伊拉克十年:慢慢復甦路
MESOPOTAMIA, the ancient name for Iraq, means “land between the rivers”. Today, though, the lines which divide the country, not those which circumscribe it, matter most. In the north and south people are emerging from the deepest of traumas into a world of possibilities. The virtually independent Kurdish region and the oil-rich Shia provinces already enjoy peace and a fair, or rising, degree of prosperity. Between them, though, the heart of the country is trapped in ethnic and sectarian strife, vicious political factionalism and foreign meddling. Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, behaves like a mafia don; his bickering rivals look little better.
美索不達米亞，伊拉克古時稱謂，意謂“兩河之間的土地”。可如今，分割伊拉克的線條，而非環繞限定伊拉克的條框，更重要，在北部和南部，人們已遠離傷痛，奔向無限可能的世界。事實上已經獨立的庫爾德地區以及石油豐富的什葉派省份也已盡享和平以及不錯的繁榮，而且還在不斷走向繁榮。不過，在他們中間，該國的中心地區卻飽受民族、宗教衝突，黨派紛爭以及外國勢力干涉。伊拉克總理努裏·卡邁勒·馬利基表現得如同黑手黨頭目，其鬥爭對手也好不了多少。Ten years after the invasion grandly called Operation Iraqi Freedom, and barely 15 months after the last American troops left, the signs of their arrival and passing are scant. Aside from the giant new American embassy in the capital, Baghdad, the monuments of triumph are concrete barriers and checkpoints, fleets of discarded gas guzzlers and the jarring sight of Iraqi soldiers decked out like GIs with sunglasses over their eyes, night-vision gear strapped to their helmets, laser torches and M4 rifles by their sides. Less tangible but more pervasive are the dashed hopes and unfulfilled promises. “They spent a trillion dollars and didn’t leave us a single building,” sniffs an Iraqi politician who once cheered America’s presence.
被冠以“伊拉克自由行動”的入侵已過10年，距最後一批美軍離開伊拉克也剛過去15個月了，而美軍到來與離去標記也明顯不足。除了位於首都巴格達新建的巨型美國大使館，美軍勝利所留下的也多見於混凝土障礙、檢查站，成堆廢棄的燃油機動車，以及那些刺眼的伊拉克士兵，裝扮的如同美國大兵，佩戴着太陽鏡，頭盔上繫着夜視裝備，身旁還配着激光電筒及M4步槍。而相比這些有形的，更多的是破滅的希望和不能兌現的承諾。一位曾歡呼美軍入侵的伊拉克政客諷刺道：“他們花費了萬億美元卻連一棟建築都沒留給我們。”That is a bit harsh. Even Iraqis with bitter memories of the invasion and occupation, the death toll from which has never been definitively established, accept that without foreign armies they could never have toppled Saddam Hussein, the tyrant who dragged the country from calamity to disaster over the three decades to 2003. “They lifted the lid on the tomb we lived in,” says Sarmand al-Taie, a newspaper columnist. “It’s not their fault we haven’t completely climbed out.” The Americans made terrible mistakes, yes, but so have we, is a common refrain.
聽起來可能有些刺耳。事實上，雖然伊拉克民衆回憶起美軍的入侵與佔領還是怨恨不已，對因此而造成的死亡人數至今沒有正式公佈而滿腹牢騷，不過他們也承認如果沒有外國軍事力量，他們也不可能推翻薩達姆·侯賽因--在2003年之前的30年這位暴君一步步將伊拉克由不幸拖入到無底深淵。新聞專欄記者 Sarmand al-Taie說，“我們生活在墳墓之中，美軍移除了墳墓頂蓋。雖然我們沒有完全從中爬出來，可這不是美軍的錯。”美軍犯了嚴重的錯誤，的確，不過我們也一樣， 如此反反覆覆。
The cities, not long after
城市，不久以後Baghdad, where just under a fifth of Iraq’s 33m people now live, remains a maze of compounds and security cordons. On a recent Friday, getting from the city’s old bazaar to Firdos Square, just three kilometres (two miles) away, required a 21km detour. Iraqis endure endless checkpoint queues in return for a lower chance of being caught in a blast or shoot-out. The frequency of attacks has fallen drastically since the sectarian bloodletting of 2006-07, and seven of Iraq’s 18 provinces have murder rates lower than Canada’s. But in Baghdad and the provinces around it outrages still recur with numbing regularity. On February 17th a wave of car bombs in Shia parts of Baghdad killed at least 30 people.
