剝奪利率和匯率調整機制 歐元先天不足
That Europe, and especially the eurozone, has not been doing well since the 2008 crisis is beyond dispute.
自2008年金融危機以來，歐洲——特別是歐元區——便一直沒有健康過，這是無可爭議的。
The single currency was supposed to bring prosperity and enhance European solidarity.
單一貨幣原本應該帶來繁榮並鞏固歐洲團結。
It has done just the opposite, with depressions in some countries even greater than the Great Depression.
但結果正好相反，一些歐元區國家遭受的蕭條甚至比大蕭條(Great Depression)時期更嚴重。
To answer the question about what is to be done, one has to answer another: what went wrong. Some claim that policymakers made a set of mistakes — excessive austerity and poorly designed structural reforms.
要回答該怎麼辦這個問題，人們必須先回答另一個問題：哪裏出了問題？一些人聲稱政策制定者犯下了一系列錯誤——推行過度緊縮的政策和設計糟糕的結構性改革。
In other words, there is nothing wrong with the euro that could not be fixed by putting someone else in charge.
換句話說，歐元沒什麼問題，換個人執掌就能解決問題。
I disagree.
我不這樣認爲。
There are more fundamental problems with the structure of the eurozone, the rules and institutions that guide and constitute it.
歐元區的結構、指引和構建歐元區的規則和制度存在更爲根本的問題。
These may well be insurmountable, raising the prospect that the time has come for a more comprehensive rethinking of the single currency, even to the point of unwinding it.
這些問題可能是無法克服的，因此引出了一種前景——是時候更全面地反思歐元了，甚至可以考慮放棄歐元了。
Put simply, the euro was flawed at birth.
簡單地說就是歐元先天不足。
It was almost inevitable that taking away two key adjustment mechanisms, the interest and exchange rates, without putting anything else in their place, would make macro adjustment difficult.
剝奪了利率和匯率這兩項關鍵的調整機制、而不加入取代它們的工具，幾乎不可避免地使得宏觀調控難以進行。
Add to that a central bank mandated to focus on inflation and with countries still further constrained by limits on their fiscal deficits, the result would be excessively high unemployment and gross domestic product consistently below potential output.
再加上央行的使命是聚焦於通脹，而成員國仍然進一步受到財政赤字上限的約束，結果就是超高的失業率和持續低於潛在產出的國內生產總值(GDP)。
With countries borrowing in a currency not under their remit, and with no easy mechanism for controlling trade deficits, crises too were predictable.
在成員國借入不在其控制範圍的貨幣、且沒有控制貿易赤字的簡單機制時，爆發危機是預料之中的。
The alternative to adjusting nominal exchange rates is adjusting real ones — having Greek prices fall relative to German prices.
調整名義匯率的替代選擇是調整實際匯率——使得希臘的物價相對德國物價下滑。
But there are no rules in place that could force a rise in German prices and the social and economic costs of forcing Greek prices to fall enough are enormous.
但是，沒有規定可以強迫德國物價上漲，而壓低希臘物價將帶來巨大的社會和經濟成本。
One might dream of Greek productivity growing faster than that of Germany as an alternative way of adjusting, but no one has figured out how to do it.
有人可能會指望希臘生產率增速超過德國作爲調整的替代選擇，但是沒人知道如何實現這一點。
So too for Spain and Portugal.
西班牙和葡萄牙也是一樣。
In the absence of a grand strategy, the troika of international institutions has flailed around, putting in place new rules for defining fresh milk or the size of loaves of bread.
在沒有總體戰略的情況下，國際機構的三駕馬車四處出擊，爲新鮮牛奶的定義或者麪包的標準出臺瑣碎新規。
Whether these are desirable can be debated; that they are not going to achieve the desired adjustment in real exchange rates cannot.
對於這些措施是否可取，可以展開辯論；但它們不會取得調整實際利率的理想效果是不容置疑的。
The rule changes needed to make the euro work are in an economic sense small.
從經濟學角度看，只需要小幅改變規則就可以拯救歐元。
A common banking union, most importantly common deposit insurance; rules to curtail trade surpluses; and eurobonds or some other similar mechanism for mutualisation of debt.
建立一個共同的銀行業聯盟，最重要的是共同的存款保險體制；制定遏制貿易順差的規則；發行歐元債券或建立其他類似的債務共擔機制。
Monetary policy to focus more on employment, growth and stability, not just inflation.
