沙特改革無法繞過教權

Mohammed bin Salman, son of Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and his deputy crown prince, is commonly referred to as the power behind the throne. That phrase falls short after this week’s unveiling of his Vision 2030, the most ambitious reform programme in the kingdom’s history. Whether he succeeds or fails, for now he is the power.

沙特國王薩勒曼(King Salman)的兒子、副王儲穆罕默德•本•薩勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)，通常被稱爲王權背後的掌權者。本週，在他公佈沙特歷史上最雄心勃勃的改革計劃“願景2030”(Vision 2030)之後，這個稱呼已經不準確了。無論他是成是敗，目前他就是掌權者。

Since his ageing father succeeded to the throne last year, the 30-year-old prince has taken hold of most of the main levers of power: as economy overlord, defence minister and architect of Saudi Arabia’s increasingly hawkish foreign policy. Now he has set breathtaking targets to wean Saudis off what he calls an “addiction to oil” by replacing fast depleting hydrocarbon revenue with income from private investment, privatisation and the creation of the world’s biggest sovereign wealth fund.

自從去年他年邁的父親繼承王位以來，這位30歲的王子已把持了國家的大部分主要權力：他是最高經濟官員、國防部長，還是沙特日益鷹派的外交政策的設計者。如今，他制定了令人激動的目標，即用私人投資、私有化和打造全球最大主權財富基金產生的收益，取代快速減少的碳氫化合物收入，從而使沙特人擺脫他所稱的“石油癮”。

He plans to float up to 5 per cent of Saudi Aramco, the state oil company, and place it and other assets in this fund, which he envisages will eventually exceed $2tn and become a global investment force. He fore sees non-oil revenue quadrupling by 2020 from just over $40bn last year, before nearly doubling again by 2030. “I think in 2020 we can live without oil,” he said this weekCHKD.

他打算將國有石油公司沙特阿拉伯石油公司(Saudi Aramco)至多5%的股份公開發行，然後把籌得資金和其他資產注入主權財富基金中。他設想，該基金的規模最終將超過2萬億美元，成爲全球投資領域的一支重要力量。他預計，到2020年非石油收入將在去年略高於400億美元的基礎上增加三倍，到2030年接近再翻一番。他本週表示：“我認爲，2020年我們不靠石油收入也能生活。”

Prince Mohammed, known in diplomatic shorthand as MbS, has said he also intends to introduce accountability in a public administration plagued by waste and corruption — including at his defence ministry, responsible for the world’s third biggest arms procurement programme. He intends to raise locally sourced arms production from 2 per cent now to 50 per cent by 2030CHKD.

穆罕默德王子表示，他也打算在浪費和腐敗問題嚴重的公共管理領域——包括他領導下的國防部——引入問責制。沙特國防部掌管着全球第三大武器採購項目。他打算到2030年把武器國產化率從目前的2%提升至50%。

All this rewrites the social contract whereby Saudis forgo political rights and offer fealty to the House of Saud in return for public sector jobs and cradle-to-grave welfare funded by oil. Coming even close to these goals implies radical social change, an upheaval in governance — all without much sign that the absolute monarchy intends its subjects to become fully participatory citizens.

所有這一切會重寫當前的社會契約：沙特人放棄政治權利，效忠沙特王室(House of Saud)，以換取公共行業的工作機會以及依靠石油收入實現的從搖籃到墳墓的福利保障。即便只是朝這些目標靠近，都暗示着激進的社會改革、治理的鉅變——同時並沒有多少跡象表明這個絕對君主制國家打算讓自己的臣民變成完全參與型公民。

While no one can fault MbS for his boldness, his programme resembles a mobilisation of technocrats to bypass big political obstacles. The biggest of these is the cornerstone of the state: the historic compact between the House of Saud and the House of ibn Abdul Wahhab, the 18th century preacher behind the most extreme version of Sunni Muslim orthodoxy ever attempted as a form of governance. The ruling family has until now relied on the Wahhabi establishment — as reactionary and bigoted as ever — for its legitimacy, in exchange for clerical control over areas such as education and the judiciary, as well as the segregation of women.

