中國勞動力規模尚有增長空間
China’s working age population will fall by more than 10 per cent, a loss of 90m people, by 2040, as much of east Asia “gets old before it gets rich”, the World Bank said last week.
世界銀行(World Bank)上週表示，到2040年中國的適齡勞動人口將減少逾10%，相當於減少9000萬勞動力，而東亞大部分地區都面臨“未富先老”的風險。
The findings conjure up a scenario of a shrinking workforce, sluggish economic growth, rising labour costs as workers become more scarce and increased government spending on pensions, sapping the vitality of one of the world’s key growth engines.
世行的報告讓人們腦海中浮現出一幅勞動力萎縮、經濟增長乏力、勞動力成本不斷攀升的畫面，因爲勞動力變得越來越稀缺而且政府不得不增加養老金支出，這將削弱中國作爲全球主要增長引擎的活力。
This scenario is widely accepted by economic and financial commentators. It is supposedly one of the great truisms of our time.
此種前景已經被經濟、財經評論員廣泛接受，並被視爲我們時代的一條大道理。
Except it is not true. None of these things need happen. The truth is that China and the rest of emerging Asia could actually see their workforces expand over the next 25 years if they fell in line with norms in much of the western world.
但這個畫面並不是真實的。所有這些都可以避免。事實是，未來25年，中國及其他亞洲新興市場國家有可能看到本國勞動力壯大，如果他們實行與西方大部分國家相似的標準的話。
To be clear, the decline in the working-age population in China and several of its neighbours is, barring some highly unlikely turn of events, certain to happen.
需要澄清的是，中國與其多個鄰國肯定會出現適齡勞動人口減少的情況（除非發生一些極不可能的事件）。
As the first chart shows, the World Bank foresees a 10 per cent decline in those aged between 15 and 64 in China by 2040, with larger falls still expected in Japan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, although most of Southeast Asia is likely to see an increase.
如下面的圖一所示，世行預計，到2040年中國年齡介於15歲至64歲之間的人口將減少10%，而日本、泰國、新加坡、韓國及香港地區的適齡勞動人口預計將出現更大降幅，但多數東南亞國家的適齡勞動人口可能出現增長。
But the size of the working-age population should not be mistaken for the size of the labour force — many of the former are neither working nor looking for a job.
但“適齡勞動人口”的規模不應被誤認爲是“勞動力”規模——前者中的許多人既不工作也不找工作。
Take reasonable measures to address this, and the data show that the resultant increase in the participation rate should be larger than the decline in the working-age population, meaning more workers, not fewer.
如果採取合理措施應對，數據顯示，由此帶來的勞動參與率的提高幅度應會大於適齡勞動人口的降幅，這意味着勞動力增多，而非減少。
China’s low retirement age, for urban workers at least, is a case in point. Official pension ages in urban areas are 50 for blue-collar women, 55 for white-collar women and 60 for men, significantly lower than in most western countries.
中國較低的退休年齡（至少對城鎮職工而言）就是一個恰當的例子。在城市地區，藍領女性開始領取退休金的法定年齡爲50歲，白領女性爲55歲，男性爲60歲，顯著低於大多數西方國家。
One might assume this is a natural result of China having a lower life expectancy than the west. There is a grain of truth to this: China’s life expectancy of 76 (74.8 for men, 77.3 for women) is about three years lower than the western average.
人們可能會認爲這是中國預期壽命低於西方的自然結果。有一點道理：中國人的預期壽命爲76歲（男性74.8歲、女性77.3歲），約比西方平均水平低三歲。
But, firstly, the typical Chinese urban worker will almost certainly live longer than 76, with the average being dragged down by poorer rural dwellers.
但是，首先，典型的中國城市勞動者的壽命幾乎肯定會超過76歲，因爲較貧困的農村居民拉低了平均值。
Secondly, and more importantly, China’s pension age looks unsustainably low even when correcting for the life expectancy gap. Data collated by the World Bank in its document Live Long and Prosper: Ageing in East Asia and Pacific illustrate this clearly.