伊拉克3300萬人中，不到五分之一居住在巴格達。如今巴格達儼然成了建築羣與安全隔離區交織的迷宮。上週五，要想從室內的老集市去三公里（2英里）之外的“天堂廣場”(Firdos Square)，需要繞道走21公里。伊拉克民衆忍受着檢查站長長的行進人羣，只爲降低被爆炸和槍戰擊中的機率。自2007-2007年的宗派流血以來，暴力事件發生率已急劇下降，伊拉克18各省份中的7個謀殺率比加拿大還低。不過在巴格達及周邊省份暴行此起彼伏，令人麻木不仁。2月17日巴格達什葉派聚居區發生新一輪汽車爆炸，造成至少30人死亡The capital has some new buildings and fancy shop fronts. But they are rare, suggesting that private investment remains a timid trickle. Armies of street vendors plying their trade through the traffic jams reflect the fact that less than 40% of Iraqi adults have a job, and that a quarter of families live below the World Bank’s poverty line, statistics little improved since the dark days of crushing UN sanctions in the 1990s. Asked how many students Mustansiriya University has, one of them replies glumly that there are about 12,000, “which means we add 4,000 to the ranks of unemployed every year.”
巴格達有些新建築物和高檔商店店面。但是這些還是很稀少，這表明私人投資仍然謹慎量出。街邊小販在擁擠的道路上做起小買賣，這反映出一個事實：伊拉克只有不到40%的人擁有工作，四分之一的家庭生活在世界銀行公佈的貧困線以下。自上世紀90年代聯合國對伊實施沉重的制裁以來，統計數字並未有明顯改善。當問到穆斯坦西里亞大學(Mustansiriya University)有多少學生時，其中一人傷心地說大約12000人，“這也就是說我們每年要向失業大軍中輸送4000人”。Umm Wafa, who with three daughters shares space among 580 other families in an abandoned military hospital on the city’s tattered outskirts, reckons just 5% of her fellow squatters earn a steady income. The house she was forced to flee in the Dora district, occupied now by hostile Sunni neighbours, stands tauntingly close. She gets no state support, and has yet to win compensation for her property despite seven years of government promises. Some 370,000 other internal refugees crowd Baghdad, half in unserviced squatter settlements.
在混亂不堪的市郊，Umm Wafa 和她的三個女兒居住在一座廢棄的軍事醫院，與他們同住的還有另外580戶家庭。Umm Wafa估計在此居住的人中，只有5%的有穩定收入。她被迫離開他在多拉地區的房子。該房如今被敵對的遜尼派人霸佔，嘲笑般地矗立在旁邊。 她沒有國家支持，沒有得到財產補償，儘管政府已承諾了7年。另有國內還有37萬難民涌向巴格達，其中的一半住在無人管理的棚戶區。A dozen checkpoints and a 150km of potholed highway to the south the picture looks impressively different. New flyovers lit by solar-powered lamps, multi-storey car parks and flashy hotels ring the centre of Najaf, a focal point of Shia pilgrimage. The city’s biggest attraction, the shrine of Imam Ali, is getting new gilding on its dome. A $600m, 56,000 square metre extension, designed by Iranian architects, will triple its footprint. The chamber of commerce boasts of $7 billion of foreign investment. “I’m optimistic about the future of this city,” says Haidar Salman, a professor at the city’s Islamic University, “but not so much about Iraq.”
經過一系列檢查站，在凹凸不平的高速公路上向南行駛150公里之後，畫面截然相反，給人深刻印象。使用太陽燈能路燈的立交橋，多層停車場和光彩奪目的酒店環繞着納賈夫中心--納賈夫是什葉派的朝聖中心。該市最具吸引力的地方就是伊瑪姆阿里的神殿，如今其圓頂也剛被鍍上金。而由伊朗設計師設計的擴建項目將是其面積的三倍；該項目造價6億美元，佔地面積達56000平方米。商會聲稱外資達到70億美元。該市伊斯蘭大學的教授Haidar Salman表示：“我對該市的未來很樂觀，不過對伊拉克我就沒這麼樂觀了。”Najaf’s Shia seminaries, historically pre-eminent, were overshadowed during Saddam’s rule by those of the rival Iranian holy city of Qom. Now they have reclaimed their place, says Sheikh Fouad al-Torfi, a mullah imprisoned by both Saddam and the Americans. Najaf’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is accepted by nearly all the world’s 150m Shias as the brightest light of the age. Most Shia religious authorities, Iranians among them, have opened offices here, some attracted by greater freedom compared with Qom.
