俄羅斯可從朝核危機中獲利

One of the people most hated by Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, was the German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, who proclaimed that “the ultimate aim of socialism is nothing, but the movement is everything”. In Soviet schools we had to study Lenin’s fierce criticism of that view, which he saw as revisionist.

布爾什維克(Bolsheviks)領袖弗拉基米爾?列寧(Vladimir Lenin)最討厭的人之一，是德國社會民主黨成員愛德華?伯恩斯坦(Eduard Bernstein)，伯恩斯坦宣稱“運動是一切，社會主義的最終目的是微不足道的”。在蘇聯時代的學校裏，我們不得不學習列寧對這種觀點的激烈批判，他將之視爲修正主義。

Lenin’s concept was the opposite — to achieve a goal as fast as possible, whatever the cost. Russia has long since ditched Leninism, and adopted the Bersteinian approach — that process is more important than the result, which is shown by Moscow’s approach to North Korea. Ironically, Pyongyang still officially follows Lenin’s teaching that the goal justifies any means.

列寧的觀點與伯恩斯坦相反：要儘可能快地達成目的，不惜代價。俄羅斯早就拋棄了列寧主義，並採取了伯恩斯坦的方式——過程比結果更重要，俄羅斯對朝鮮的態度就體現了這種路線。諷刺的是，朝鮮官方仍然遵循列寧的教導：目的證明手段正確。

The North Korean nuclear missile crisis has no easy solution, but managing it is both possible and necessary. And if Russia does this skilfully it will strengthen its position in Asia-Pacific and mark another step away from US hegemony in international affairs. Moscow sees this, and it explains some controversial statements by the country’s officials.

朝鮮導彈危機並無容易的解決方案，但管理這場危機是可能而且必要的。而如果俄羅斯能夠巧妙地做到這一點，那將會加強其在亞太地區的地位，並標誌着進一步弱化美國在國際事務中的霸權。莫斯科方面認識到了這一點，這也解釋了該國官員一些有爭議的表態。

Russia supported the UN Security Council’s resolution to toughen sanctions on North Korea (followed by the latest missile launch, fired towards Japan), but Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, warned that “no further new sanctions?.?.?.?can help avert the deepening threat from the Korean peninsula”.

俄羅斯支持聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)加大對朝鮮實施制裁的決議（之後朝鮮又發射一枚導彈，飛越日本），但俄羅斯常駐聯合國大使瓦西里?涅邊賈(Vasily Nebenzya)警告說：“進一步的新制裁?……無助於防止來自朝鮮半島的威脅繼續加大”。

Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the Russian foreign ministry’s department for non-proliferation and arms control, “unequivocally” rejected Pyongyang’s conduct, but emphasised: “in the absence of truly reliable international legal guarantees for its national security, North Korea relies on nuclear missile weapons, treating them primarily as a deterrent tool”.

俄羅斯外交部防擴散和軍備控制部主任米哈伊爾?烏里揚諾夫(Mikhail Ulyanov)“明確地”反對平壤方面的行爲，但強調說：“在其國家安全沒有真正可靠的國際法律保障的情況下，朝鮮依賴核導彈武器，將其主要作爲一種威懾工具。”

President Vladimir Putin earlier this month condemned the missile tests as “provocative”, but called sanctions “useless and ineffective”. North Korea “would rather eat grass than abandon their [nuclear weapons] programme unless they feel secure”, he said.

俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾?普京(Vladimir Putin)本月早些時候譴責朝鮮導彈試射是“挑釁性的”，但也稱制裁“對朝鮮不起作用”。他說，朝鮮“寧願吃草，也不會放棄他們的（核武）計劃，除非他們感到安全”。

The Kremlin understands the North Korean psychology, since Russia’s leaders have historically also felt besieged. For North Korea, it is not about bargaining, but survival —

俄羅斯瞭解朝鮮人的心理，因爲歷史上俄羅斯的領導人也曾有受到圍困的感覺。對朝鮮來說，發展核武不是討價還價，而是生死攸關——金正恩(Kim Jong Un)知道伊拉克的薩達姆?侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)和利比亞的穆阿邁爾?卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)的下場，他將核導彈視爲自己的生命保障。

Kim Jong Un knows the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammer Gaddafi and sees nuclear missiles as his life insurance.

