全球化時代 西方不再自信

For the first half of my life, international politics was defined by the cold war. The fall of the Berlin Wall ended that era and began another one: the age of globalisation. Now, 25 years later, it feels like we are once again witnessing the close of an era.

在我的前半生，國際政治格局是由冷戰決定的。柏林牆的倒塌終結了冷戰時代，開啓了另一個時代：全球化時代。如今，25年過去，我們似乎正再次見證一個時代的結束。

The sense that things are changing is strongest in the realm of ideas. In the past few years, the west has lost confidence in the strength of the three props on which the post-cold war world has been constructed: markets, democracy and American power.

這種世事無常的感覺在意識形態領域最爲強烈。在過去幾年裏，西方對支撐起冷戰後世界的三大支柱的力量失去了信心，它們是：市場、民主和美國力量。

The success of these three ideas was, of course, connected. Once the cold war had ended it was natural to ask why the western system had prevailed. The obvious conclusion was that democratic, market-based systems had simply outperformed command economies and authoritarian politics. As the popular saying went: “Freedom works.” The result was that the US was not just the only superpower left standing. It also enjoyed intellectual hegemony.

這三種觀念的成功當然是相互關連的。冷戰一結束，人們自然會提出一個問題：爲什麼西方制度獲勝了？最明顯的結論是，民主的、基於市場的制度就是比計劃經濟和威權政治好。套用當時的流行說法：“自由成功了。”結果是，美國不僅成了唯一屹立不倒的超級大國，它還享有觀念霸權。

After the fall of the wall, there was a new vigour behind the spread of market economics and democratic politics around the world. It was appropriate that the free-market consensus championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund came to be known as the “Washington consensus”.

柏林牆倒塌後，市場經濟和民主政治在全球的傳播煥發了新的活力。世界銀行(World Bank)和國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)所倡導的那種自由市場共識被稱爲“華盛頓共識”，這個名稱是恰如其分的。

The political equivalent of the Washington consensus was the belief that democracy would eventually triumph not just in eastern Europe but all over the world. And in the 1990s countries as diverse as South Africa, Chile and Indonesia did indeed complete successful transitions to democracy. Underpinning these economic and political developments was the fact that the US was the unchallenged global superpower and at the centre of the military and strategic system all over the world — from Latin America to east Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

與華盛頓共識對應的政治共識是：相信民主最終會獲取勝利，不止在東歐，還將在全世界。上世紀90年代，南非、智利和印度尼西亞等差異巨大的國家，確實都成功完成了向民主的轉型。支撐這些經濟和政治動向的是一個客觀事實，即美國是無人可以挑戰的全球超級大國，佔據全世界——從拉丁美洲到東亞、中東和歐洲——軍事和戰略體系的中心。

In many ways that is the world we still live in. And yet there are growing doubts in the west about the trinity of ideas around which the post cold-war world has been constructed: markets, democracy and American power. In each case, there was a signature event that served to undermine confidence.

從很多方面而言，我們依然生活在這樣一個世界。然而西方對支撐冷戰後世界的三大觀念——市場、民主和美國力量——越來越懷疑。對於每一個觀念，都有一個標誌性事件足以動搖人們對它的信心。

The faith in free markets was severely shaken by the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession — and has never really recovered. Although the global depression that many feared was avoided, the exuberant belief in the ability of free markets to raise living standards all over the world has not returned. In much of the west, economic debate is instead dominated by discussion of income inequality — with Europe adding an extra layer of anxiety about the euro and high unemployment. Star emerging markets such as Brazil and India have lost their fizz, and even China is slowing. The belief that there is a market-based formula out there that all sensible policy makers can adopt — a “Washington consensus” — has faded, to be replaced by a global lack of consensus.