納賈夫的什葉派神學院在歷史上傑出非凡，不過在薩達姆統治時期卻在伊朗聖城庫姆的競爭下，不禁黯然失色。毛拉（伊斯蘭教神學家）Sheikh Fouad al-Torfi說，如今這些學院已重奪其地位。Sheikh Fouad al-Torfi曾被薩達姆和美軍曾囚禁過。納賈夫大阿雅圖拉西斯塔尼(Ali al-Sistani)幾乎被全球一億五千萬什葉派民衆接受爲當今最明亮的星光。大多數的什葉派當局，包括伊朗，都在該地設有辦公室，其中的因該地比庫姆擁有更大的自由而被吸引過來。The Shia Mecca’s revival is fuelled by a dynamic private sector. The same is true of Kurdistan, which is also booming; it even enjoys power 24 hours a day. In the centre, though, creaky bureaucracy, bickering politicians and lingering insecurity stymie Iraq’s progress. The state employs 3.5m people—65% of the workforce—and accounts for 70% of GDP. It relies for its income almost entirely on oil revenues, which now average $8 billion a month. A recent survey by the International Energy Agency suggests exports could double by 2020, though this will not be easy (see box on next page).
私營部門的活躍也刺激了什葉派麥加的復甦。同樣繁榮的還有庫爾德斯坦，那裏每天24小時電力供應。儘管在伊拉克中心，腐朽的官僚主義、喋喋不休的政客以及揮之不去的安全隱患都阻礙了該國的發展。國家僱傭了350萬人--65%的勞動力--貢獻了GDP的70%。國家收入幾乎全部依賴石油收入，如今平均月收入達到80億美元。國際能源署的最新報告顯示到2020年，出口將加倍，儘管實現起來並不輕鬆（見下頁圖表）In much of the country the private sector is shackled. The World Bank ranks Iraq 165th out of the 185 places rated in its latest index on the ease of doing business; it says that shipping a container in or out of Iraq takes four times as long, and costs three times as much, as it tends to elsewhere in the region. Worse, the bank reports no legislative attempts in the past five years to make access to credit easier or speed the procedures to start a business. Iraq’s lawmakers have been too busy fighting political battles and dividing spoils among parties to attend to such practicalities. The electricity in Baghdad seldom stays on more than a few hours at a time, though new plants are being built.
伊拉克大部分地區，私營部門備受束縛。在世界銀行評估的185個國家經商容易度指數中，伊拉克排在第165位。世行表示向伊拉克進出集裝箱所花費的時間是向該地區其他國家進出的4倍，花費也是其他國家的三倍。更糟糕的是，世行表示在過去的五年伊拉克並沒有進行立法以使信貸更便捷或加快開辦生意流程。伊拉克立法員一直忙於政治相鬥和分割黨派戰利品，根本無暇顧及這些事務。巴格達電力供應很難一次維持數小時，儘管新工廠還在不斷新建。Najaf and the south are doing so much better than Baghdad largely because the Shia majority there feels satisfied with the post-war settlement. From 1546, when the port city of Basra was captured by the Ottoman empire, to the invasion of 2003, Sunni-led states held sway over the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, although the most thickly populated part of the country, south of Baghdad, is largely Shia (see map). The Shia sense of disenfranchisement peaked under Saddam and his mostly Sunni henchmen, whose notion of nation-building included genocide against Kurds and mass execution for members of Shia religious parties they thought allied to Iran. The regime’s previously indiscriminate brutality took a sectarian turn after a failed Shia uprising in 1991.
納賈夫及南部地區比巴格達表現得如此之好很大程度上是因爲兩地的主要派什葉派對戰後穩定秩序滿意。從1546年港口城市巴士拉被奧斯曼帝國佔領到2003年美軍入侵，遜尼派領導的政府一直統治着底格里斯河和幼發拉底河流域，儘管伊拉克大部分人口稠密的地區，如巴格達南部，遜尼派是主體。什葉派對公民權被剝奪的意識在薩達姆及其主要是遜尼派追隨者的統治下達到最高峯，薩達姆建國的計劃就包括對庫爾德人實行種族滅絕，對他們聲稱與伊朗有聯繫的什葉派團體成員實行大規模殺戮。1991年什葉派起義失敗後，薩達姆政權先前不分青紅皁白的殘暴蠻橫開始轉向宗派上來。Understandably, Shias are tempted to regard their current dominance of Iraqi politics with righteous triumphalism. Since the first democratic elections in 2005, Shia-led parties, many of them with clerical or Islamist roots, have had a majority in Iraq’s parliament, as well as the prime minister’s office. They control local government in nine southern provinces. Ordinary Shias share the Najafi businessman’s contempt for Baghdad’s political logjam. Sunni claims of having become Iraq’s new, marginalised underclass fall on deaf ears.
