中國債務週期 勇敢者的遊戲

How times change in China. Or maybe not. This year the People’s Bank of China replaced its monthly loan quota system with a new procedure — its Macro Prudential Assessment to monitor credit growth.

中國的變化多快啊。嗯，也許沒怎麼改變。今年，中國央行(PBoC)用新的流程——宏觀審慎評估體系(Macro Prudential Assessment)——取代了月度貸款配額機制，以監測信貸增長。

The change comes at a time when once again the flow of total credit is being ratcheted up, both from the banks and the non-banks in an effort to support economic expansion.

此舉出臺之際，中國總的信貸資金流（源自銀行和非銀行類機構）規模再次加大，以求支持經濟擴張。

Between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of the third quarter of last year, non-financial sector debt swelled 279 per cent and now amounts to 249 per cent of gross domestic product, data from the Bank for International Settlements show. Those numbers do not capture the jump in credit in recent months. China’s banks are meant to do their national service in a variety of ways — and never mind their obligations to minority shareholders.

國際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的數據顯示，2008年第四季度至去年第三季度末期間，非金融部門的債務擴大了279%，如今相當於國內生產總值(GDP)的249%。這些數據並未計入最近幾個月信貸的激增。中國各銀行存在的目的就是以各種方式服務於國家——對少數股東的義務就別提了。

As Chris Wood, at Citic Securities, notes, recent talk of the banks converting part of their debts into the equity of their weaker corporate clients points to the “political reality that the interests of the banks could be subordinated to the interests of the real economy — a potential negative for shareholders in Chinese banks”.

正如中信證券(Citic Securities)的克里斯•伍德(Chris Wood)所指出的，近期有關銀行把它們對較疲弱企業客戶的部分債權轉換爲股權的言論，表明了“這樣一個政治現實：銀行的利益可能會屈從於實體經濟的利益，這對中資銀行的股東可能是個壞消息”。

It also suggests that another distressed debt cycle looms.

這也預示着又一個不良債務週期將要開啓。

There have already been seven corporate defaults this year, with more likely. Credit spreads have widened as a result, which means that after a rush of issuance, the bond market may not be as kind to issuers, Mr Wood adds.

今年已經發生了七起企業違約，還可能發生更多違約事件。伍德補充說，這已導致信貸息差擴大，意味着在經歷一輪債券發行熱潮之後，債券市場對發行人可能不再像過去那樣友好。

Many bold foreign investors are starting to consider the opportunity either in buying up loan portfolios, or in extending rescue financing to those sectors where the banks are forbidden to lend. Options include offering funds to property developers to buy new land banks, and taking as collateral existing projects.

許多大膽的外國投資者正在開始考慮兩方面的機遇：一是買進貸款組合，二是向銀行被禁止放款的那些部門提供援救資金。他們的選項包括向房地產開發商提供買入新的土地儲備的資金，並接受現有項目作爲抵押品。

In April, Huarong and Cinda , the asset management arms of ICBC and Cinda respectively set up by Beijing to help clean up bad loans, reported strong earnings, particularly in their distressed debt businesses, with annualised yields of about 12 per cent on restructured loans and returns of more than 20 per cent on disposed assets, CreditSights, the fixed income research boutique says. The combined purchase of distressed debt assets amounted to almost Rmb400bn ($61.4bn) in 2015, up 31 per cent from 2014, with sellers including non-financial institutions and banks.

固定收益研究機構CreditSights表示，今年4月，中國政府爲了幫助清理不良貸款而設立的資產管理公司——華融(Huarong)和信達(Cinda)報出強勁的盈利增長，尤其是在不良債權業務上，重組貸款的年化收益約爲12%，處置資產的回報率超過20%。2015年不良債權資產的總收購規模達到近4000億元人民幣（合614億美元），比2014年上升了31%；賣家包括多家非金融機構和銀行。

Much of that activity came from restructuring property debt, CreditSights adds. While this shows there is opportunity, it is not clear whether that extends to outsiders.

CreditSights補充說，這些業務活動有很大一部分來自對地產債務的重組。儘管這顯示該領域存在機遇，但這些機遇會不會向局外人開放仍是一個問題。

Since Guangdong International Trust and Investment defaulted in 1998 — becoming the first formal bankruptcy of a big Chinese financial institution after its failure to repay a $120m loan to a foreign lender — foreigners have ventured into this treacherous turf with caution.

1998年，在未能向一家外資銀行償付1.2億美元的貸款後，廣東國際信託投資公司(Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp)成爲中國首家正式破產的大型金融機構。自那次違約以來，外國投資者在進入這個危險的領域時小心謹慎。

There is a belief that China lacks a level playing field, that few transactions occur at market prices and that there is not a clear rule of law, although bankruptcy processes are more transparent. Moreover, it is not obvious whether this cycle will be more or less virulent than the last one.

有一種觀點認爲，中國缺少公平的競技場，幾乎沒有以市場價達成的交易，也不存在明確的法治——儘管破產流程的透明度提高了。此外，下一個週期的嚴重性是否會超過上一個也尚未明朗。

Huarong’s performance was based on disposals from the last cycle, leading CreditSights to wonder how sustainable such results are, given the structural slowdown, the painful progress in reforming state-owned enterprises and in cutting chronic overcapacity in numerous sectors. Many of the problem assets come from the heartland of China, an area that stretches from the rust belt in the north-east to the mines of Shanxi in the interior. Industrial profits have improved. But a big part of that improvement comes from activities separate to the core business of industrial companies and investment income, JPMorgan says.

華融的業績建立在上一輪債務週期不良資產的處置之上，這令CreditSights揣測：考慮到結構性放緩、改革國企和削減諸多部門長期過剩產能的痛苦過程，這樣的業績可持續性如何？許多問題資產來自中國的傳統工業腹地，從東北的“鏽帶”老工業區延伸至內陸山西省的煤礦。摩根大通(JPMorgan)表示，雖然工業利潤近來有所提高，但是這一提高有很大一部分來自工業企業核心業務以外的活動以及投資收入。