蒸蒸日上的地緣政治風險評估生意

The west has a new industry. It is the booming business of calculating geopolitical risk. Glance around the world at the fires burning in the Middle East, at Russia’s march into Ukraine and the tensions in East Asia fuelled by China’s rise, and it is easy to see why. These conflicts and collisions are more than an unhappy coincidence. The end of history has made way for the era of systemic disorder.

西方出現了一個新行業——蒸蒸日上的地緣政治風險評估生意。環顧世界，中東戰火不斷、俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭以及中國崛起加劇東亞緊張局勢，造成這種局面的原因不難理解。這些衝突與碰撞不僅僅是令人遺憾的巧合。歷史的終結已讓位給系統性混亂的時代。

Sitting in the other day at a conference organised by two leading think-tanks — Aspen Italia and Chatham House — it occurred to me that when historians cast around for a title for the present chapter in global affairs, they might do worse than opt for “the great unwinding”. The backdrop for the gathering of business leaders and policy makers was the glorious tranquillity of Venice. The talk was about the ruptures that have brought down the post-cold war order.

上個月，我出席了意大利阿斯平研究所(Aspen Italia Institute)和英國皇家國際事務研究所(Chatham House)這兩家領先智庫組織的一場會議。在會上我突然想到，當歷史學家爲當前國際局勢的章節尋找標題時，或許沒有比“大失控”更貼切的選擇了。商界領袖和政策制定者是在明媚而寧靜的威尼斯舉行這場會議的，主題是摧毀了冷戰後秩序的“斷層”。

The optimism in the west that greeted the collapse of communism was rooted in a clutch of organising assumptions. The world has become a more dangerous and unpredictable place during the intervening 25 years because most of these suppositions have now unwound.

西方對共產主義的崩潰感到歡欣鼓舞，這種樂觀情緒根植於幾條組織方面的假設。自那以來的25年裏，世界已變得更加危險和不可預測，因爲這些假設中的大部分如今已不成立。

The first was the permanence of the Pax Americana. Remember the breathless commentary about the impregnable hegemony of the US? At the turn of the millennium Washington assumed, and most experts concurred, that the sole superpower would set the terms of international relations for most of the 21st century. There would be adjustments to accommodate the new powers, but the US would continue to act as guarantor of the peace.

第一條假設是“美國治下的和平”(Pax Americana)將永遠持續下去。記得有關美國霸權牢不可破那種令人窒息的評論嗎？在世紀交替之際，華盛頓方面想當然地覺得，在21世紀的大部分時間裏，美國這個唯一的超級大國將制定國際關係的規則——大多數專家對此表示同意。規則將會適當調整以適應新興大國的崛起，但美國將繼續充當和平的守護者。

The historians no doubt will debate when precisely the illusion was shattered. The chaos that followed shock and awe in Iraq is a good a point as any. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ultimately drew the limits of US power, and did so just at the moment that China, India and the rest were rising fast. The war on terror did more than delineate the shortcomings of military might. Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo shattered the notion that America would always act as a benign hegemon.

毫無疑問，歷史學家們將會激辯這一幻覺究竟在何時破滅。美國在伊拉克發起震懾行動之後的混亂，就是一個最恰當的時間點。阿富汗和伊拉克兩場戰爭最終使美國的力量繃緊到了極限，與此同時，中國、印度以及其他國家卻在迅速崛起。反恐戰爭不只是暴露出軍力的不足。阿布格萊布(Abu Ghraib)和關塔那摩(Guantánamo)兩所監獄讓美國將會永遠充當仁慈霸主的想法化爲泡影。

US declinism can be overdone. In an excellent new essay asking Is the American Century Over?, the Harvard scholar Joseph Nye points up America’s enduring strengths — economic, demographic and geographic as well as military. It is also salutary to note how quickly the shale revolution has overturned many predictions of ebbing US power. What is true, though, is that the US of the 21st century is unlikely to possess the capacity or the will to shape the geopolitical order in the way it did in the 20th. For all the noise now being made by Republicans in Congress, future presidents will be obliged to follow President Barack Obama in recognising the constraints of a multipolar world.