這也就很容易理解，如今什葉派試圖捍衛在伊拉克政治的優勢地位，堅信正義必勝。2005年伊拉克舉行首次民主選舉以來，什葉派領導的政黨--其中的許多有着教士或伊斯蘭根源，如今在伊拉克議會，以及總理辦公室都佔多數。在南部九個省份，他們也控制着當地政府。普通什葉派民衆也和納賈夫的商人一樣，對巴格達政治僵局嗤之以鼻。遜尼派聲稱已成爲伊拉克新一批被邊緣化的下層民衆，卻並未被理睬。After the tables turned
局勢轉變之後，Since mid-December mass protests in the style of the Arab spring have kicked off in Sunni-majority provinces to the north and west of Baghdad. The trigger was the arrest of more than 100 men in the entourage of Rafi Issawi, Mr Maliki’s Sunni minister of finance. A similar move by police units controlled by the prime minister forced Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni deputy prime minister, into exile in 2011. In Mr Issawi’s case all but nine bodyguards were soon released, but the arrests still raised simmering Sunni anger to its boiling point.
自12月中期以來，在巴格達北部、西部以遜尼派爲主體的省份爆發了類似阿拉伯之春的大規模遊行示威。導火索就是100多名拉菲·埃薩維（Rafi Issawi）的工作人員遭到逮捕。拉菲·埃薩維是馬利基政府內的遜尼派財政部長。而此前，由總理控制的警察局也有過類似的行動：2011年迫使遜尼派副總統塔裏克·哈希米（Tariq al-Hashemi）流往國外。在埃薩維事件中，九名保鏢將很快獲釋，但是其餘工作人員依然被關押，這無疑還是會將遜尼派激怒到爆發點。That should have come as no surprise. Diplomats reckon that Iraq’s myriad security services in recent months have held something like 10,000 people, disproportionately Sunnis, in custody on terrorism-related charges. This is similar to the number once held by American forces. The Baghdad government has suspended salaries the Americans paid to Sunni militiamen. The residents of some Sunni parts of Baghdad are subjected to humiliating searches when leaving their neighbourhoods; on Fridays, days of prayer and protest, they are not let out at all.
這也在意料之中。外交官員估計伊拉克龐大的安全機構在最近數月拘捕了約10000人，其中的遜尼派比例嚴重失衡，他們都因與恐怖組織相關連而被收押。這與美軍曾關押的數字大抵相當。伊拉克政府也凍結了美軍付給遜尼派軍事人員的薪水。巴格達部分遜尼派聚居區的民衆離開家後便遭到羞辱性的搜查；在週五的禱告日和遊行示威期間，他們更是不能出門。Mr Maliki has responded to Sunni protests with concessions, promises and veiled threats. A committee he formed to hear their demands says it has released more than 2,000 prisoners, and resumed or increased salaries for 74,000 militiamen. Despite one incident in January when police opened fire on a mob in Falluja, an ever-restive Sunni city, killing five, security forces have for the most part avoided confronting protesters.
馬利基在迴應遜尼派的抗議時，做出了讓步、承諾以及隱含的威脅。馬利基組建了一個專門的委員會，傾聽示威者的要求。該委員會表示已釋放2000多名嫌犯，重新發放並提高了74000名軍事人員的薪水。儘管一月份在費盧傑(Falluja)--頑固無比的遜尼派城市，警方朝示威人羣開火，造成五人死亡，但是安全部隊在大多數情況下一直避免正面對抗示威者。Shia politicians warn that their own constituents are increasingly alarmed by the sight of Baathist slogans and jihadist banners in the Sunni protests. They are terrified that the increasingly sectarian civil war in Syria could create a hostile, Sunni-led post-Assad neighbour. Some speak of the need to rearm and prepare for another round of sectarian conflict.
