核氾濫 南亞核武器的建立仍然是恐怖異常

THE militant attack early on August 16th on the Minhas air-force base in Kamra, just 40km (25 miles) outside Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, involved an intense gunfight but was beaten back without much difficulty. Yet probably not before it had rattled nerves in the White House. According to a new book ("Confront and Conceal") by David Sanger of the New York Times, late last year Barack Obama told his staff that his "biggest single national-security concern" was that Pakistan might disintegrate and set off a scramble for its nuclear weapons.

8.16日早晨，僅僅距離巴基斯坦首伊斯蘭堡40公里遠（25英里）的卡姆拉明罕斯空軍基遭到了一次武裝襲擊，雙方發生了激烈的槍戰，但是，武裝襲擊被輕鬆擊退了。然而，可能在此之前這次襲擊事件也讓白宮緊張了一把。根據一本叫《面對與隱瞞》的新書——作者是紐約時報的大衛桑格---披露：去年末，巴拉克奧巴馬曾經告訴他的同僚，當時他最關注的單一國家安全問題——就是巴基斯坦可能會解體，並且會發生爭奪核武器的戰爭。

Inevitably Pakistan denied that Minhas held any of its nuclear warheads, believed to number about 100. In any event the country's security arrangements, it claims, are "perfect". As for the fear of "disintegration", officials are used to pooh-poohing the overheated fears of foreign doom-mongers. Even if bearded fanatics entered the presidential palace and proclaimed a new caliphate, they would dismiss it as a minor upset and offer a cup of tea.

巴基斯坦不出意料地否認說：明罕斯基地沒有任何核彈頭（據說核彈頭數目大概有100枚）。巴方聲稱，任何有關本國的安全佈置都很"完美"。對於"解體"的擔心，官方人員總是對國外末世論者的過度擔心嗤之以鼻。即使滿臉大鬍子的狂熱分子進入巴總統府，宣佈一個新的伊斯蘭教國王職權，他們也將會把它視之爲一個小小的動亂置之不理，心安理得地喝着茶。

Yet Mr Obama is right to worry that Pakistan's warheads and fissile material could end up in the wrong hands. He should also fret about their future in the "right" hands. Fourteen years after India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers, the world has become rather blasé about the risks of a subcontinental nuclear confrontation.

然而奧巴馬先生擔心——巴基斯坦的核彈頭和核燃料最終可能落到歹人之手——是有理由的。他也會爲這些核彈頭和核燃料未來在該掌控它們的人手中而擔心。十四年前印度和巴基斯坦宣佈自己掌握了核能。而世界對次大陸覈對峙的危險越來越不在意。

The history of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal gives at least three reasons for concern. First, no country has such an appalling record as a proliferator of nuclear know-how-and the proliferator-in-chief, A.Q. Khan, remains a national hero. Second, parts of the Pakistani establishment seem to sympathise with militant Islamist movements. It is hard to believe that no senior official or army officer was aware of the late Osama bin Laden's comfortable sojourn in Abbottabad, a stone's throw from an elite military academy. As Mr Sanger reported in an earlier book ("The Inheritance"), in August 2001 a nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, met bin Laden. Mr Sanger quotes an American spook as saying that Mr Mahmood "was our ultimate nightmare. He had access to the entire Pakistani programme. He knew what he was doing. And he was completely out of his mind."

根據巴基斯坦核軍火庫的歷史，至少有三個理由值得人們擔心。首先，沒有國家擁有這樣讓人觸目驚心的核專用技術擴散記錄---核擴散主管阿卜杜拉-卡迪爾-可漢，到現在對巴基斯坦人來說還是個民族英雄。第二，巴基斯坦建立核武器的部分原因似乎與同情激進的伊斯蘭運動有關。一名優秀軍事學院的內部人員認爲，巴基斯坦國的資深官員或者部隊官員不知道奧斯馬-本拉登在阿伯塔巴德逗留的最新消息——這一點讓人很難相信。就像桑格先生在他早期的書《遺產》中寫道的，2001年8月，一名叫蘇丹-馬哈茂德的核科學家拜會了本拉登。桑格先生引用一個美國間諜的說法，馬哈茂德先生是"我們的終極噩夢，他知道巴基斯坦全部的核計劃。他知道他在幹什麼。他簡直是瘋了。"

Third is the risk of terrorists breaching Pakistan's defences. Al-Qaeda and other militant groups are known to be desperate to get their hands on fissile material or an assembled warhead. As Pakistan is apparently increasing its arsenal as fast as it can and investing in smaller and more easily waylaid weapons, the risks are mounting. This was the fourth attack by extremist groups on Minhas alone. Five other sites linked to the nuclear programme have also been targets.

第三，破壞巴基斯坦防禦措施的恐怖分子的威脅。人們知道，基地組織和其他激進組織都不顧一切地想把核燃料或者組裝好的核彈頭弄到手。很明顯，巴基斯坦現在盡它可能地增加它的核武器庫，並且在更小規模和更容易伏擊的武器上面大量投資。這樣的話，風險就會越來越大了。僅在明罕斯，這已經是激進組織發動的第四次襲擊了。其它五個與核計劃有關的基地也成爲了攻擊目標。

Pakistan is not at imminent risk of a fundamentalist takeover. But the long-term trends are in the wrong direction. That is why America has given it hundreds of millions of dollars to keep its nuclear weapons safe, even though their very existence is an affront to the non-proliferation doctrine. In an irony typical of the United States-Pakistan "alliance", the chief threat Pakistan now perceives to its arsenal is from America itself. Just after the American raid on Abbottabad in 2011 that killed bin Laden, Pakistan stepped up efforts to secure its nuclear weapons, by dispersing bits of them around the country. One way it does this, apparently, is in unobtrusive civilian vans that can get stuck in traffic.

