中國銀行業亂局爲什麼是個政治問題(2)
The growth of China's shadow banking system (with estimated outstanding credits equaling roughly 10-15% of the balance sheet of the formal banking sector) has long been flagged as a source of risk in China's financial sector. Chinese policy-makers are fully aware of the risky activities within this sector but have opted to do nothing because the system serves several useful functions and has powerful interest groups. Local governments, real estate developers, and private entrepreneurs unable to obtain loans from the state-owned formal banking sector can tap this system for funding by paying a higher interest rate. State-owned banks and investment companies pocket lucrative transaction fees by peddling wealth management products (WMPs) issued by borrowers to depositors chasing high yields. When this game is going well, a lot of rich and powerful people make money while risk builds up in the financial sector.
很長一段時間以來，人們一直把中國影子銀行體系的擴張（據估算，這個體系的信貸餘額約等於正規銀行業資產負債規模的10-15%）視爲中國金融行業的風險源頭。中國的決策者完全清楚這個領域的風險活動，但一直選擇按兵不動，原因是影子銀行有多種有利用途，也有着強大的利益團體。無法從正規國有銀行得到貸款的地方政府、房地產開發商和私營企業主能以更高的利率爲代價從影子銀行獲得資金。而國有銀行和投資公司將借款人發行的理財產品兜售給追逐高收益的儲戶，進而獲得可觀的交易費。在一切進展順利的情況下，許多有錢有勢的人賺了錢，金融行業的風險則不斷積累。
As with similar instances of financial recklessness, confidence can evaporate quickly, setting off a panicked exit from the market. Even sophisticated and capable regulators are often ill-prepared for such unforeseen and highly disruptive events. If we analyze the recent gyrations in China's interbank loan market from this perspective, we may gain a better understanding of the causes behind the short-lived panic and avoid overreacting to or over-interpreting this event.
和金融領域類似的冒進事件一樣，信心會瞬間化爲烏有，人們會慌忙逃離市場。面對這種預料之外而又有很大破壞性的局面，就連經驗豐富、很有能力的監管部門也經常準備不足。如果從這個角度來分析中國銀行間拆借市場近期出現的震盪，我們也許能更好地理解本次短期恐慌的成因，進而避免反應過度或過度解讀。
Granted, the opacity of the decision-making process, the lack of a free press, and the insensitivity of policy-makers to the need to communicate their intentions to market participants all contribute to the difficulty in making the right call on China. To avoid making mistakes in the future, analysts should do themselves a favor by focusing more on political factors than on economics. In the case of the recent upheaval in China's financial system, the idea that the squeeze was deliberately engineered by the PBOC to crack down on the shadow banking system makes little political sense. Only the Politburo Standing Committee, the ruling Communist Party's most powerful body, could have made such a decision. But the Politburo would not likely authorize such a move at this delicate moment.
當然，決策過程不透明，媒體受到限制，決策者不在乎是否需要就自己的意圖和市場參與者進行溝通，這都使得在中國做出正確選擇成爲一個難題。爲避免今後犯錯，分析師應當更關注政治因素而不是經濟，這樣做對他們有益。就中國金融體系這次的震盪而言，央行特意壓縮信貸以整治影子銀行的說法從政治角度來看幾乎沒有任何道理可言。只有中央政治局纔有可能做出這樣的決定。但在目前這樣的微妙時刻，中央政治局不太可能授權採取這樣的行動。
The Communist Party is scheduled to hold its third central committee plenum in the fall, when its most important economic initiatives will be unveiled. It is inconceivable that the party's leadership would risk economic turmoil and disrupt its plans with a bold move on the shadow banking system before they head to the beach for the summer.
中共中央第三次全體會議將在今年秋天召開，會上將宣佈最重要的經濟措施。中央領導人在夏季到來之前冒着影響經濟並打亂自身部署的風險對影子銀行採取大膽行動，這是件不能想象的事情。
To implement any kind of meaningful reform to the shadow banking system, Chinese leadership will first have to reach a consensus at the top, overcome resistance from interest groups, and devise complex plans to address the consequences of reform. All this takes time and fierce bargaining. Based on the quick retreat sounded by the PBOC, it is quite obvious that the top leadership has no such plans in place for now.
對影子銀行進行實質性改革前，中國領導人首先需要在最高層達成共識，消除來自利益集團的阻力，並針對改革產生的影響制定完善的應對計劃。所有這些都需要時間和激烈的討價還價。考慮到中國人民銀行接到了迅速撤退的命令，最高領導層目前顯然還沒有這樣的計劃。
However, this does not mean that Beijing can delay dealing with the massive risks in the banking system for very long. If anything, the recent bloodbath in the Chinese financial sector should prompt China's top leaders that they must have a more comprehensive plan for financial deleveraging when they meet in the fall. Otherwise, they are almost certain to face a bursting of China's credit bubble that will make last week's turmoil look insignificant.
不過，這並不意味着中國政府可以長期推遲化解銀行系統中大量風險的工作。如果說最近中國金融業陷入困境有什麼作用的話，那就是它應該讓中國最高領導人意識到，今年秋天的三中全會上，他們必須就金融去槓桿化拿出更完善的方案。否則，他們幾乎必然會看到中國信貸泡沫的破裂，與之相比，上週的情況就會顯得微不足道。