什葉派政客警告稱，其本派民衆也越來越擔心遜尼派示威遊行中出現的復興社會黨（Baathist）的口號及聖戰組織標語。他們擔心敘利亞不斷升級的宗派內戰會促使產生一個充滿敵意的、遜尼派領導的支持阿薩德的團體。一些人則指出需要重新武裝，爲新一輪的宗派爭鬥做準備。Mr Maliki, who first came to power as a compromise prime minister in 2005 and then patched together a flimsy government in 2010, bears much of the blame for provoking these tensions. The move against Mr Issawi baffled Iraqi and foreign observers, who see Mr Maliki’s grudging response to the subsequent anger as foolishly inadequate. The grievances of the Sunnis who feel ignored go beyond salaries and harsh policing to a more general anger over rampant corruption and resentment of Mr Maliki’s dictatorial tendencies.
2005年各方妥協之下馬利基首次就任伊拉克總理，隨後於2010年拼湊脆弱的新一屆政府。如今對局勢的不斷激化緊張，馬利基承擔大部分責任。這起針對埃薩維行動使得伊拉克國內及國外的觀察者難以理解。他們認爲馬利基對隨之而發生的怨恨迴應過於吝嗇，愚蠢可笑。遜尼派民衆感到備受忽視，他們已由原先對薪水及暴力執法的憤怒，演變爲對貪污成風的普遍惱怒，對馬利基政府越來越獨裁的怨恨。Yet most observers seem to think Iraq can avoid returning to mayhem. Few in Iraq’s political class relish the idea of renewed conflict, says a London-based analyst. He cites as positive signs that Sunni protests have remained peaceful so far, and that calls for the removal of Mr Maliki or scrapping the 2005 constitution, the drafting of which most Sunni politicians boycotted to their later regret, have failed to gain traction. Some Shia politicians, including Muqtada al-Sadr, a young cleric with a strong following who was long branded a dangerous firebrand, have even voiced sympathy with Sunni demands.
不過大部分觀察家傾向於伊拉克可以避免重返混亂無序的狀態。倫敦的一位分析家表示，在伊拉克政治階層，幾乎沒有人考慮重挑爭端。遜尼派的遊行示威迄今和平有序；要求罷免馬利基或廢除2005年憲法（絕大多數的遜尼派後來後悔抵制該法的起草）的呼聲也沒能得到響應。他表示這些都是積極的信號。Muqtada al-Sadr是位年輕的牧師，擁有很強的號召力，長期以來一直被視爲是危險的煽動叛亂的人。如今他和其他一些什葉派政治家呼籲關心同情遜尼派的訴求。If there is no dire reason to fear things getting worse, though, there is not much hope for improvement either. Iraq’s politics are a mess of micro-parties in ever-shifting alliances. In the 2010 elections a centrist, secular-leaning bloc, Iraqiya, actually won more seats than Mr Maliki’s party, but fell to bickering amid the peculiar reluctance of its leader, Iyad Allawi, to visit parliament. The political class’s rejection of seemingly sensible reforms and proclivity for intrigue and factionalism have strengthened Mr Maliki as much as his determination to divide and rule.
如果沒有極端的理由擔心局勢會變得更差，可是，也沒有多少希望局勢復甦的希望。伊拉克的政治就是些混亂不堪的小黨派，黨派同盟變化無常。2010年選舉時，中間派的、世俗傾向的的政黨聯盟“伊拉克名單”(Iraqiya)實際上比馬利基的政黨多兩票，但奇怪的是，其領導人阿拉維不情願訪問議會，聯盟陷入爭吵。政治階層拒絕看起來合理的改革，不再理會爾虞我詐和黨派紛爭，鞏固了馬利基的地位，以及其分而治之的決心。Trouble with the neighbours
與鄰之爭Mr Maliki’s efforts to control military appointments, his use of state perks to woo defections from opposition blocs, his abuse of police power and his increasingly brazen appeals to Shia sentiment are all lamentable. Yet these may also be seen as natural responses to the pressures on him. “I’m not sure that anyone else would act much different, and it’s not as if the opposition are offering any alternative,” says a diplomat in Baghdad.