貨幣政策在更大程度上關注就業、增長和穩定，而不僅僅盯着通脹。
Meanwhile, industrial and other policies should be orientated to helping the laggard countries catch up to the leaders.
與此同時，產業和其他政策應該定位於幫助落後國家趕上領頭羊。
Most importantly: a move away from austerity towards growth oriented fiscal policies.
最重要的是：從緊縮政策轉向以增長爲導向的財政政策。
But these seem well beyond the politics of Europe today, with Germany still arguing that Europe is not a transfer union.
但是這些似乎遠遠超越了當今歐洲的政治現實，德國仍然主張歐洲不是撥款聯盟。
Good currency arrangements cannot ensure prosperity; flawed ones lead to recessions and depressions.
良好的貨幣安排無法確保繁榮；但有缺陷的安排會導致衰退和蕭條。
And among the kinds of currency arrangements long associated with recessions and depressions are pegs, where the value of one country’s currency is fixed relative to another.
長期以來的經驗表明，與衰退和蕭條關聯的種種貨幣安排都存在掛鉤機制，即一國貨幣的幣值緊盯另一國貨幣。
A single currency is neither necessary nor sufficient for close economic and political co-operation.
單一貨幣既不是緊密經濟和政治合作的必要條件，也不是此類合作的充分條件。
Europe needs to focus on what is important to achieve that goal.
歐洲需要聚焦於實現目標的關鍵。
An end to the single currency would not be the end of the European project.
結束單一貨幣並不意味着終結歐洲一體化。
The other institutions of the EU would remain: there would still be free trade and migration.
歐盟的其他制度仍將存在：自由貿易和人口自由流動仍會繼續。
It is important that there can be a smooth transition out of the euro, with an amicable divorce, possibly moving to a flexible-euro system, with say a strong Northern Euro and softer Southern Euro.
有必要平穩過渡退出歐元，盡力實現友好分手，也許是轉向一種靈活的歐元體系，包括強勁的北方歐元和較疲軟的南方歐元。
Of course, none of this will be easy.
當然，這不會輕易實現。
The hardest problem will be dealing with the legacy of debt.
最難的問題是處理遺留債務。
The easiest way of doing that is to redenominate all euro debts as Southern Euro debts.
最簡單的辦法是對所有歐元債務進行重新計價，改爲南方歐元債務。
As we move to a digital economy, modern technology enables a set of market-based reforms that can simultaneously achieve the triple goals of full employment, trade balance, and fiscal balance, through credit auctions and electronic trade tokens.
隨着我們進入數字化經濟的時代，現代技術爲一系列市場化改革創造了條件，這些改革通過信貸拍賣和電子交易令牌，可以兼顧完全就業、貿易平衡和財政平衡這三大目標。
In the current global system, we rely on central banks to set interest rates, hoping somehow that the resulting trade balance, investment, and consumption will be right.
在目前的全球體系中，我們依靠央行來設定利率，指望由此帶來恰到好處的貿易平衡、投資和消費。
They typically aren’t.
結果通常並不理想。
The alternative approach focuses on the quantities of, say, investment and trade balance, that we need, and lets the market set the price to achieve this.
替代選擇聚焦於我們所需要的投資和貿易平衡的數量，然後讓市場設定價格以實現目標。
Over time exchange rate variations could become more limited as institutions develop.
隨着時間推移，匯率差異有望隨着制度發展而變得更有限。
The flexible euro is a strategy for incorporating the advances in economic integration already made while providing the space for reforms.
靈活的歐元將是一種策略，在整合經濟一體化現有成果的同時，爲改革提供空間。
The single currency was supposed to be a means to an end.
單一貨幣本應該是一種達到目的的手段。
It has become an end in itself — one that undermines more fundamental aspects of the European project, as it spreads divisiveness rather than solidarity.
但現在它本身成了一個目的——這個目的破壞了歐洲一體化更爲根本的方面，因爲它帶來了分歧、而非團結。
An amicable divorce — a relatively smooth end to the euro, perhaps instituting the proposed system of the flexible euro — could restore Europe to prosperity and enable the continent to once again focus, with renewed solidarity, on the many real challenges that it faces.
友好分手——相對平穩地終結歐元，或許建立上述靈活歐元制度——可能使歐洲恢復繁榮，使之可以重新團結起來，再次專注於它面臨的很多真正挑戰。
Europe may have to abandon the euro to save Europe and the European project.
爲了拯救歐洲和歐洲一體化，歐洲或許不得不放棄歐元。