2008年的金融危機和隨後的經濟大衰退(Great Recession)——迄今沒有真正恢復——嚴重動搖了人們對自由市場的信心。雖然許多人所擔心的全球性衰退沒有發生，但人們不再對自由市場有能力提高全世界生活水平抱有強烈信念。在西方世界大部分地區，主導經濟辯論的反而是關於收入不平等的討論，在歐洲，還要加上兩個令人擔憂的問題——歐元和高失業率。巴西、印度等新興市場之星已經失去了活力，就連中國的經濟都在放緩。對於存在一個基於市場的標準方案、可供所有明智的政策制定者採納的信念，即“華盛頓共識”，已逐漸消失，取而代之的是全球性的缺乏共識。

Democratic evangelism, meanwhile, has been undermined by the horrors unleashed by the Arab uprisings. The wave of revolutionary change that hit the Middle East in 2011 initially looked like the Arab equivalent of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Authoritarian systems were tumbling and new democracies seemed to be emerging. But the failure of democracy to take root in any of the countries that underwent revolutions, with the exception of Tunisia, has undermined faith in the inevitable advance of political freedom.

與此同時，阿拉伯地區此起彼伏的起義所帶來的恐懼，打擊了對民主的狂熱。這股在2011年衝擊中東的革命浪潮，最初看上去像阿拉伯版的柏林牆倒塌。專制政體被推翻，新的民主國家似乎即將誕生。但除突尼斯以外，民主沒有在任何一個經歷了革命的國家紮下根來，動搖了政治自由必將推進的信念。

Just as troubling, in some ways, is an emerging loss of faith in the ability of established democracies to deliver competent government. In the US, respect for Congress is at near-record lows. In European states such as Italy and France, the political systems seem incapable of delivering reform or growth — and voters are flirting with extremist parties.

某些方面而言同樣令人不安的是，人們開始對成熟民主國家提供稱職治理的能力喪失信心。在美國，國會的威望已接近歷史最低水平。在意大利、法國等歐洲國家，其政治制度似乎無法爲改革或增長提供土壤，選民開始跟極端主義政黨眉目傳情。

The third prop of the age of globalisation is American power. That, too, looks less reliable than it did a decade ago. Here the central event was the Iraq war.

全球化時代的第三個支柱是美國的實力。這一點看起來似乎也沒有十年前那麼可靠，就這一點而言的核心事件是伊拉克戰爭。

That conflict, unleashed by President George W Bush, initially looked like a triumphant demonstration of US might as Saddam Hussein was swept from power. But America’s inability to stabilise Iraq or Afghanistan, despite many years of effort, has demonstrated that while the US military can destroy a hostile regime in weeks, it cannot guarantee a stable postwar settlement. More than a decade after the fall of Baghdad, America is back at war in Iraq — and the Middle East as a whole is in a state of violent anarchy.

一開始，薩達姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)被掃地下臺，這場小布什(George W. Bush)總統發動的戰爭似乎成功證明了美國的實力。但美國努力多年，仍無力讓伊拉克或阿富汗恢復穩定，證明了美軍雖能在數週內摧毀一個敵對政權，卻不能爲一個穩定的戰後安排打包票。在巴格達陷落十多年後，美國眼下又重返伊拉克戰場，而整個中東都正處於暴力無政府狀態。

The rise of China has also raised questions about how long America’s reign as “sole superpower” can continue. In October the IMF announced that — measured in terms of purchasing power — China is now the world’s largest economy. It is still miles away from matching America’s international political reach. But America’s own ability and willingness to sustain its role as global hegemon is open to question.

中國的崛起也提出一個問題：美國的“唯一超級大國”支配地位還能維持多久？去年10月，IMF宣佈，以購買力計算，中國已成爲全球最大經濟體。中國與美國的國際政治影響力還相差甚遠，但美國本身在維持全球霸主地位方面的能力和意願都值得商榷。

That said, it is worth remembering that the fall of the Berlin Wall came at a time when many in the US were obsessed with the rise of Japan. That should serve as a reminder of how quickly the intellectual climate can shift and fashionable preoccupations fade. But, while the start of the year has seen a revival of the US economy, the revival of the west’s intellectual self-confidence still looks a long way off.

即便如此，應該記住的是，柏林牆倒塌的時候，許多美國人正糾結於日本的崛起。我們應引以爲戒，記住觀念氛圍可以轉變得多麼迅速，流行的偏見可以消失得多麼快。不過，雖然今年年初美國經濟已出現復甦的跡象，想恢復西方世界的觀念自信看起來仍有很長的路要走。