北京並非亞投行總部最佳選擇

Beijing might seem the obvious choice. But given the political sensitivities surrounding the bank’s formation, it may seek to alleviate fears of Sinocentrism and opt for a neutral, regional destination. A similar calculation resulted in the decision by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – in which Japan is the largest shareholder – to pitch its regional headquarters in Manila.

北京似乎是個顯而易見的選擇。但是，考慮到圍繞該行成立的政治敏感性，亞投行也許會力圖緩解外界對中國中心論(Sinocentrism)的恐懼而選擇一箇中立的地區性地點。亞洲開發銀行(ADB)——日本是該行最大的出資國——決定將其地區總部設在馬尼拉，就是出於類似的考慮。

Southeast Asia would appear logical in this regard, given both its strategic significance and its rapidly growing regional economies that remain simultaneously infrastructure deficient. In late 2014, senior members of the new Joko Widodo-led Indonesian government traveled to Beijing to lobby for the bank’s headquarters in Jakarta.

就這一點來看，並鑑於東南亞具有戰略重要性、該地區經濟體發展迅速而基礎設施仍然不足，印度尼西亞呼籲亞投行將總部設在東南亞看上去合乎邏輯。2014年底，佐科•維多多(Joko Widodo)領導的新一屆印尼政府的高級官員出訪北京，就亞投行將總部設立在雅加達進行遊說。

In some ways, Indonesia may seem a perfect choice. It is one of the region’s largest markets, has huge infrastructure requirements, and is geopolitically neutral, in relative terms. Indeed, at a time when Japan and US regional influence is increasing– Japan is soon set to sign a defense pact with Indonesia, while its conglomerates have been pumping investment into the economy –it is arguably in China’s interest to engage the de facto leader of the Asean grouping, particularly with growing calls within the region to adopt common policies towards China.

在某些方面，印尼或許看似一種完美的選擇。印尼是東南亞最大的市場之一，擁有龐大的基礎設施需求，在地緣政治上保持中立。事實上，在當下日本和美國在這個地區的影響力日益加大之際（日本很快將與印尼簽署一項國防合作協議，同時日本財團正不斷加大對印尼經濟的投資），拉攏印尼這個東盟的實際領導國，可以說是符合中國利益的，特別是在東南亞採取共同對華政策的呼聲日益高漲的情況下。

Chinese investment interest in Indonesian infrastructure is already well established and growing. Given the cheap price of coal and their existing cost advantages, Chinese companies are likely to win contracts in the country’s ambitious build-out of new power capacity, even despite the poor track record of previous Chinese participation in this space. The lower oil price environment also arguably benefits Chinese players in upstream extractive industries.

中國對投資印尼基礎設施的興趣早已產生並日漸濃厚。印尼正在雄心勃勃地增建新的發電廠，鑑於低廉的煤炭價格及它們當前的成本優勢，即便中國參與該地區投資有着糟糕的過往，中國企業也很可能拿下合同。油價下滑對上游採掘業的中國企業也可以說是個利好因素。

Ports are another major potential investment sector. Unlike the island of Sri Lanka, where a major planned Chinese port investment was frozen following the change of president, Indonesia desperately needs greater investment to upgrade ports, to reduce logistics costs across a sprawling archipelago of over 17,000 islands. The government has a plan to build or upgrade 24 ports, particularly connecting eastern Indonesia, which might be beneficial for Chinese companies both from a commercial and strategic perspective (it arguably offers another route for international cargo to bypass the Straits of Malacca).

港口是另一個潛在的主要投資領域。與斯里蘭卡島不同（該國總統更迭後，中方一個規劃中的大型港口投資項目被凍結），印尼是一片由逾1.7萬座島嶼組成的廣闊羣島，它亟需大規模投資來進行港口升級，以減少島嶼間的物流成本。印尼政府計劃修建或升級24個港口，特別是連接印尼東部的港口，這從商業和戰略角度或許都有利於中國企業（有可能會提供一條無須途徑馬六甲海峽的國際海運航線）。

Moreover, unlike Bangkok and Manila, which already have the United Nations and ADB, Jakarta does not currently host the regional office of any major multilateral institution. As one of the world’s largest cities (potentially the largest within a decade), it itself is a reflection of the significant long-term challenges of urbanisation in Asia.

此外，不同於分別作爲聯合國(UN)亞洲總部和亞開行總部地點的曼谷和馬尼拉，雅加達目前不是任何大型多邊機構的地區辦事處所在地。作爲世界上最大的城市之一（很可能在十年內成爲最大城市），雅加達本身就反映了亞洲城市化進程面臨的種種重大長期挑戰。

Nonetheless, Jakarta’s chronic urban and transport congestion, and lack of available space in central areas are arguably a deterrent to an AIIB headquarters. Unlike the ADB, which was founded in Manila nearly 50 years ago, and the entire city of Ortigas in metro Manila developed around it – the hectic pace of urbanisation in Jakarta and notoriously difficult land acquisition procedures make a potential replication of the ADB model a challenge.

話雖如此，但雅加達的兩大頑疾——交通擁堵以及市中心可用空間緊缺，可能會阻礙其成爲亞投行總部所在地。亞開行近50年前成立於馬尼拉，馬尼拉大都會(Metro Manila)的Ortigas市整個城市都是圍繞亞開行總部發展而來。與馬尼拉不同，雅加達的城市化過程混亂，徵地流程也出了名地費勁，使得其很難複製亞開行的模式。

Somewhere closer to home?

找個離本土更近的地方？

Arguably, three other potential candidates in the East Asian region include Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong/Shenzhen. Bangkok is already a sizable regional hub in its own right, with a government that is friendly towards China, and which could serve as a springboard for major ongoing infrastructure investments in the greater Mekong region.