其次（更重要的是），即使就預期壽命差做了調整，中國的退休年齡看起來也是低得不可持續。世行在《長壽與繁榮：東亞與太平洋地區的老齡化》(Live Long and Prosper: Ageing in East Asia and Pacific)報告中收集的數據清楚地闡明瞭這一點。
Chinese women can typically expect to live for virtually 30 years in retirement, with women in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia also enjoying long retirements, on average.
中國女性通常可以預期退休後再活差不多30年，平均而言，越南、泰國以及馬來西亞的女性也可以享受較長的退休時間。
In contrast, women in richer countries such as Sweden, Germany and the US can realistically expect 20 years or less of retirement, as the second chart shows.
相比之下，如下面的圖二所示，瑞典、德國以及美國等較富裕國家的女性實際上只能盼得20年或者更短的退休時間。
For men, the gap is not so extreme but the average retirement span in China, at 18 years, is still longer than in Sweden, Germany or the US. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia would appear to have more scope still to raise retirement ages.
對男性而言，差距不是那麼大，但中國男性的平均退休期爲18年，仍然比瑞典、德國及美國的男性要長。泰國、馬來西亞以及印度尼西亞似乎有更大的空間來延長退休年齡。
Not everyone, of course, retires at the official retirement age, particularly if their pension is inadequate, but a closer look at the ages Chinese people actually do retire at vividly illustrates the scope for change.
當然，並非所有人都在法定退休年齡退休，尤其是如果他們的養老金不充裕的話，但仔細觀察中國人的實際退休年齡能夠很清晰地展現出改革空間。
As the third chart shows, by the age of 60, just one in three urban women and 55 per cent of urban men are still in the labour force. In contrast, two-thirds of rural women and 80 per cent of rural men are still in the labour force at this age.
如圖三所示，到60歲時，只有三分之一的城市女性與55%的城市男性仍堅持工作。相比之下，三分之二的農村女性以及80%的農村男性60歲時仍在勞動。
This divergence is likely to be driven by the financial pressure on the poorer, rural population to continue working for longer.
這種差異很可能是經濟壓力造成的，迫使較貧困的農村人口繼續勞動更長時間。
But given that most rural labourers are engaged in physically tough, back-breaking agricultural work, it certainly suggests most urban workers should be perfectly capable of continuing in their generally less physically demanding jobs for longer, although there will clearly be some exceptions to this, such as the construction industry.
但是，鑑於大多數農村勞動力從事的都是繁重勞累的農活，這恰恰反襯出，大多數城市勞動者應該完全有能力繼續再幹一段時間他們通常不需太多體力的工作，雖然有一些明顯的例外，比如建築業。
Overall, though, the World Bank says that average retirement ages in China (as well as Vietnam) among urban workers in formal jobs are three to four years below the already low official retirement ages.
不過，總體而言，世行表示，中國（以及越南）擁有正式工作的城市勞動力的平均退休年齡比本已較低的官方退休年齡還要低3至4年。
Across east and Southeast Asia as a whole, the Bank argues this trend is driven by government policy.
世行認爲，在整個東亞以及東南亞地區，這種趨勢是由政府政策造成的。
Indonesians and Vietnamese are not allowed to continue working beyond the normal retirement age (55 in the formal sector in Indonesia, 60 for men and 55 for women in Vietnam).
印度尼西亞和越南不允許超過退休年齡者繼續工作（印尼正規部門退休年齡爲55歲，越南男性爲60、女性55歲）。
In China, meanwhile, late retirement is “effectively penalised”, with the additional year of pension contributions not increasing the individual’s pension.
而在中國，晚退休“實際上是不利的”，養老金繳費年頭延長了，但個人養老金數額並未增加。
Early retirement is incentivised in many countries. In Vietnam, early retirement “actually increases pension wealth because the penalty is too low to offset the extra benefits received”, the World Bank says, adding that “the Philippines rewards early retirement with a large increase in pension wealth and penalises late retirement at a rate of 17 per cent a year”.
許多國家都採取激勵措施鼓勵提前退休。世行表示，在越南提前退休“實際上增加了養老金財富，因爲懲罰太少，不會抵消額外收益。菲律賓對提前退休者的獎勵是大幅增加養老金財富，對延遲退休者則課以一年17%的處罰”。
Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the reforms the World Bank is calling for in east and Southeast Asia is for governments to provide actuarially fair incentives for both early and late retirement.
