內部問題隱現: 中國經濟未來荊棘密佈

Over the next decade, China’s growth will slow, probably sharply. That is not the view of malevolent outsiders. It is the view of the Chinese government. The question is whether it will do so smoothly or abruptly. On the answer depends not only China’s own future, but also that of much of the world.

未來十年，中國經濟的增長將會放緩，甚至是劇烈放緩。這不是心懷惡意的外人觀點，而是中國政府的觀點。問題是放緩的過程將是平穩的還是劇烈的。這個問題的答案不僅關乎中國的未來，也關乎世界許多國家的命運。

Official Chinese thinking was on display at last month’s China Development Forum, organised by the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), which brought influential foreigners together with high-level officials. Among the background papers was one prepared by economists at the DRC, entitled “Ten-year Outlook: Decline of Potential Growth Rate and Start of a New Phase of Growth”. Its proposition is that China’s growth will slow from more than 10 per cent a year from 2000 to 2010 to 6.5 per cent between 2018 and 2022. Such a decline, notes the paper, is consistent with the slowdown since the second quarter of 2010 (see chart).

上個月中國國務院發展研究中心(DRC)組織的中國發展高層論壇(China Development Forum)展示了中國官方的觀點。該論壇聚集了有影響力的外國人士和中國高級官員。背景論文中有一篇國務院發展研究中心經濟學家撰寫的文章，題爲“十年展望：潛在增長率下降以及新增長階段的開始”(Ten-year Outlook: Decline of Potential Growth Rate and Start of a New Phase of Growth)。文章提出，中國將從2000年到2010年10%以上的年均增長率，下降到2018年到2022年6.5%的年均增長率。文章還指出，這種下降與2010年第二季度以來的經濟放緩趨勢是一致的（見圖表）。

The authors note two possible reasons for the decline: either China has fallen into the “middle income trap” of aborted industrialisation; or it is managing the “natural landing” that occurs when an economy begins to catch-up with advanced economies. This latter scenario played out in Japan in the 1970s and South Korea in the 1990s. The DRC paper argues that, after three and a half decades of 10 per cent growth, it is at last happening to China.

作者列出了增速降低的兩個可能原因：要麼中國陷入了工業化失敗的“中等收入陷阱”；要麼中國正在努力應對增速的“自然回落”，當一個經濟體開始追趕發達經濟體時，會出現這種回落。第二種情況分別在上世紀70年代的日本和90年代的韓國出現過。國務院發展研究中心的這篇文章認爲，在經歷了35年左右10%的增長率之後，同樣的事最終在中國也發生了。

Here are a few reasons why the authors say this view is plausible. First, the potential for infrastructure investment has “contracted conspicuously”, with its share in fixed asset investment down from 30 per cent to 20 per cent over the last decade. Second, returns on assets have decreased and overcapacity has soared. The “incremental capital output ratio” – a measure of the growth generated by a given level of investment – reached 4.6 in 2011, the highest since 1992. China is getting less growth bang for its investment buck. Third, growth of the labour supply has fallen sharply. Fourth, urbanisation is still rising, but at a decelerating rate. Finally, risks are growing in the finance of local governments and real estate.

文章作者認爲這種觀點成立的原因有以下幾點：第一，基礎設施投資潛力“明顯收縮”，過去十年，基礎設施投資在固定資產投資中的比例從30%下降到20%。第二，資產回報率下降，產能大量過剩。2011年，“增量資本產出率”（衡量一定投資水平對增長的貢獻率）達到了4.6，爲1992年以來的最高值。投資對中國經濟增長的貢獻正在降低。第三，勞動力供應增長顯著放緩。第四，城市化仍在擴大，但速度有所下降。最後，地方政府財政和房地產風險增加。

This melange of reasons is enough, argue the authors, to indicate that a transition to slower growth has begun. To analyse prospects more rigorously, the authors employ an economic model. Its most striking result is that long-established trends reverse. Fixed investment rose to 49 per cent of GDP in 2011. But this is forecast to fall to 42 per cent in 2022. Meanwhile, the share of consumption in GDP is forecast to rise from 48 to per cent to 56 per cent in 2022. Again, the share of industry is forecast to decline from 45 per cent of GDP to 40 per cent, while the share of services is to jump from 45 per cent to 55 per cent. The economy is consumption-led, instead of investment-led. On the supply side, the principal driver of the decline in growth is the collapse in the growth of the capital stock, as investment growth collapses. (See charts.)

文章作者認爲，這一系列的原因足以表明中國經濟已經開始向較低增速過渡。爲了更加精確地分析前景，作者採用了一個經濟模型。最令人吃驚的結果就是，與現在相比，經濟的長期趨勢將顛倒。2011年固定資產投資佔國內生產總值(GDP)的比重增加至49%，但預計將在2022年降至42%。與此同時，預計2022年消費佔GDP的比重將會從48%上升至56%。類似地，預計工業佔GDP的比重將會從45%下降至40%，而服務業的比重將會從45%上升至55%。經濟將由消費拉動而不是投資拉動。從供應的層面來看，造成增長放緩的主要原因是，隨着投資增長瓦解，資本存量增長崩潰（見圖表）。

The view that such a growth slowdown is imminent is quite plausible. But one can advance a more optimistic view. According to the Conference Board’s data, China’s GDP per head (at purchasing power parity) is the same as Japan’s in 1966 and South Korea’s in 1988. These countries then had between seven and nine years of superfast growth ahead, respectively. Relative to US levels (another measure of catch-up potential), China is where Japan was in 1950 and South Korea in 1982. That suggest yet more growth potential. China’s GDP per head is just over a fifth of US levels. It seems to have much further to go.

