不良運作模式惹人眼,銀行業迎來秋後算賬

After the 2008 financial crisis, banks initially acted like a cartoon character who shoots over a cliff-edge at high speed and keeps going for a while before falling. Five years on, they are lying on the ground – and will never be allowed to return to their fast-paced ways.

2008年金融危機之後，最初銀行就像卡通中的人物一樣，以很快的速度衝向懸崖邊，在摔下去之前還向前滑了一段距離。五年過後，他們依然躺在地上，也將永遠被禁止像過去那樣狂奔疾跑。

It has taken a long time for the authorities on both sides of the Atlantic to address some of the deep-seated problems that contributed to the crisis. But they are now doing so, despite all the lobbying and protests. Few bankers have gone to jail, but the industry is being disciplined.

大西洋兩岸當局花了很長時間才着手解決導致危機的一些深層次問題。現在他們就在這麼做，儘管面臨許多遊說和抗議。幾乎沒有銀行家入獄，但這個行業正在受到整肅。

This week brought two announcements that strike at the distortions caused to banking by cheap credit and the underpricing of risk over past decades. One was the Federal Reserve’s decision to implement the Basel III capital rules, and to add extra measures. The other was the European Commission’s assault on how banks trade credit derivatives.

近期出了兩條政策，矛頭指向近幾十年來低息信貸和風險定價過低在銀行業造成的扭曲現象。一個是美聯儲決定執行“巴塞爾III”資本規定，還採取額外措施。另一個就是歐盟委員會(EC)對銀行的信用衍生品交易方式開刀。

These measures sound technical, and lack the populist appeal of EU efforts to limit bonuses or impose a financial transactions tax. Yet both will have fundamental effects on how banks operate, and how likely they are to fail again in a crisis. They will not only make banking less profitable, but also less volatile.

這些措施比較具有技術性，與歐盟限制獎金或者徵收金融交易稅的努力相比，缺乏民粹吸引力。然而，對於銀行如何運營、有多大可能再次在危機中陷落，這兩個方面有着根本性的影響。它們不僅會削弱銀行盈利性，也會讓銀行變得更穩定。

It is notable that, both for banks’ capital requirements, and the move from derivatives being traded over-the-counter among banks to trading on exchanges and settling within clearing houses, the industry’s rearguard action has failed. The reforms being imposed after periods of consultation and review are little changed from the originals.

有一點值得注意，不論在銀行資本要求方面，還是讓銀行間的衍生品場外交易轉入交易所交易並在結算所結算的做法，銀行業的“後衛”行動都是失敗的。徵求意見和審覈期之後所實施的改革與最初並沒有多大不同。

Jamie Dimon, chairman and chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, once described Basel III as “anti-American” but the Fed has taken the Swiss approach of adding to its penalties, rather than subtracting. Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, has energetically forced through US derivatives reforms in the teeth of lawsuits.

摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)董事長兼首席執行官傑米•戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)曾說巴塞爾III是“反美國”的，但美聯儲(Fed)卻採取了瑞士的方法，增加而不是減少懲罰力度。美國商品期貨交易委員會(Commodity Futures Trading Commission)主席蓋瑞•傑斯勒(Gary Gensler)頂着法律訴訟的壓力一直在積極推進美國衍生品改革。

The EU has passed laws that will implement similar changes to swaps trading – making it more transparent and safer by pushing trades through clearing houses. The European Commission’s antitrust action against investment banks, which fought off incursions by exchanges into their over-the-counter market, fits with this.

歐盟已經通過法律，將對掉期交易實施類似改革——讓交易通過結算所進行結算，使其更加透明和安全。歐盟委員會針對投資銀行（後者擊退了交易所對他們的場外市場的入侵）的反壟斷行動就符合這一目標。

Such initiatives address one of the biggest weaknesses exposed by the 2008 crisis – over-the-counter trading of credit default swaps without an adequate capital cushion contributed to the near-collapse of American International Group. More broadly, banks held too little capital for the risks they were unwittingly taking, as many discovered.

這些舉措觸及了2008年金融危機暴露出來的一大弱點：在沒有足夠資本緩衝情況下進行的場外信用違約掉期(CDS)交易，正是這種做法導致美國國際集團(American International Group)陷於崩潰邊緣。更廣泛地來看，很多人都發現，銀行用來應對意外風險的資金過少。

The chief task after 2008 was to remedy this, and the fact that the reforms are now falling into place is welcome. Despite Mr Gensler’s fear that other countries will exploit his reforms by luring dealers to less regulated spots, the US and Europe have matched each other. Europe lags behind the US in swaps reform but is on the same path.