這或許可以解釋爲什麼世行會呼籲東亞及東南亞國家的政府進行改革，爲提前退休和延遲退休者提供真正公平的激勵。
The Bank is also recommending that countries equalise retirement ages for men and women, correcting a glaring anomaly whereby women can often retire at a younger age despite enjoying greater life expectancy in every country in the region, as well as linking retirement ages to changes in life expectancy.
世行還建議各國把男性及女性退休年齡拉平，以糾正一個明顯的反常現象，即該地區所有國家的女性預期壽命都要更長些，卻往往更早退休。世行還建議各國將退休年齡與預期壽命變化掛鉤。
Its concern is not just that de facto retirement ages may fail to rise in line with life expectancy, but that they may fall still further.
世行擔心的不僅是實際退休年齡可能無法與預期壽命保持同步增長，而且還可能會進一步下降。
“As East Asia and Pacific continues its rapid urbanisation, coverage of pension systems grows, and rising incomes provide new opportunities for people to retire before they are no longer physically capable of work, thereby creating a significant risk that average lengths of working lives will fall,” it says.
世行表示：“隨着東亞與太平洋地區繼續快速城市化，養老金制度覆蓋範圍也隨之擴大。收入的增加爲人們提供了新的機會，他們可以不用等到體力無法負荷工作時再退休，這便產生了一個顯著的風險，即人們的平均勞動壽命將縮短。”
Moreover, bringing retirement systems more into line with western norms is not the only measure that would increase the workforce in ageing Asian nations.
此外，讓退休制度更加符合西方標準並不是亞洲老齡化國家增加勞動力的唯一措施。
The World Bank also argues that many Asian countries have scope to significantly increase female labour force participation, which typically lags behind that of men, for instance by improving public childcare provision. They could also expand their labour force via immigration, although this is obviously a zero-sum game.
世行還指出，許多亞洲國傢俱備空間大幅提高女性勞動力參與率，這一指標通常落後於男性，可採取措施包括改善公共幼兒託管服務的提供。它們還可以通過增加移民來擴充自己的勞動力，不過這顯然是一個零和遊戲。
The Bank provides a vivid demonstration of how these effects could play out in China.
世行生動地展示了這些措施將會在中國產生什麼樣的影響。
As widely reported, the baseline, business-as-usual scenario, does indeed show the labour force declining 10 per cent or so between now and 2040.
就像媒體廣泛報道的一樣，如果一切照舊，正如基準線所示，從現在起到2040年中國的勞動力會下降10%左右。
But, as the final chart shows, if China adopted measures to retain older workers in the labour force, its working population would barely fall at all until at least the mid-2030s.
但正如最後一張圖所示，如果中國採取措施延長退休年齡，至少到2030年代中期，其勞動人口基本不會下降。
Alternatively, if China succeeded in achieving a degree of convergence between male and female employment rates, the labour force would be just as large in 2040 as it is today. (This calculation is based on female labour force participation rising at an annual rate of 1/40th of the 2010 gap between men and women, thereby eliminating three-quarters of the gap by 2040.)
另外，如果中國能成功地縮小男女就業率的差距，至2040年其勞動力將與現在一樣多。（該計算是基於女性勞動力參與率將以2010年男女就業率差距四十分之一的年增長率持續上升，這樣至2040年中國就能消除四分之三的男女就業率差距）。
It is important to note that the “elderly” and “female” lines in the chart are mutually exclusive. If both of these issues were addressed, China’s labour force would actually rise by about 10 per cent by 2040, rather than falling by this amount.
需要注意的是在該圖中，“老年人”和“女性”兩條曲線是相互獨立的。如果這兩個問題都能得到解決，2040年中國的勞動人口不但不會下降10%，反而能增長10%左右。
“In the most optimistic scenario, you can actually increase the labour force from the current levels,” says Nithin Umaphathi, co-author of the report. “There is underutilised potential out there.”
該報告的合著者尼辛烏瑪哈蒂(Nithin Umaphathi)表示：“在最樂觀的情況下，中國的勞動力規模甚至會高於當前水平。中國還未充分利用其勞動力潛力。”