馬利基竭力謀求掌控軍隊任命權，利用國家特權拉攏反對派頭程叛變，濫用警力，變得愈發厚顏無恥得迎合什葉派感情。這的確可悲可嘆。不過，這也可以看做是馬利基深處壓力之中的本能反應罷了。巴格達一名外交官員表示：”我不確定其他人會不會有所不同，反對派似乎也不能提供可選方案。”Western diplomats are often irked by the blind eye Mr Maliki turns to Iranian influence in the country—but they also understand that it is inevitable. The Islamic Republic sponsors several armed and virulently sectarian Shia factions. It also, to the annoyance of Western countries and Sunnis, flies regular cargoes over Iraqi airspace to bolster the flailing Assad regime in Syria. But this does not mean that Iraq is fully under Iranian sway. Very few of Iraq’s Shia leaders subscribe to Iran’s state ideology of velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the jurist. And in increasing its oil exports[做狀語，其中的its是指伊拉克] Iraq is clearly pursuing its own interests, not its neighbour’s. The extent to which Iraqi exports have steadied oil prices vexes the cash-strapped and sanctions-crippled regime next door.
馬利基對伊朗在伊拉克的影響熟視無睹，這使得西方外交官憤怒不已，不過他們也知道這無可避免。因爲伊朗這個伊斯蘭共和國支持了不少武裝及危險的什葉派宗教團體。使西方國家及遜尼派憤怒的是，伊朗還定期飛越伊拉克上空，向垂死掙扎的敘利亞阿薩德政權提供貨物。不過這並不是說伊拉克完全受伊朗影響。幾乎沒有伊拉克什葉派領導人贊同伊朗的法基赫的監護（velayat-e faqih）國家理念。伊拉克不斷提高石油出口量，很明顯其要保護本國的利益，而非鄰國伊朗的。伊拉克出口在多大程度上穩定了油價，這使得缺乏現金、飽受制裁之困的隔壁煩惱不已。“We share Iran’s concerns about Syria, but not its strategic interests,” explains Naama Obaidi, a cleric who runs a Najaf think-tank. “And we respect that Iran, which fought a long war with us, and faces big threats, should exert lots of its intelligence effort here.” But while Iraq is willing to accommodate Iran, he says, it will not embrace it fully—unless pushed by fear of its Sunni neighbours.
在納賈夫運營着一家智庫的牧師Naama Obaidi說：”我們贊同伊朗對敘利亞的關切，而非贊同其戰略利益。”“伊朗曾與我們交戰多年，如今也面臨巨大威脅。我們認爲伊朗應將其才能發揮在這些地方。”他還表示：“儘管伊拉克願意接受伊朗，但並不會完全敞開懷抱，除非擔心被其遜尼派近鄰所逼。”One of those is Turkey, which has often appeared to consider Iraq’s Shia-dominated government as a catspaw for Iran and acted accordingly. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has repeatedly clashed with Mr Maliki. Iraqi officials contend that their neighbour to the north, which runs a thriving $17 billion trade with Iraq, has promoted both Kurdish and Sunni obstinacy in dealing with Baghdad. A Western official says that it would be hard to exaggerate Turkey’s recklessness.
其中的一個近鄰就是土耳其。土耳其常視伊拉克什葉派政府爲伊朗的爪牙，並採取相應行動。土耳其總理雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)常常與馬利基總理惡語相向。伊拉克官員很高興看到，其北方近鄰土耳其在庫爾德人和遜尼派頑固者與巴格達交往中推動作用。土耳其與伊拉克的貿易也蒸蒸日上，達到了170億美元。一位西方官員表示很難誇大土耳其的輕率魯莽。Mr Maliki will probably serve out the rest of his current term, which ends in April 2014. That is not good news for Iraq, but not entirely bad, either. Just keeping a lid on things, as oil revenues grow and begin to percolate downwards, may be a realistic ambition for a country divided internally and surrounded by strife. Muwafaq al-Rubaie, a former national security adviser of courtly demeanour who displays the noose that hanged Saddam in his heavily guarded villa beside the Tigris, insists that Iraq’s trajectory is generally upwards, not steeply so but recognisably. “Compromise in Arabic is a bad word,” he says, “but reaching it at the eleventh hour is one thing we have learned.”
馬利基可能會繼續其剩餘任期，直到2014年4月。對伊拉克來說，這不是個消息，不過也不是個很壞的消息。隨着石油收入增加，並開始流入民間，僅僅控制某些事情，對國內四分五裂、爭吵不斷的伊拉克來說也許也是一個現實的目標。舉止典雅的前國家安全顧問Muwafaq al-Rubaie在底格里斯河旁戒備深嚴的別墅裏展示了絞死薩達姆的繩套，他堅信伊拉克的軌道前進上升的，而非大起大落，很容易辨認。他還說：”妥協在阿拉伯是個糟糕的詞彙，但是在最後一刻妥協是我們必須學會的東西。