巴基斯坦現在還沒有面臨立刻被原教旨主義接管的危險。但是長期發展趨勢卻已經偏離了正確方向。那也是美國給它數億美元讓它保持核武器安全的原因，即使這些武器的存在已經違反了核武器不擴散原則。在美國-巴基斯坦聯盟中，讓人感到典型並且充滿諷刺的是，現在巴基斯坦認爲它的核武器庫的主要威脅來自於美國本身。就在2011年，美國突襲阿伯塔巴德殺死本拉登後，巴基斯坦把它的核武器分散到了巴全國，以進一步加強它的核武器的保護能力。其中一種保護方式，就是把核武器藏在那些隨時可能會遇到交通堵塞的不顯眼民用卡車裏，運到目的地。

Perhaps even Pakistani generals accept that this is not an ideal disaster-avoidance plan. Fear of capture or pre-emptive destruction of their nuclear defences seems to be one reason why they are determined to develop a third leg, after air- and land-based delivery systems, to Pakistan's nuclear "triad": nuclear-armed ships and submarines. As Iskander Rehman of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank, observes in a recent paper, Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry is drifting "from the dusty plains of the Punjab and Rajasthan into the world's most congested shipping lanes." "It is only a matter of time," he argues, "before Pakistan formally brings nuclear weapons into its own fleet."

可能甚至巴基斯坦將軍都會承認，這不是一個理想的避免災難計劃。被抓到或者核防禦被對方先發制人破壞的擔心，似乎解釋了爲什麼他們決定開發空中、陸地運輸系統以外的第三個系統——核艦艇和核潛艇，以對付巴基斯坦的核黑社會。就像諮詢機構---卡內基國際和平基金會的伊斯坎德爾-拉赫曼在最近報道中觀察到的，印巴核競爭已經從塵土飛揚的旁遮普邦及拉賈斯坦邦草原上轉移到了世界最擁擠的海上航道上。他認爲，"在巴基斯坦正式把核武器納入其武器系列之前，這只是個時間問題。"

Other reasons for expecting this include a perceived need to match India's own development of sea-based systems, missiles and missile defences, and fear that a future government in Afghanistan might be hostile. Pakistan has always felt the need for "strategic depth" in any conflict with India. In the nuclear age this has meant the ability to scatter defences around its western neighbour. Unlike India, Pakistan has never adopted a "no-first-use" nuclear doctrine. Huge fans of their bombs, Pakistani strategists argue that deterrence works. They point to Pakistan's incursion in Kargil in 1999 and repeated terrorist attacks since then blamed on Pakistan. None provoked full-scale war. Three wars were fought between 1947 and 1971. So this is progress, of a sort.

其他期待的核武器原因，包括：認爲要能夠與印度人自己開發的海上系統，導彈和導彈防禦相抗衡的需要，和對阿富汗未來政府敵意舉動的擔心。巴基斯坦總是覺得：在任何與印度的衝突中都有戰略縱深的需要。在覈戰爭時代，這個意味着，在它西部鄰國的周圍，巴基斯坦要有分散防禦的能力。不像印度，巴基斯坦從未接受過"不首先使用核武器"的核條令。巴基斯坦戰略家認爲，對熱衷於自殺式炸彈的狂熱分子們來說，這個還是有一定震懾作用的。他們指出，自從巴基斯坦在1999年侵入克什米爾地區時起，後來多次的恐怖襲擊都因此歸咎於巴基斯坦。沒有人願意挑起全面戰爭。1947年到1971年之間只發生了三次戰爭。所以這也算是一種進步。

Hot finish?

熱情似火的結果？

Naval nuclearisation makes this analysis look recklessly complacent. India has been working on "Cold Start", a plan for a blitzkrieg invasion of Pakistan that would not provoke nuclear war. India might think Pakistan is bluffing in its professed willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons against Indian ground troops on Pakistani soil. Weapons at sea could lower the threshold. Pakistan might be less loth to use battlefield nuclear weapons against an aircraft-carrier strike force than soldiers on its own soil.

海軍核動力讓這種分析看起來就像是坐井觀天。印度一直在努力進行一個"冷啓動"計劃——針對巴基斯坦，不會挑起核戰爭的閃電侵入計劃。印度可能認爲--巴基斯坦公開宣稱在巴自己的國土上，它可以使用戰略核武器來對付印度地面部隊--這是在吹牛。海上作戰武器要求沒有那麼高。相比於用戰地核武器對付那些士兵。巴基斯坦可能更樂意，在自己的國土上使用戰地核武器來對付具有攻擊力的航空母艦。

As nukes move to sea, "dual-use" platforms that can be used for both conventional and nuclear weapons create an even more hazardous ambiguity than they do on land. What India sees as a prudent defensive response to China's naval build-up might easily be taken by Pakistan as aggressive. A competitive arms race beckons-with the added twist that the navy, which would be in charge of seaborne nuclear weapons, is thought to be the branch of Pakistan's armed forces most infiltrated by extremists.

當核潛艇駛向海洋時，可以同時用於常規武器和核武器的雙重用途平臺會產生一種甚至比他們在陸地上使用時，更危險的歧義。印度做出的認爲是對中國海軍建設的謹慎防禦反應可能很容易被巴基斯坦認爲其帶有侵犯性。加上將配備海上核武器的海軍，一個競爭性軍備競賽的潛臺詞將被認爲—這是一支被極端主義者滲透最徹底的巴基斯坦軍隊的分支。