法國仇外的國民陣線(National Front)的領導人馬琳?勒龐(Marine Le Pen)入主愛麗捨宮。法國總統大選可能會成爲2017年最重要的政治事件。特朗普鄙視大西洋共同體的戰後框架令人擔憂。勒龐將會撕毀這一框架。

What has happened is that large segments of the population have withdrawn their consent for the democratic order. For 70 years the political argument in liberal democracies has been largely about “means”. Right and left could disagree, often angrily, about the distribution of power, the relationship between the state and the individual, and the pace of societal change, but they signed up to essentially the same pluralist framework.

現在的情況是，大批民衆不再贊同民主秩序。過去70年來，自由民主體制中的政治爭論基本上與“方式”有關。右翼和左翼對權力分配、政府與個人之間的關係以及社會改革步伐存在分歧，往往還對此感到憤怒，但他們一致同意基本上一樣的多元化框架。

The populists have upturned the debate: now it is about the “ends”. Mr Trump, spurred by his White House strategic adviser Stephen Bannon, imagines an entirely different order — one that is robustly nationalist and protectionist and guards the privileges of the native, white, Christian majority. The values of the old order — human dignity, pluralism, the role of law, protection for minorities — have no place in this identity politics. Nor do the institutions of democracy. Judges, media and the rest are “enemies of the people”.

民粹主義者顛覆了這場辯論：現在它與“目的”有關。在白宮戰略顧問斯蒂芬?班農(Stephen Bannon)的鼓動下，特朗普設想了一種截然不同的秩序——一種堅決奉行民族主義和保護主義、捍衛本土白人基督徒這些“多數人”的利益的秩序。舊秩序的價值觀——人類尊嚴、多元化、法律的作用和保護少數羣體——在這種身份政治中沒有任何位置。民主的各項制度同樣如此。法官、媒體以及其他機構是“人民的敵人”。

An “America first” foreign policy is part of the same construct. Mr Bannon, the ideologue who informs Mr Trump’s impulses, anticipates a civilisational clash with Islam and a war with China. The flirtation with Mr Putin is about confessional and cultural solidarity against an imagined barbarian threat.

“美國優先”的外交政策是相同架構的一部分。激發特朗普衝動的理論家班農預感會與伊斯蘭爆發文明衝突、與中國開戰。與普京親密互動爲的是在信仰和文化上抱團，以防範想象中的野蠻人威脅。

Why now? Everyone has their own explanation as to why the Trumps and Le Pens have succeeded where others have failed to tap into the anger and anxieties of so many. Stagnating incomes, hubristic elites, post-crash austerity, the insecurities thrown up by technology and globalisation, the cultural shocks of migration — all played a part. I am not sure they explain the striking energy of the insurgents.

爲何是現在？爲何特朗普和勒龐之流能成功利用這麼多人的憤怒和擔憂情緒，而其他人卻失敗？對於其中原因，每個人都會有自己的解釋。收入停滯、精英傲慢、危機後的緊縮政策、技術和全球化造成的不安全感，以及移民帶來的文化衝擊——這些都有一定的影響。我不確定它們能否解釋反叛者那種引人注目的聲勢。

This is about more than flat living standards and rising migration. The other day a German friend recalled the 1930s, and reminded me of George Orwell’s review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Writing in 1940, Orwell reflected on the complacency of that era’s progressives. The ruling assumption had been that material welfare — the greatest happiness of the greatest number — would safeguard the prevailing order.

這不只與生活水平停滯和移民人數增加有關。前幾天，一位德國朋友回憶起上世紀30年代，並向我提起了喬治?奧威爾(George Orwell)對希特勒(Hitler)所寫的《我的奮鬥》(Mein Kampf)一書的評論。奧威爾在這篇寫於1940年的書評中反思了那個時代的進步分子的自滿情緒。當時主流的想法是，物質福利（最大多數人的最大幸福）將保障主要秩序。

But, in Orwell’s words, “human beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flags and loyalty-parades”. It helps, he might have added, if the promised struggle is rooted in identity, with “the other” — be they Jews or Muslims — the enemy.

但用奧威爾的話來說，“人類不僅僅想要舒適、安全、工作時間短、衛生、生育控制以及總體的共識……他們也想要戰鬥和自我犧牲，至少是時斷時續的戰鬥和自我犧牲，更不用說戰鼓、戰旗和表現忠誠的列隊了”。他或許還可以加上一句，如果承諾的戰鬥源於身份，“其他人”——不管是猶太人還是穆斯林——是敵人，那就更好了。

Nazism and Fascism, Orwell was saying, had caught a psychological current. Emotions elbowed aside economic calculation. Something similar is happening today if not, thankfully, on the same level of evil delusion.

奧威爾當時表示，納粹主義和法西斯主義抓住了人們的心理潛流。情感擠掉了經濟方面的考量。如今正在發生類似的事情，不過謝天謝地的是，邪惡妄想的程度不一樣。

For Orwell’s generation the only answer was to fight for its values. Perhaps there is a message here too for all the liberals who have blithely assumed these past few decades that it was enough to declare the end of history.

對奧威爾那代人來說，唯一的答案是爲他們的價值觀而戰。過去幾十年來那些輕率地認定如今已足以宣告歷史終結的自由主義者，或許也可以從中領會到什麼。