西方該不該與敘利亞合作

The US and much of the world have been rudely awakened to the fact that the group formerly known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is both a dangerous terrorist organisation, and considerably more than that. The deadly reality of its capabilities and ambitions is captured in the latest title by which Isis styles itself: the Islamic State. It is a de facto government with evolving borders that seeks to impose its vision of society on the millions of people over whom it rules. And, as it has dramatically shown since the capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul in June, it seeks to expand its borders and the numbers subject to its control.

美國和世界大部分地區被這樣一個事實粗暴地喚醒：原先被稱爲“伊拉克與黎凡特伊斯蘭國”（Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant，簡稱Isis）的組織，遠不止是一個危險的恐怖主義組織；它的致命實力和野心，反映在它給自己的最新封號上：伊斯蘭國(Islamic State)。這是個事實上的政府，有着仍在變化的邊界線，謀求將自己的社會願景強加於自己統治的數百萬號民衆頭上。此外，這個組織還謀求擴張自己的邊界，擴大自己控制的民衆數量。自6月攻佔伊拉克摩蘇爾以來，這一意圖已表露無遺。

The biggest question now facing western states is what to do about Syria. Iraq’s neighbour is where Isis established itself and from where it directs its operations. The fact is that the world cannot defeat Isis in Iraq, or limit its potential elsewhere, if it continues to enjoy sanctuary in Syria. Yet this is a country whose president, Bashar al-Assad, stands accused by the west of war crimes as part of an onslaught against his own citizens that has fuelled a conflict costing almost 200,000 lives.

西方國家眼下面臨的最大問題在於，該如何對待伊拉克的鄰國敘利亞。Isis就是在敘利亞站穩腳跟的，至今仍從敘利亞指揮各項行動。事實是，如果Isis繼續在敘利亞擁有根據地，世界就無法在伊拉克擊敗Isis，也無法在別的地方遏制它的潛在危害。然而，爲難的是，西方譴責敘利亞總統巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Assad)在一場針對本國人民的戰爭中犯下戰爭罪，對一場導致近20萬人死亡的衝突負有責任。

The first thing that needs to be done, despite White House reluctance, is to make good on what General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, suggested last week. The US should attack Isis targets across the border from Iraq inside Syria. More could and should be done, too, to slow the flow of recruits, arms and dollars.

當務之急是（儘管白宮不情願這樣做）儘快落實美國參謀長聯席會議主席馬丁•鄧普西(Martin Dempsey)上將上週的提議：美國應跨過伊拉克邊境，打擊敘利亞境內的Isis目標。我們還應該、也有能力加大努力，減慢Isis招募成員以及籌措武器和資金的速度。

Yet even with support from US special forces, Kurdish peshmerga, Sunni tribesmen and Iraqi ground troops operating at home – together with attempts to close borders and banks – there are limits to what air power can achieve. What is needed are ground forces operating inside Syria. This is where things get complicated. Very complicated.

然而，即便有美軍特種部隊、庫爾德“自由鬥士”、遜尼派部落以及本土作戰的伊拉克地面部隊的支持，並採取措施嘗試關閉邊境和銀行，空中打擊的效果仍將是有限的。我們需要的是在敘利亞境內作戰的地面部隊。談到這一點，事情就變得非常複雜了。

In principle there are four options. The US and European governments could provide ground forces. But, with widespread hostility to renewed military involvement following wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is a political non-starter. An expeditionary force would be an undertaking of enormous cost and risk, with no prospect of speedy success and likely to yield at best only limited progress. Given public attitudes, it is not going to happen.

基本上，我們有4種選擇。美國和歐洲政府可以出動地面部隊。但考慮到伊拉克和阿富汗戰爭後普遍的反戰情緒，這在政治上是不可能實現的。出動遠征軍成本高昂、風險巨大，也不可能迅速取得勝利，至多隻會取得有限的進展。考慮到民意，這是一種不可能的選擇。

A second option would be to create a pan-Arab expeditionary force, one with units from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and possibly Egypt. Organising and deploying such a force would be extremely difficult. It might also trigger intervention from other outsiders with a stake in Syria’s future, including Iran. If this were to happen, what is already a bad situation could become worse.

