走出經濟危機先要解決政治危機
A crisis of global capitalism has thrown up a crisis of global politics. Or perhaps it has been the other way round. In truth, the direction of causality scarcely matters. The important point is that only good politics has the capacity to clear up the mess left by bad economics.
全球資本主義危機催生了全球政治危機。又或者反言之，政治危機導致了經濟危機。事實上，哪個是因，哪個是果，一點都不重要。重要的是，只有好的政治制度才能清理壞經濟制度留下的爛攤子。
The future could look brighter. From Washington to Beijing, Berlin to Buenos Aires, everyone signs up to the fact of economic interdependence. But even as the synchronised slump has underlined the implications of this integration, it has turned politics inwards. Voters want shelter from the global storms. Talk of a new architecture for the international system does not quell the anger of the dispossessed and unemployed.
未來可能看上去比較光明。從美國到中國、從德國到阿根廷，每個國家都簽名同意了經濟相互依賴的事實。但正當同步發生的經濟蕭條凸顯出這種一體化的含義之際，政治也被捲了進來。選民們希望避開這場全球風暴。對構建新國際體系的討論無法平息失去房屋和工作的人的憤怒。
For two decades the prosperity that flowed from globalisation, albeit often unevenly distributed, seemed to assure its forward momentum. The world has fallen off the bicycle. The financial crash has exposed the failures and fragilities of globalisation. The unanswered question is whether governments can build a framework to restore its political legitimacy.
20年來，全球化帶來的經濟繁榮——儘管通常分配不均勻——似乎保證了其向前發展的勢頭。世界已經從這輛“自行車”上摔了下來。金融危機已經暴露出了全球化的失敗和脆弱。一個未得到解答的問題是，政府是否能夠建立一個框架來恢復政治合理性。
The present international system is a relic of a bygone era – of a time when the world was described by the competing ideologies of liberal democracy and communism, and when the institutions charged with what passed for global governance were the preserve of the rich nations of the west. The fall of the Berlin Wall was held to mark the triumph of this Washington consensus. The collapse of Lehman Brothers last autumn marked its demise.
當前的國際體系是過往時代的遺蹟——一個被形容爲自由民主和共產主義意識形態之爭的年代，一個負責制定全球治理規則的機構全都是西方富裕國家的領地的時代。柏林牆的倒下被認爲是上述“華盛頓共識”(Washington consensus)勝利的標誌。而雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)去年秋季的倒閉則標誌着它的死亡。
Some hope the Group of 20 summit of world leaders in London early next month will provide a new answer. The G20, it is said, could turn the rising powers of the east and south into stakeholders in a refurbished global order. Gordon Brown, Britain's prime minister and the summit host, has promised governments will at last bring to bear the “global solutions” needed to resolve the economic crisis. After a period of apparent indifference, Barack Obama's new US administration has said it is prepared to show leadership.
一些人希望下月初在倫敦舉行的20國集團(G20)全球領導人峯會，會提供一個新的答案。據說，20國集團可能會將東方和南部的新興國家變成全球新秩序的利益相關者。英國首相戈登•布朗(Gordon Brown)將主持此次峯會。他已承諾，各國政府將最終利用應對此次經濟危機所需的“全球性解決方案”。在經歷了表面上漠不關心的一段時期後，巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)領導的美國新政府已表示，準備發揮其領導作用。
Supporters suggest the G20 could eventually emerge, in a manner of which the Austrian statesman Metternich would have approved, as a global concert of powers: Americans and Asians, Europeans and Africans, Latin Americans and Antipodeans would all sit down to safeguard prosperity and settle conflicts.
支持者們表示，20國集團最終可能會以世界各國協作的面貌出現：美國人和亞洲人、歐洲人和非洲人、拉美人和北美人將一起坐下來維護繁榮並解決衝突。奧地利政治家梅特涅(Metternich)也將同意這種方式。
This enterprise, though, has already hit an embarrassing snag. Diplomats charged with the meeting's preparation confide that, contrary to popular belief, the G20 summit is, well, not really a G20 summit.
然而，該計劃已經遇到了令人尷尬的障礙。負責此次峯會準備工作的外交家表示，與普遍的看法相反，20國集團峯會並非20個國家參加的峯會。
It is true that heads of government from all points north, south, east and west will converge on London. For reasons too complicated to explain in this space, 28 delegations have been invited – 23 (or is it 24?) national leaders as well as the heads of organisations such as the International Monetary Fund.
確實，來自地球東西南北各國的政府首腦將齊聚倫敦。出於諸多過於複雜無法在這裏解釋的原因，28個代表團受邀參加此次峯會——包括23（或者24？）位國家領導人以及國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)等機構的主席。
This numerical confusion, though, does not explain why the event is officially named the London (as opposed to the G20) summit. The problem is rather more substantive. Strange though it seems, there is as yet no agreement among the attendees that the G20 actually exists.
然而，這種數字混亂並沒有解釋爲何此次峯會在官方被稱爲倫敦峯會（而非20國集團峯會）。這個問題更爲重要。儘管看似奇怪，但與會者迄今尚未就20國集團是否真正存在達成一致。
If this sounds surreal, let me refine the last statement. The G20 has long met at the level of finance ministers and central bankers. It has a rotating chairmanship and a secretariat.