東亞地區潛在的候選城市可能還有三個：曼谷、吉隆坡以及香港（或深圳）。曼谷本身已經是具有相當規模的地區樞紐，且該國政府對華友好，這裏也可以作爲大湄公河流域正在進行的大規模基礎設施投資的跳板。

The same is also true somewhat of Malaysia, which also has higher livability standards for staff – although Malaysia’s comparatively advanced economy itself is generally not in dire need of new infrastucture. Nevertheless, Malaysia also has a particularly high standard of English, which would enable AIIB and its participants to engage in bilingual or predominantly English-language medium, as in the ADB.

從某種程度而言，馬來西亞的情況也一樣，且對工作人員來說這裏有着更適宜的生活條件，不過馬來西亞經濟相對發達，本身總體上對新基礎設施沒有迫切需求。儘管如此，馬來西亞還具備極高的英語水平，這會使亞投行及其參與方可以使用雙語或主要用英語來溝通，就像亞開行一樣。

Closer to home, however, one less-considered option is Hong Kong and/or Shenzhen. Indeed, Hong Kong is also a global city with world-class infrastructure, and where the setup of AIIB would come with much fewer political undertones given that it is on home soil. It would also allow AIIB to appear both global and domestic at the same time.

離本土更近但較不被看好的一個選擇是香港和（或）深圳。的確，香港也是一座擁有世界一流基礎設施的全球化城市，而且鑑於香港就在中國，把亞投行總部設立在香港帶來的政治暗流會少得多。這也會讓亞投行同時具有全球化和本土化的形象。

It also potentially dovetails with the broader aim of local regional governments in the Pearl River Delta to expand Hong Kong’s “window to the world” status to other parts of Guangdong. The massive Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge now well underway, while there are growing visa exemptions for foreign visitors to Shenzhen and Guangdong, and the Hong Kong government’s determination to expand its regional hub status exemplified by the controversial recent decision to build a third runway at Hong Kong International Airport.

這可能也與珠三角地方政府希望把香港的“世界之窗”地位擴大至廣東其他地區的整體目標相契合。珠港澳大橋早已開工，同時與中國互免簽證的國家日益增加使得越來越多的外國遊客可以來到深圳和廣東，而且香港政府最近做出興建香港國際機場(Hong Kong International Airport)第三跑道的爭議性決定，從中可見其擴大地區樞紐地位的決心。

Space and other constraints are also potential issues for Hong Kong too, however. Available land for a big headquarters in Hong Kong is limited, while the capacity of an already-stretched local economy to cater to such a project could potentially be questioned. The same would also be true of Singapore, were it ever to be considered.

不過，空間及其他限制條件也是香港面臨的潛在問題。在香港建設一處大型總部的可用土地十分有限，同時香港經濟已然不堪重負，其承載這樣一個項目的能力可能會受到質疑。新加坡也是一樣，儘管它並未在考慮之內。

Or somewhere way out west?

或者遠赴西邊某地？

Regional cities such as Delhi, Hanoi, Manila, Seoul are likely unpalatable political choices either for Beijing or for the host countries themselves. However, another potential option would be to consider a location in west or southwest Asia.

無論是對北京還是對東道國本身來說，諸如德里、河內、馬尼拉和首爾之類的地區性城市很可能都是難以下嚥的政治選擇。然而，另一種潛在選項可能是考慮設在西亞或西南亞的某個地點。

This could potentially serve several purposes, commercial and strategic. It could consolidate AIIB’s status as a global player, as opposed to merely a regional one. In turn, it could also encourage greater financial commitments from European countries, who despite their relative absence in the ADB are increasingly keen to join. European companies and multilaterals such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also have greater experience implementing project finance in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), relative to East Asia and the Pacific.

這種選擇有可能會在商業和戰略上滿足一些目的。它可能會強化亞投行作爲一個國際機構（而不僅僅是一個區域性機構）的地位，還可能反過來鼓勵歐洲國家承擔更大出資額，這些國家儘管在亞開行出資額相對較少，但現在愈發熱衷於加入亞投行。相對於東亞和太平洋地區，歐洲的企業和多邊機構（比如歐洲復興開發銀行(EBRD)）在歐洲、中東和非洲地區(EMEA)還擁有更豐富的項目融資實施經驗。

Indeed, serving as a springboard for infrastructure developments in the Middle East and Africa could also be easier politically, where the relative competition from western and Japanese soft power is lower, and where infrastructure requirements also very high. It could help buoy growing enthusiasm for the concept of a “Eurasian economy”, connecting the Middle East with southwest and Central Asia, and with western China.

事實上，選擇一個可以作爲在中東和非洲發展基礎設施跳板的地點，在政治上可能也更容易實現。西方和日本的軟實力在這裏的競爭相對緩和，而且這裏的基礎設施需求也非常高。這個選擇可能有助於支撐起對“歐亞經濟體(Eurasian economy)”概念日益高漲的熱情，在中東與西南亞、中亞以及中國西部地區之間建立連接。

Of course, any future decision on the headquarters would also depend on the proportional financing commitments from other shareholders in AIIB, with China encouraging significant contributions from other potential member countries. It will also depend on the model through which Chinese companies/institutions and their foreign counterparts to implement project finance, and to what extent this model may differ from the current norm at institutions like ADB and the World Bank.

當然，未來對總部地點的決定也會取決於亞投行各股東國承擔的出資比例，中國鼓勵其他潛在的成員國多出資。這個決定還將取決於中國和外國的企業或機構實施項目融資的模式，以及這種模式可能在何種程度上異於亞開行和世界銀行等機構目前的慣例。