第二個選擇是，由約旦、沙特、阿聯酋、或許還有埃及，共同出兵組建一支泛阿拉伯遠征軍。這樣一支軍隊的組織和部署將異常困難，或許還會引發其他與敘利亞未來利益相關的外部力量的干預，其中包括伊朗。若如此，已經很糟的情況可能變得更糟。

The third option is to create an internal Syrian opposition, building on elements that already exist. But this, too, would take a good deal of time, and it would be a tall order for any such force to contend successfully with both the Syrian government and Isis.

第三個選擇是以現有力量爲基礎，組建一支敘利亞內部的反政府武裝。但這需要花費很長時間，而且指望這樣一支部隊能同時擊敗敘利亞政府和Isis是不現實的。

The fourth option is to turn to the regime of Mr Assad to take the lead in defeating Isis. This would mean accepting for the foreseeable future a regime that has committed war crimes; that is supported by Iran and Russia, with which the west has considerable strategic differences; and that is opposed by countries, including Saudi Arabia, with which the US has more often than not co-operated.

第四個選擇是，轉向阿薩德政權，讓其領導對Isis的打擊。這意味着在可預見的未來接受一個犯有戰爭罪的政權；一個得到與西方存在顯著戰略分歧的伊朗和俄羅斯支持的政權；一個經常與美國合作的國家（包括沙特）反對的政權。

Such a policy change would be costly but not as costly as a scenario in which Isis could use Syrian territory from which to mount attacks on the region and beyond. The Assad government may be evil – but it is a lesser evil than Isis, and a local one. Such an accommodation would require a great deal of diplomacy if it were to succeed. Understandings would have to be reached with Damascus, with the mostly secular opposition, much depleted by three years of brutal battles against Isis and the regime; and with outside backers (mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia) about how Syria was to be run, both now and in the future, and what would happen in liberated areas.

這樣的政策轉向代價高昂，但假如Isis以敘利亞爲根據地，對中東乃至世界其他地區發動攻擊，我們將付出更爲高昂的代價。阿薩德政府或許邪惡，但沒有Isis邪惡，而且只侷限於本土。這種安排要想取得成功，需要做大量外交工作。我們必須就敘利亞現在和未來的治理方式、以及如何對待已經被反對派解放的地區，與大馬士革方面、基本上世俗的反對派（與Isis和阿薩德政權的三年殘酷鬥爭已使其被削弱）以及雙方的外部支持者（主要是伊朗和沙特）達成諒解。

As is often the case, the more attractive options may not be feasible, while the option that could prove feasible would present distinct difficulties. The calculus argues for determining whether creating a pan-Arab force or developing a viable internal opposition are possible in the near future; if not, the US and Europe may have to live with, and even work with, a regime they have for years sought to remove. What is certain is that it should be a priority to convene a meeting of all the relevant governments – which, if initial discussions with other countries show promise, should include the Assad regime – to determine whether a common policy towards Syria and Isis can be forged.

就像經常發生的情況一樣，更誘人的選擇或許不可行，而可能可行的選擇面臨明顯的困難。從邏輯上說，應當確定在較近的未來是否有可能組建一支泛阿拉伯部隊，或扶植一支有望成功的內部反對力量；如果不可能，那麼美國和歐洲或許就必須容忍一個自己多年來尋求推翻的政權繼續存在，甚至與這個政權合作。有一點是肯定的，那就是當務之急是召集所有相關政府開會，確定能否制定一套針對敘利亞和Isis的共同政策；如果與其他國家的初步討論有眉目，那麼也應邀請阿薩德政權參與討論。