中國銀行業亂局爲什麼是個政治問題(1)
The worst credit squeeze in China in recent memory seems to be over. After the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the country's central bank, issued a reassuring statement on June 25 that dispelled investors' worries about the lack of liquidity in China's interbank loan market, Chinese stock markets halted their plunge, and the rates of China's interbank loans fell from over 20% to around 6% (still two to three times greater than the average rate before the recent panic). China's Lehman moment, for now at least, appears to have been averted.
最近一個時期內，中國最嚴重的信貸緊縮似乎已經過去。6月25日，中國人民銀行（the People's Bank of China）發佈了一份公告來穩定人心，掃除了投資者對中國銀行間同業拆借市場流動性不足的擔憂。中國股市停止暴跌，銀行間拆借利率從20%以上回落至6%左右（仍爲最近恐慌行情出現之前平均利率的兩到三倍）。看來中國已經躲過了自己的雷曼時刻，至少目前是這樣。
However, many questions remain, both about the causes of the recent turmoil in China's banking system and the implications for the Chinese economy.
不過，還有許多問題，其中既有最近中國銀行體系陷入混亂的原因，又有它對中國經濟的影響。
As for what prompted the recent seizing-up of China's interbank loan market, there is no shortage of theories. The PBOC, widely perceived as having engineered an artificial credit squeeze to crack down on China's shadow banking sector, has come out with innocent but not very credible explanations. It blames the panic on a set of coincidental factors, such as the June deadline for banks to report their numbers (a requirement that forces many banks to reduce outstanding loans and embellish their risk profiles), tax due dates at the end of May and middle of June (tax payments suck cash out of the circulation), and increased demand for cash before a traditional Chinese holiday.
對於最近中國銀行間拆借市場爲什麼會出現資金緊張的情況，人們莫衷一是。外界廣泛認爲是中國人民銀行人爲製造了信貸緊張的局面，目的是整治國內的影子銀行。央行則爲自己開脫，但它的解釋並不非常可信。央行將這次恐慌歸結爲一系列巧合，比如銀行要在6月底前公佈經營數據（這項要求迫使許多銀行壓縮貸款餘額，同時矯飾自身的風險情況），5月底和6月中期清繳稅收（繳稅造成現金退出流通）以及端午節假期前現金需求增多。
An alternative explanation, popular mainly among economists and investors, is that the PBOC was engaged in a high-stakes game with players in China's shadow banking system, all with the blessing of China's new political leadership. Because interbank loans constitute the bulk of funding for borrowers in the shadow banking system, making such loans less available sends a powerful message that the central government will no longer tolerate risky behavior and keep inflating China's credit bubble. Some analysts went so far as to suggest that this is the first shot fired by the Chinese government to signal the start of a deleveraging process.
許多經濟學家和投資者都接受另一種解釋，那就是，獲得新一屆領導人許可後，央行和國內影子銀行體系的參與者展開了一次高風險角逐。由於在影子銀行體系中，借款人獲得的資金主要來自銀行間市場，減少此類貸款供應釋放出了一個有力信號，即中央政府不會再允許冒險行爲，也不會允許國內信貸泡沫繼續膨脹。有些分析師甚至認爲，這是中國政府打響的第一槍，它標誌着去槓桿化進程的開始。
There is a third explanation, which is simpler and perhaps more reasonable. This incident is most likely a botched response by the Chinese monetary authorities to a problem that has been long in the making but exploded without warning and caught them completely by surprise.
還有第三種解釋，它更簡單、而且可能更爲合理。那就是長期以來一直存在的一個問題在沒有徵兆的情況下突然爆發了，完全出乎中國貨幣監管部門的預料，而且監管部門對此應對不力，很可能是造成本次危機的原因。
