俄羅斯爲何不接受烏克蘭債務重組

Imagine the Greek government had insisted that EU institutions accept the same haircut as the country’s private creditors. The reaction in European capitals would have been frosty. Yet this is the position now taken by Kiev with respect to Ukraine’s $3bn eurobond held by Russia.

想象一下，如果希臘政府堅持要歐盟機構接受與該國私人部門債權人同樣的“削髮”(haircut)，歐洲各國政府將會反應冷淡。然而，基輔方面現在對其欠俄羅斯的30億美元歐洲債券就是這種立場。

In late 2013, Ukraine had been in recession for more than a year, its current account deficit was becoming unsustainable, its interNational reserves were barely enough to cover three months’ imports, and no other creditor was prepared to lend on terms acceptable to Kiev. Yet Russia provided $3bn of much-needed funding at a 5 per cent interest rate, when Ukraine’s bonds were yielding nearly 12 per cent.

2013年年末，烏克蘭已陷入衰退一年多時間，其經常賬戶赤字變得不可持續，國際儲備僅能勉強覆蓋3個月的進口需求，而且沒有其他債權人準備以基輔能夠接受的條款提供貸款。然而，就在那種情況下，俄羅斯以5%的利率爲烏克蘭提供了其亟需的30億美元資金，而當時烏克蘭債券的收益率接近12%。

Russia’s financing was not made for commercial gain. Just as America and Britain regularly do, it provided assistance to a country whose policies it supported. The US is now supporting the current Ukrainian government through its USAID guarantee programme.

俄羅斯並不是爲了商業收益而提供資金的。就像美國和英國經常做的那樣，俄羅斯向政策受到其支持的國家提供援助。美國現在通過其國際開發署(USAID)擔保計劃支持烏克蘭現政府。

Because the loan came from our National Wealth Fund, which can only invest in securities, it was structured as a eurobond. It is nonetheless an official credit, as the management and staff of the International Monetary Fund are widely reported to have acknowledged.

由於貸款來自我們只能投資於證券的“國家財富基金”，因此它被設計爲歐洲債券的結構。但它是一筆官方信貸，正如媒體普遍報道的那樣，國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的管理層和員工都承認這一點。

Longstanding international practice dictates that Russia’s official credit should have been afforded preferential treatment compared with private credits, and the same treatment as other official credits. Yet when Ukraine recently restructured its debt it treated Russia’s claim as a private credit, while excluding all other official credits (including USAID-guaranteed credits) from the 20 per cent haircut and four-year maturity extension agreed with private creditors.

長期的國際慣例要求，俄羅斯的官方信貸應該得到比私人信貸更優先的對待，也就是得到和其他官方信貸相同的待遇。然而，烏克蘭最近在重組其債務時將俄羅斯的債權視爲私人信貸，同時把其他所有官方信貸（包括USAID擔保的信貸）排除在該國與私人部門債權人達成的重組（20%“削髮”和4年期限延長）以外。

Russia has experience of accepted international practice. Following the August 1998 financial crisis, our private creditors wrote off more than one-third of their claims, while official creditors refused to accept any haircut. More recently, European authorities insisted that Greece’s private creditors accept an even larger haircut, but rejected Greece’s requests that its official creditors write-off a portion of their claims.

俄羅斯有過按照公認國際慣例行事的經歷。在1998年8月金融危機之後，我們的私人部門債權人註銷了逾三分之一的債權，同時官方債權人拒絕接受任何“削髮”。近年，歐洲當局堅持要求希臘的私人部門債權人接受更大幅度的“削髮”，但拒絕了希臘提出的官方債權人減記一部分債權的要求。

The IMF, which has long refused to lend to countries that are in arrears on payments to official creditors, earlier this week accelerated a change to this policy in advance of the December 2015 maturity date on our eurobond. Russia has no desire to see the IMF curtail its funding programme for Ukraine, but we are concerned that changing this policy in the context of Ukraine’s politically charged restructuring may raise questions as to the impartiality of an institution that plays a critical role in addressing international financial instability.

一直拒絕向拖欠官方債權人債務的國家提供貸款的IMF，偏偏在2015年12月我們的歐洲債券到期前夕加快了對該政策的修改。俄羅斯並不想看到IMF削減其對烏克蘭的融資項目，但我們擔心，在烏克蘭從政治出發的債務重組的背景下改變該政策，可能讓人懷疑一家在解決國際金融不穩定方面扮演關鍵角色的機構的公正性。

Official bilateral lending is an indispensable supplement to the IMF’s own funding efforts. If the IMF were to lend into arrears on Russia’s eurobond, official bilateral creditors are likely to be reluctant to lend to sovereign borrowers that cannot access private markets, for fear that their public policy-motivated financing may be restructured with the claims of the debtor’s private, profit-seeking lenders. This is why the IMF has long refused to lend into official arrears.

官方雙邊貸款是對IMF自身信貸努力不可或缺的補充。如果IMF向拖欠俄羅斯歐洲債券的國家提供貸款，那麼官方雙邊債權人可能不願向無法進入私人市場的主權借款人提供貸款，擔心由公共政策驅動的融資可能與尋求謀利的私人機構債權人的債權一起被重組。這就是IMF一直拒絕向拖欠官方債務的債務人提供貸款的原因。

It must be a core principle of IMF lending that a borrower may receive funding only if it negotiates in good faith with official creditors. Ukraine has not. In addition to refusing to treat Russia’s claim as an official credit, Ukraine has contractually committed in its new private-sector bonds not to repay Russia’s claim in accordance with its terms, and not to offer Russia an alternative having a value even equal to the package offered to private sector creditors.

IMF放貸的核心原則必須包括這樣一條：借款人只有在與官方債權人真誠談判的情況下才會得到融資。烏克蘭沒有這麼做。該國不僅拒絕將俄羅斯的債權視爲官方信貸，還在其新的私人部門債券合同中承諾不按照原有條款償還俄羅斯的債權，也沒有爲俄羅斯提供哪怕在價值上相當於私人部門債權人待遇的替代方案。

In contrast, Russia has exercised considerable restraint in not accelerating its eurobond — which could have seriously complicated Ukraine’s restructuring — even though Ukraine long ago breached its undertaking not to allow its debt to exceed 60 per cent of its GDP. Russia has also proposed to defer our eurobond, so that it would be repaid in three annual instalments of $1bn in 2016, 2017 and 2018, with interest and a suitable western guarantee. The IMF has publicly called our proposal a “positive step”.

相比之下，俄羅斯表現出了極大的剋制，沒有要求提前償付歐洲債券——那可能讓烏克蘭的債務重組變得極爲複雜——即便烏克蘭早就違背了債務與GDP之比不超過60%的承諾。俄羅斯還提議對我們的歐洲債券展期，在2016年、2017年和2018年每年分期償還10億美元，外加利息並由西方提供適當擔保。IMF公開表示，我們的提議是“積極的一步”。

The international framework that has guided debtors, creditors and others in dealing with sovereign financial distress over the past 50 years has been successful in large part due to the work of the IMF. Its well-founded principles should be changed only after due consideration, and not in response to the politics of the moment.

在過去50年裏指引債務人、債權人以及其他方面處理主權金融危機的國際框架一直是非常成功的，這在很大程度上歸功於IMF的工作。它的有理有據的原則應當在充分考慮之後才做出改變，而不應只是響應當下的政治。