儘管誰也不能指責穆罕默德王子的大膽，但他的改革計劃好像是想利用技術官僚繞過一些重大政治障礙。其中最大的政治障礙是沙特國家的基石：沙特王室(House of Saud)與伊本•阿卜杜勒•瓦哈卜家族(House of ibn Abdul Wahhab)締結的歷史性條約。伊本•阿卜杜勒•瓦哈卜是瓦哈比教派的創始人，生活在18世紀。該教派是伊斯蘭教正統遜尼派各分支中，曾被嘗試作爲一種治理形式的最極端的一支。直到如今，沙特執政家族一直依賴瓦哈比當權派——他們像以往任何時候一樣極端頑固保守——維持執政合法性，同時作爲回報，給予後者在教育、司法以及隔離女性等領域的宗教控制權。

That is one lever of power the deputy crown prince does not hold, and it is hard to see his reform plans prospering if this symbiotic compact stays as it is. Deference to Saudi Arabia, moreover, has diminished as understanding grows of the ways in which Wahhabi proselytism feeds into virulent jihadi phenomena such as al-Qaeda and Isis. That alone undermines the kingdom’s potential as an investment magnet.

這是這位副王儲並未掌握的一種權力，倘若這一共存條約不改變的話，我們是很難看到他的改革計劃取得成功的。此外，隨着人們日益瞭解瓦哈比教派的勸誘改宗如何催生基地組織(al-Qaeda)、伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國(ISIS)等危險聖戰組織，外界對沙特的尊重減弱了。僅這一點就損害了沙特的潛在投資吸引力。

MbS, with a reputation for strong-headedness, may be seeking new sources of legitimacy from his own generation. He still has to consolidate his power inside a sprawling, faction-ridden family — but he has given a few hints.

以固執而著稱的穆罕默德王子，或許正向他的同代人那裏尋找新的執政合法性來源。他還是得在一個派系林立的龐大家族內鞏固自己的權力——但他也給出了些許暗示。

This month the unbridled power of the religious police, the notorious Mutawa, was curbed; the force can no longer arrest, question or pursue those judged in breach of its stern social mores. This week he said that whether Saudi women — whose participation in the workforce he intends to increase — would win the right to drive was a decision for society. Yet in a recent interview with Bloomberg he said: “We believe women have rights in Islam that they’ve yet to obtain” — almost an invitation for Saudis to become more assertive on this and similarly discriminatory issues.

本月，沙特臭名昭著的宗教警察(Mutawa)肆無忌憚的權力受到了限制；他們再也不能逮捕、審問或追捕那些被認定違反了其嚴厲社會風俗的人。本週，他表示，沙特婦女——他打算讓更多婦女進入職場——是否將贏得駕駛權利，是社會的決定。但他不久前接受彭博社(Bloomberg)採訪時表示，“我們相信，在伊斯蘭世界中，婦女還有權利尚未實現”——這幾乎是鼓勵沙特人在這個問題以及其他具有同樣歧視性的問題上表現得更堅決。

But on education, for example, reform cannot sidestep the clergy. At the heart of the MbS plan is the creation of private-sector jobs for underemployed, often underqualified youth, much of whose schooling consists of bombardment with Wahhabi dogma. One front-rank Gulf employer tells of interviewing a Saudi graduate whose doctorate was on Islamic ablutions.

但是，改革在比如教育等領域無法繞過教權。穆罕默德王子改革方案的核心，是爲那些未充分就業、往往資質不足的年輕人創造私人部門的工作機會。在這些年輕人中，很多人受到的教育都包括大量瓦哈比教義的灌輸。一家海灣地區的一流僱主談到，他們曾經面試過一名沙特畢業生，這名畢業生博士讀的是伊斯蘭淨禮。

Prince Mohammed’s vision calls for wholesale curriculum reform and five Saudi universities in the top 200. There are no technocratic bypasses on that road, which leads to collision with the Wahhabi clerical establishment.

穆罕默德王子的願景呼籲實施全面的課程改革，讓5所沙特大學進入全球前200名。這個目標是無法通過技術官僚式繞路實現的，這意味着與瓦哈比宗教當權派的衝突在所難免。