如果這聽上去有些超現實，那麼讓我來提煉一下最後一句吧。長期以來，20國集團一直在財長和央行行長級別的會議上碰面。各國輪流擔任主席和祕書長。
But there is no consensus that the group should reach beyond the financial and the economic to become a permanent political institution. To the contrary, some rich nations – Japan and Italy spring to mind – fear regular meetings of G20 leaders would undermine the G8 industrial nations. Others think a G13 – the G8 plus the five biggest emerging nations – would be a more effective global forum.
但尚未達成共識的是，20國集團是否應超越金融和經濟領域，成爲永久性的政治組織。相反，一些富國——日本和意大利的名字在腦海中閃現——擔心，20國集團定期會議將破壞八國集團(G8)。其他人認爲，13國集團(G13)——八國集團加上5個最大新興國家——將成爲更有效的全球論壇。
The temptation is to laugh at the bureaucratic imbecility of such wrangling. Who but the diplomats could care about the precise number after the “G”; or whether we should talk about the London or the G20 summit? What matters surely is that governments, rich and rising, pull in roughly the same direction.
人們不禁嘲笑這種爭論的官僚愚蠢之處。除了外交家，誰會關心G後邊的確切數字；或者誰會關心我們是應討論倫敦峯會還是20國集團峯會呢？重要的問題肯定是富有和正崛起的政府差不多往同一個方向努力。
Sad to say, however, this argument is a painfully perfect metaphor for the more profound confusion and competition standing in the way of effective international co-operation.
然而，遺憾的來說，這種看法是一個完美的令人痛苦的比喻，體現了阻礙國際有效合作的更爲深刻的混亂和競爭。
It is one thing for political leaders to agree that safeguarding globalisation requires more coherent international governance. After all, prominent among the causes of the financial crash was the failure of politics to keep up with economic integration. Global markets ran far ahead of the capacity of governments to oversee, even to understand, them.
政治領袖同意，捍衛全球化需要更爲一致的全球管理，這是一回事。畢竟，在此次金融垮臺的原因中，一個突出的原因是政治未能跟上經濟一體化的步伐。全球市場遠遠領先於政府監管甚至理解市場的能力。
It is quite something else, however, to proceed from this analysis to an accord on how power and responsibility should be shared in a new international system. The rich nations are reluctant to give up their power in the institutions they created in the middle of the past century; the rising powers, notably but not solely China and India, ask why they should be stakeholders in a system in which they have so small a stake.
然而，從這種分析出發，到就如何在一個新的國際體系分擔權力和責任達成一致，這就是另外一回事了。富國不願放棄它們在其上個世紀中葉創建的機構中的權力；新興國家（尤其但不單單是中國和印度）提出，它們爲什麼應該在其權益如此之小的體系中擔當利益相關者。
Thus the US still bridles at any suggestion it should accept arrangements that would limit its national freedom of action. Europeans are more adept at speaking the language of inclusion but, clinging on to the illusions of past greatness, they too find it hard to cede power. Why else would Benelux still have more votes at the IMF than China?
有人建議，美國應接受安排，限制其國家行動自由。美國對這些建議嗤之以鼻。歐洲人更善於說出包容的語言，但仍堅守着過去輝煌的幻想。它們也發現很難放棄權力。比利時-荷蘭-盧森堡聯盟在IMF的投票權爲何高於中國？
The hesitations are not only on the side of the old powers. China wants influence without responsibility: to prosper from international order without shouldering the burdens of sustaining it. India, for all its determination to be recognised as a great power, is overtly contemptuous of anything beyond a narrowly drawn definition of its national interest.
躊躇猶豫的並非只有過去的那些大國。中國希望在不承擔責任的情況下施加影響；在不承擔維持全球秩序的責任的情況下從國際秩序中繁榮。儘管印度決心被視爲一個強國，但它公然輕視任何超出其被狹義定義的國家利益以外的事情。
Reconciling these conflicting interests and anxieties is not a realistic task for a single, or even several, summits, whether of the G20, G13 or some other combination. As with much else in the world today, the pace of progress will depend on the US – the insufficient but still indispensable power.
對於單獨一次甚至幾次峯會（不管是20國集團峯會、13國集團峯會還是其它峯會）而言，協調這些互相沖突的利益和擔憂並非一個現實的任務。由於如今全球還有很多其它任務，前進的步伐將取決於美國——這個不勝任但仍不可缺少的大國。
Those looking for a grand design for the international order are destined to be disappointed. The best one can hope for perhaps is a patchwork of “Gs” in which responsibility and power are more widely distributed. The signs from Washington, and from Beijing, are not all discouraging. Next month's summit, whatever it is called, might make a start.
那些爲全球秩序尋找宏偉計劃的人註定要失望。人們能夠期待的最好的事情是修補“類似的集團峯會”，讓責任和權力得到更廣泛分配。來自華盛頓和北京的跡象並非全都令人沮喪。下月的峯會（不管它的名字是什麼）可能是一個開端。
