一場正在露頭的全球償付能力危機
Central banks have been engaged in unprecedented monetary experimentation.
全球各主要央行近年投入史無前例的貨幣實驗。
Unlike scientists developing drugs, fear of the unknown has had no moderating influence on their activities.
不像科學家們開發藥物，對未知的恐懼並未對央行活動產生抑制效果。
That in itself is alarming.
這本身就是令人震驚的。
Nor is it possible to reverse recent policies.
近年政策也是不可能逆轉的。
Now governments must accept responsibility for resolving an incipient global solvency crisis.
現在，各國政府必須承擔起責任，應對一場正在露頭的全球償付能力危機。
The monetary stimulus provided repeatedly over the past eight years has failed to produce the expected expansion of aggregate demand.
過去8年一再提供的貨幣刺激，未能像預期那樣擴大總需求。
Debt levels have risen, especially in emerging market economies, constraining expectations of future spending and current capital expenditures.
債務水平已上升，尤其是在新興市場經濟體，制約了有關未來消費和當前資本支出的預期。
Consumers have had to save more, not less, to ensure adequate income in retirement.
消費者必須儲蓄更多而非更少，以確保退休後有足夠的收入。
At the same time, easy money threatens two sets of undesirable side effects.
另一方面，寬鬆貨幣可能產生兩組不受歡迎的副作用。
First, current policies foster financial instability.
首先，當前政策助長了金融不穩定。
By squeezing credit and term spreads, the business models of banks, insurance companies and pension funds are put at risk, as is their lending.
通過擠壓信貸息差和期限息差，銀行、保險公司和養老基金的業務模式面臨風險，它們的放貸也面臨風險。
The functioning of financial markets has also changed, with market anomalies indicating hidden structural shifts, and many asset prices bid up to dangerously high levels.
金融市場的運作也發生了變化，市場異常現象預示着隱藏的結構性轉變，許多資產價格被哄擡到危險的高水平。
Second, current policies threaten future growth.
其次，當前政策對未來增長構成威脅。
Resources misallocated before the crisis have been locked in through zombie banks supporting zombie companies.
危機之前錯配的資源已被固化，因爲殭屍銀行支持着殭屍企業。
And with neither financial institutions nor financial markets functioning properly, real misallocations since the crisis have been further encouraged.
由於金融機構和金融市場的運轉都不正常，自危機以來實際錯配受到了進一步鼓勵。
Perhaps we need look no further for the cause of the alarming slowdown in global growth than the insidious effects of easy-money policies.
要尋找令人吃驚的全球增長放緩的原因，也許我們只需要考察寬鬆貨幣政策的不良效果。
Two vicious circles are at work with a wounded financial system contributing to both.
兩種惡性循環正發生作用，而受傷的金融體系對兩者都起到推波助瀾的作用。
On the demand side, accumulating debt creates headwinds, leading to more monetary expansion and more debt.
在需求側，債務積累引發逆風，導致更多貨幣擴張和更多債務。
This explanation contrasts sharply with the hypothesis of a savings glut: little more than a tautology for slow demand growth.
這種解釋與儲蓄過剩的假設形成了鮮明對比：那不過是需求增長緩慢的同義反復。
On the supply side, misallocations slow growth which again leads to monetary easing, more misallocation and still less growth.
在供應側，錯配拉低了增速，進而也導致貨幣寬鬆、更多錯配和增長更加乏力。
This explanation seems far more convincing than secular stagnation in an era of extraordinary technological advances.
這種解釋似乎遠比非凡技術進步時代的長期停滯更令人信服。
Accepting the importance of these varied effects also undercuts the popular argument that central banks must reduce the financial rate of interest whenever the natural rate of interest (the expected rate of return on capital) declines.
接受這種種後果的重要意義，還削弱了這樣一種流行說法：只要自然利率（預期的資本回報率）下降，央行就必須降低金融利率。
If expected profits have collapsed as a side effect of past monetary policies, this hardly seems to justify maintaining such polices.
如果預期利潤大幅下滑是以往貨幣政策的副作用，這似乎很難爲維持此類政策提供正當理由。
If central banks should not continue doing what they are doing, what should they do? One tempting option is to say tighten up.
如果央行不應該繼續做它們正在做的事情，那麼它們應該做什麼？一個誘人的選項是說收緊。
The problem is that damage cannot be undone.
問題在於，損害無法挽回。
All the problems identified above have rendered both the real and financial side of the global economy enormously fragile.
上面列舉的所有問題，已使全球經濟的實際和金融層面都變得極爲脆弱。
Fortunately there is a way forward, but it relies on government action rather than that of central banks.
所幸有一條出路，但它依賴政府（而非央行）的行動。
To please John Maynard Keynes, two sets of solutions are commonly suggested.
爲了取悅約翰•梅納德•凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)，經常有兩套解決方案被提出來。
First, governments with fiscal room for manoeuvre should use it.
首先，具有財政迴旋餘地的政府應該使用它。
That room could be increased through legislating medium-term fiscal frameworks to ensure debt sustainability over time.
通過立法確立中期財政框架、確保隨着時間推移債務具有可持續性，財政迴旋餘地還可以增大。
Second, emphasis should be put on infrastructure investment with the private sector.
其次，應該注重讓私營部門參與基礎設施投資。
To please Friedrich Hayek, two sets of solutions are also suggested.
爲了取悅弗里德里希•哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)，也有兩套解決方案被提出來。
Excessive debt must be solved by write-offs and restructuring.
必須通過減記和重組來解決過高負債的問題。
This might require recapitalisation or closure of financial firms that made bad loans.
這或許會要求對持有不良貸款的金融公司重新注資，或者將其關閉。
Second, structural reforms to raise growth potential and the capacity to service debt will pay longer-term dividends.
其次，實施結構性改革以提高增長潛力和償債能力，這將帶來長期紅利。
We must please both Keynes and Hayek.
我們必須同時取悅凱恩斯和哈耶克。
It is not an either/or world.
這不是一個非此即彼的世界。
Evidently, there will be obstacles.
顯然，前方會存在障礙。
We need a paradigm shift in thinking about how the economy and policy works.
在思考經濟和政策如何運行方面，我們需要一次範式轉換。
Further, we need legislation to allow implementation of many of the policies suggested above.
此外，我們需要通過立法，落實以上建議的許多政策。
Finally, we need the political will to accept that central banks can only buy time for governments to act.
最後，我們需要擁有這樣的政治意志，即接受央行只能爲政府行動贏得時間。
That time is now up.
這種時間現在到尾聲了。