增長放緩即將到來的觀點非常可信。但我們可以持一種更加樂觀的觀點。世界大型企業聯合會(Conference Board)數據顯示，當前中國人均GDP（按購買力平價計算）與1966年的日本和1988年的韓國相等。這兩個國家後來分別出現了7到9年的超速增長。與美國相比（追趕潛力的另外一種衡量），中國與1950年的日本和1982年的韓國水平相當。這就表明中國還有更多的增長潛力。中國的人均GDP只有美國的五分之一略多一點，似乎還有很大的增長空間。

However, there is also a case against this optimistic view. China is an order of magnitude bigger even than Japan. Its opportunities, particularly in the world economy, must be relatively smaller. Furthermore, as former premier Wen Jiabao often stated, China’s growth has been “unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable”. This is true, on a number of dimensions. But the most significant is the dependence on investment, not just as a source of extra capacity, but as a source of demand. Consistently rising investment rates are not sustainable, since the returns ultimately depend on additional consumption.

然而，這種樂觀的觀點也有反面論據。中國的數量級甚至高於日本。其機會，特別是在世界經濟中的機會，必定相對較少。此外，正如中國前總理溫家寶經常說的，中國的增長“不平衡、不協調、不可持續”。這在諸多層面上都是事實。但最重要的是對投資的依賴，投資不僅是額外產能的來源，也是需求的來源。不斷增加投資率是不可持續的，因爲投資回報最終取決於消費增加。

This is where a far more pessimistic view emerges. As the experience of Japan has shown, managing a shift from a high-investment, high-growth economy to a lower-investment, lower-growth economy is very tricky. I can envisage at least three risks.

於是就出現了一種悲觀得多的觀點。日本的例子表明，實現高投資、高增長的經濟體向低投資、低增長的經濟體的成功轉型是非常困難的。我可以列舉至少三點風險。

First, if expected growth falls from over 10 to, say, 6 per cent, the needed rate of investment in productive capital will collapse: under a constant incremental capital output ratio the fall would be from 50 per cent to, say, 30 per cent of GDP. If swift, such a decline would cause a depression, all on its own.

首先，如果預期增長率從10%以上下降到（比如說）6%，必要的生產資本投資率就會大幅下降：若增量資本產出率恆定，生產資本投資佔GDP的比重將會從50%下降到30%。如果下降過程非常快，單是這種下降就會引發蕭條。

Second, a big jump in credit has gone together with reliance on real estate and other investments with falling marginal returns. Partly for this reason, the decline in growth is likely to mean a rise in bad debts, not least on the investments made on the assumption that past growth would continue. The fragility of the financial system could increase very sharply, not least in the rapidly expanding “shadow banking” sector.

第二，由於中國經濟對房地產和其他投資的依賴，信貸出現大幅增長，而這些投資的邊際收益率在下降。部分出於這個原因，增長的下降可能意味着不良貸款的增加，尤其是那些押注過去的增速會持續的投資。金融體系可能變得極爲脆弱，尤其是快速擴張的“影子銀行”領域。

Third, since there is little reason to expect a decline in the household savings rate, sustaining the envisaged rise in consumption, relative to investment, demands a matching shift in incomes towards households and away from corporations, including state enterprises. This can happen: the growing labour shortage and a move towards higher interest rates might deliver it smoothly. But, even so, there is also a clear risk that the resulting decline in profits would accelerate a collapse in investment.

第三，鑑於家庭儲蓄率下降的可能性不大，要想維持設想中的消費相對於投資的持續增長，需要相應地將收入從企業轉移到家庭，包括國有企業。這是可能發生的：日益擴大的勞動力短缺以及利率的上漲趨勢可能會順利實現這種轉變。然而，即便如此，仍存在一個顯著的風險——隨之而來的利潤下降可能會加速投資的崩潰。

The government’s plan is, of course, to make the transition to a better balanced and slower-growing economy smoothly. This is far from impossible. The government has all the levers it needs in its hands. Moreover, the economy continues to have much potential. But managing a decline in the growth rate without an investment collapse and financial disruption is far trickier than any general equilibrium model suggests.

毫無疑問，政府的計劃是順利地轉型爲更加平衡、增長放慢的經濟。這是很有可能實現的。中國政府掌握着所需的所有要素。此外，中國經濟依然有很大的潛力。然而，在不引起投資崩塌和金融動盪的情況下實現增速放緩，比任何一般均衡模型所顯示的都要棘手得多。

It is easy to think of economies that long showed superlative performance, but failed to manage the inevitable slowdown. Japan is an example. China can avoid that fate, partly because it still has so much growth potential. But the chances of accidents are high. I would not expect one to stop China’s rise altogether. But the decade to come could be far bumpier than the last.

長期表現優越的經濟體沒能把握好不可避免的放緩，這樣的例子不難列舉。比如日本。中國可以避免這種命運，部分原因是它依然有很大的增長潛力。但出現意外的可能性也很大。在我看來，任何意外也不可能一下子讓中國的增長停止，但未來十年註定要比過去十年更加艱辛。