多年來，朝鮮問題並不是俄羅斯的當務之急，但是國內和國際形勢都發生了變化。莫斯科方面希望利用在政治上轉向亞洲的契機（烏克蘭危機加快了這一進程），給其人口不足且欠發達的遠東地區帶來一股社會經濟驅動力。俄羅斯促進發展的傳統做法不是刺激投資環境，而是創造地緣政治活力，讓自己成爲重要的戰略參與者——就像敘利亞政府軍在戰場上取得進展後，該國發生的情況。

For years North Korea was not a priority for Moscow, but that has changed domestically and internationally. Moscow hopes to use the political pivot to Asia, which was accelerated by the Ukraine crisis, as a socio-economic driver of Russia’s under-populated and under-developed far east. The country’s traditional way of boosting development is not to stimulate the investment climate, but to create geopolitical dynamism and make itself an important strategic player — as happened in Syria in the wake of military advances.

蘭德公司(Rand)最近研究了俄羅斯在中東的戰略後得出結論：“俄羅斯戰略中最明顯的要素——多方位的外交關係或近期的干涉主義傾向——可能會被更長期的經濟、能源和軍備合作所取代。這些合作有可能鞏固俄羅斯的參與，帶來真正的回報，並塑造俄羅斯與地區參與者兩方面的關係。”

A recent study by Rand on Russian strategy in the Middle East concluded: “The most visible elements of Russian strategy — its multi-faceted diplomatic relations or its recent interventionist trend — are likely to be superseded by longer-term economic, energy, and arms deals. These have the potential to cement Russian involvement, generate real returns, and shape the relations of both Russia and regional actors.”

俄羅斯在東亞地位獨特。可能除了美國之外，俄羅斯與所有相關國家都可以合作。中國是一個重要的合作伙伴，俄羅斯與韓國的關係相當密切，與朝鮮的特殊關係仍有歷史迴音，與日本的聯繫也在加強。

Russia is uniquely positioned in east Asia. It has workable relations with all the countries involved, with the possible exception of the US. China is an important partner, relations with South Korea are pretty close, there is still the echo of special relations with North Korea and ties with Japan are strengthening.

朝鮮問題的解決將爲俄羅斯經濟帶來新的機遇，因爲目前一些前景光明的能源和運輸項目（如通往韓國的輸氣管道，以及西伯利亞鐵路的延伸）被朝鮮的孤立和地區衝突升級的風險“擋路”。

Settlement of the North Korean issue would bring new opportunities for the Russian economy, because promising energy and transportation projects (such as the gas pipeline to South Korea and the extension of the Trans-Siberian route) are blocked by the isolation of North Korea and the risk of escalating regional conflict.

持續多年的“六方會談”未能阻止平壤方面的核野心，需要採取新的方法。比起俄羅斯和中國7月在聯合國提出的“雙暫停”——朝鮮凍結導彈試驗，美國和韓國暫停大規模軍事演習，俄中或許可以提出一項更加雄心勃勃的議程。一種可能的解決方案是由俄羅斯和中國發起聯合倡議（不代表美國），向朝鮮提供安全保證，並納入重大區域經濟項目，以換取朝鮮停止挑釁，並接受可驗證的核武及導彈計劃凍結。

Decades of six-party talks have failed to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions and new approaches are needed. Russia and China could probably offer a more ambitious agenda than the “freeze for freeze” presented at the UN in July — North Korea freezes its missile tests and the US and South Korea impose a moratorium on large-scale military exercises. One possibility is a joint initiative by Russia and China (not on behalf of the US), offering North Korea security guarantees and inclusion in major regional economic projects in return for the end of provocations and a verifiable freeze of the nuclear missile programme.

那將給俄羅斯和中國帶來重任，包括有義務對朝鮮不遵守協議作出懲罰。

That would put serious responsibility on Moscow and Beijing, including the obligation to punish North Korea for non-compliance with the agreement.

這可能也會爲朝鮮挽回顏面，因爲這將被包裝爲友邦之間的友好協議，而不是向敵人屈服。但美國將視此爲獎勵無法接受的行爲，並予以抵制。