2008年之後的主要任務就是彌補這點，而改革措施正在逐漸落實的事實令人欣慰。儘管傑斯勒擔憂其他國家會利用他的改革措施，將交易商“引誘”到監管較鬆的地方，但美國和歐洲是差不多的。在掉期交易改革中，歐洲落後於美國，但卻走在同樣的道路上。

Since changes to capital and to margin requirements – a crucial part of derivatives reforms – occur deep within banks’ operations, it is easy to miss their impact. But they affect each transaction a bank undertakes with a customer.

由於資本金和保證金要求（衍生品改革的一個關鍵部分）的變化發生在銀行運營的較深層面，很容易就會忽略它們的影響。但它們影響着銀行與客戶的每一筆交易。

Take the market in credit default swaps, which developed in the 1990s as a means for banks to offset credit risk, and is the target of European antitrust action. Until recently, it was an over-the-counter market controlled by banks, in which deals were done privately and banks did not have to post collateral, as swaps dealers must on exchanges.

以上世紀九十年代發展起來的信用違約掉期市場爲例，信用違約掉期是銀行抵消信用風險的一種方式，該市場也是歐洲反壟斷行動的目標。之前，它一直都是銀行控制的一個場外交易市場，在這個市場上，銀行私下完成交易，不需要像掉期交易商在交易所那樣必須提供擔保。

If Megabank had been doing a lot of business with ABC Corporation and was near its credit limit, it could clear its balance sheet by writing a swap with Minorbank. Minorbank would take on the existing ABC risk for a hefty fee, and Megabank could carry on as before. The cost of the swap was high, but it paid for itself by releasing capital.

假設Megabank與ABC公司有大量業務往來，並且接近其信貸限額，就可以通過與Minorbank的掉期協議來清理其資產負債表。Minorbank會收取很高的費用來承擔與ABC相關風險。而Megabank則照常運營。掉期的成本很高，但它會釋放出資本。

Until 2008, this worked nicely for everyone. ABC kept being allocated cheap credit, while Minorbank’s traders got bonuses at the end of the year from the swap fees (and later returned the favour to their mates at Megabank). Banks shared out their excess profits from underpriced credit among the shareholders, customers and traders.

2008年之前，這麼做對每個人來說都很順利。ABC一直都能獲得低息信貸，而Minorbank的交易員則從掉期費用中獲得年終獎（之後也會回報Megabank的同仁）。銀行在股東、客戶、交易員之間分配低價信貸帶來的超額收益。

Then they ran off the cliff.

之後他們就集體掉下懸崖。

In the new world of higher capital charges, central clearing, exchange-traded futures and a crackdown on anything that smacks of big banks colluding, things are tougher. Banks will need to put aside more capital against deals and cannot reap similarly juicy profits.

在資本成本上升、實行中央結算方式、相關期貨在交易所交易，以及遏制一切有大銀行“勾結”嫌疑操作的新世界，形勢變得更加艱難。銀行需要留出更多資金，並且無法獲得像以前一樣的豐厚收益。

For the health and durability of the system, that is a considerable benefit. The fact that dealers have to pass trades through clearing houses and post margin makes it less likely that the AIG failure will be repeated. If banks hold more capital, taxpayers won’t need to rescue them.

這對整個銀行體系的健康和持久發展大爲有利。交易商必須通過結算所來完成交易並提交保證金，使得AIG式的失敗重演的可能性降低。如果銀行有更多的資本金，納稅人就不需要拯救它們。

It isn’t cost-free. Joaquín Almunia, the EU competition commissioner, is right that exchange-trading of swaps should be cheaper for investors than the banks’ over-the-counter market, all other things being equal. As it becomes more expensive for banks to arrange swaps, however, they will inevitably pass on some of these regulatory costs to their customers.

這麼做也是有代價的。歐盟競爭委員會專員傑奎因•阿爾穆尼亞(Joaquín Almunia)說得對，在其他方面對等的情況下，對投資者來說，交易所掉期交易的成本應該低於銀行的場外交易市場。然而，隨着銀行安排掉期交易的費用增加，他們將不可避免地將一些監管成本轉移給客戶。

“A product that a bank could customise and was almost free is becoming standardised and very expensive,” says Will Rhode, head of fixed income at Tabb Group, a consultant. Volumes of credit default swaps have fallen sharply as banks becomes swaps dealers.

諮詢公司Tabb集團固定收益業務主管威爾•羅德(Will Rhode)說：“銀行過去可以定製設計並近乎免費的產品如今正在成爲標準化產品，並且非常昂貴。”銀行成爲掉期交易商之後，信用違約掉期的數量就大幅下降。

This is the price society and the financial system pays for lessening risks and promoting stability. It was never going to be easy to reform bad banking habits acquired over decades but, several years after the crash, banks are facing the inevitable regulatory reckoning.

這是社會和金融體系爲降低風險、提升穩定性所付出的代價。銀行業幾十年來形成的糟糕習慣很難改革，但在危機的幾年之後，銀行正面臨不可避免的監管算賬。