說美國已經衰落可能有些過頭。在一本名爲《美國世紀結束了嗎？》(Is the American Century Over?)的傑出的新書中，美國哈佛大學學者約瑟夫•奈(Joseph Nye)強調了美國在經濟、人口、地理和軍事方面的持久優勢。另外有必要指出的是，頁岩氣革命是多麼迅速地推翻了衆多關於美國實力衰落的預言。不過，21世紀的美國不太可能擁有像其在20世紀塑造地緣政治秩序那樣的能力或意願，這也是實情。不管共和黨人在國會怎麼喧囂，未來的美國總統都不得不仿效巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)，承認多極世界的種種約束。

The second unwinding has been in Europe. The creation of the euro was intended to complete the work of the EU’s founding fathers, replacing the deep scars of competing nationalisms with a postmodern model of deep integration. Europe’s borders had been fixed in perpetuity and the continent had said goodbye to war.

第二項失控發生在歐洲。創立歐元的本意是爲了完成歐盟(EU)創始人的工作，以深度融合的後現代模式取代民族主義相互對抗的深深傷疤。歐洲國家的邊界被永久性地固定下來，歐洲已告別了戰爭。

The thought, too, was that Europe’s postwar model would be exported, first to the EU’s neighbours in the east and then as a template for the rising world. For a while it worked: a procession of once-communist states queuing to join the democratic club testified to the potency of normative power. There was something to be said for playing Venus to America’s Mars.

這種想法也意味着，歐洲的戰後模式將被輸出，首先輸出至歐洲東部鄰國，然後成爲新興世界的樣板。該想法一度是有效的：衆多前共產主義國家排隊要求加入歐盟這個驗證過規範型權力效力的民主俱樂部。以歐洲的“金星”對抗美國的“火星”一定程度上不無道理。

And now? The euro has been exposed as a half-finished project, a statement of intent that lacks vital political and economic underpinnings. Even after the crisis of recent years, and I am still not convinced Greece can remain in the euro, governments are reluctant to pool sufficient sovereignty to assure the single currency’s long-term future. The resurgence of nationalism is not confined to arguments about debt and deficits. Populists of left and right have prospered across Europe by demanding governments slam the door against the alleged depredations of globalisation.

現在情況如何呢？歐元已被曝光爲一個半吊子工程，不過是一份缺乏關鍵政治與經濟基礎支持的意向書。即便在近幾年的危機之後——現在我仍不確定希臘能否留在歐元區——歐洲各國政府還是不願讓渡足夠多的主權以保證歐元的長遠未來。民族主義的再度興起不僅僅是因爲債務與赤字爭論的影響。左右翼民粹勢力要求政府對所謂的全球化掠奪關上大門，在歐洲各地迅猛發展。

There lies the third unwinding — of the assumption that economic interdependence would soften national competition and that global supply chains would beget more effective global governance. Instead we have seen the return of nationalist competition, in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revanchism, and in the territorial disputes between China and its neighbours in the East and China seas.

第三項不成立的假設是，經濟上的相互依賴將削弱國家間的競爭，同時全球供應鏈將帶來更有效的全球治理。相反，我們看到了民族主義競爭的迴歸，比如俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的復仇主義，以及中國與其鄰國在東中國海和南中國海上的領土糾紛。

If the Europeans are having second thoughts about postmodern integration, most of the rising — and in Russia’s case, declining — powers never signed up to the idea of sharing national sovereignty. The threat in the Middle East and parts of Africa comes from collapsing states; in Asia it is rooted in competition between states.

如果歐洲人重新考慮一下後現代融合，就會發現大多數興起中的大國（俄羅斯則是衰退中的大國）從未支持過共享國家主權的主張。在中東和非洲部分地區，威脅來自於瀕臨崩潰的國家；在亞洲，威脅根植於國家間的競爭。

So how should business respond to this increase in political risk? Many still choose to ignore it: [words missing here could you expand pls?]they worry instead about competitors’ pricing, economic growth and regulation. Investors in, and exporters to, Russia have learnt that complacency can carry a cost.

那麼，企業應當如何應對這種不斷加劇的政治風險？許多企業仍選擇忽視此種風險：它們擔心的反而是競爭對手的定價、經濟增長和監管。投資於俄羅斯的投資者以及向俄羅斯出口的企業已意識到，自滿可能讓人付出代價。

As they operate their multi-nation supply chains and just-in-time production processes, businesses should understand that the world has changed. The cold war era was dangerous but stable. The great unwinding has created a world that is dangerously unpredictable. If there is money to be made in calculating geopolitical risk, there is money to be saved in understanding it.

在經營跨國供應鏈和適時生產流程時，企業應當明白，世界已經發生了改變。冷戰時代危險，但穩定。大失控造就了一個危險而不可預測的世界。如果計算地緣政治風險可以賺錢的話，那麼明白這種風險就能省錢。