日本和歐洲 貨幣戰弄巧成拙

Looking back on three months’ worth of extreme market volatility it is clear that global currency wars have entered a new and more complicated phase. In effect, volatility has neutered the power of those central banks that have been most committed to weakening their currencies. The Bank of Japan provides the most notable example of impotence.

回顧持續3個月之久的極端市場波動，可以看出全球貨幣戰顯然進入了一個更加複雜的新階段。實際上，市場波動已經讓那些最堅定地致力於本幣貶值的央行失去了戰鬥力。彰顯這種無能爲力的最顯著的例子就是日本央行(BoJ)。

It was quite a paradox that a country with Japan’s level of public sector debt turned into a haven in a global market storm, but that was the case in the first quarter of 2016. The sharp appreciation of the yen against the dollar, despite negative Policy interest rates, reversed the normal currency market laws of gravity. And since the equity market has tended to move in tandem with the yen since the inception of Abenomics in 2012 — logical enough given the impact of competitive devaluation on export volumes or corporate profits — Japanese equities have tumbled.

日本這樣一個有着如此之高公債水平的國家，居然能夠成爲全球市場風暴中的避風港，這實在是有悖常理，但在2016年第一季度情況恰恰就是這樣。儘管日本推出了負政策利率，但日元相對美元仍急劇升值，這顛覆了正常的外匯市場“引力定律”。由於自2012年安倍經濟學(Abenomics)出臺以來，日本股市往往隨日元匯率變動而變動（考慮到競爭性貶值對出口規模或者企業利潤的影響，這完全符合邏輯），因此日本股市已大幅下跌。

In Europe, meantime, the super-dovish rhetoric of Mario Draghi no longer works its magic. On the announcement of a monetary package more radical than expected last month, the euro rose against the dollar. The speech by Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen last week, in which she indicated that US rates might stay lower for longer, then rubbed salt in the eurozone’s wounds.

與此同時，在歐洲，歐洲央行(ECB)行長馬里奧•德拉吉（Mario Draghi，上圖）的超級鴿派的言論失去了魔力。上月歐洲央行宣佈了一套比預期更爲激進的貨幣政策方案後，歐元對美元升值。美聯儲(Fed)主席珍妮特•耶倫（Janet Yellen，右圖）上週在講話中暗示美國將在更長時間內將利率保持在較低水平，這讓歐元區雪上加霜。

Whatever its motivation, the Fed could be said to have had its revenge. The weakening dollar helped roll back, albeit modestly, competitive devaluations that grabbed enlarged shares of global output and corporate profits growth for Japan and the eurozone at US expense. But the US had, of course, been an earlier beneficiary of devaluation when the Fed launched the first round of quantitative easing after the financial crisis. Nor is the fight over yet.

無論其動機是什麼，美聯儲可以說是報了仇。美元疲弱有助於反擊競爭性貶值（儘管幫助作用有限）——競爭性貶值讓日本和歐元區搶到了更大份額的全球產出和企業利潤增長，受損的卻是美國。當然，此前當美聯儲在金融危機後推出首輪量化寬鬆時，美國也曾是本幣貶值的受益者。這場戰鬥並沒有結束。

In all of this China stands out as a non-combatant. Despite lingering perceptions on Capitol Hill about mercantilist exchange rate policy and the fulminations of Donald Trump, the frontrunner to be the Republicans’ presidential nominee, the People’s Bank of China has spent billions shoring up an overvalued currency. The PBoC’s warrior instincts have been reserved for the hedge funds that are betting on a devaluation that the central bank does not want. The hedgier have learnt the hard way that the adage about not fighting the Fed may also apply to the PBoC.

中國明顯沒有參與這場戰鬥。儘管國會山依然殘留着中國推行重商主義匯率政策的印象，在提名戰中領跑的美國共和黨總統競選人唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)也猛烈抨擊中國的匯率政策，但中國央行已拿出大量美元來支撐被高估的人民幣。那些與中國央行對着幹、押注人民幣貶值的對衝基金獨自領教了該行天生的戰鬥精神。對衝基金付出了慘痛代價才明白，別跟美聯儲對着幹的格言也適用於中國央行。

The other notable non-combatant has been Britain which, thanks to the looming possibility of exit from the EU, has become a devaluationist by default. With the current account deficit running at around 7 per cent of GDP this could not be more timely. Given the unplanned nature of sterling’s decline, the term competitive devaluation scarcely applies.

另外一個明顯沒有參與戰鬥的是英國。得益於日益迫近的“退歐”可能性，英國自動成了一個貨幣貶值國。眼下英國經常賬戶赤字與國內生產總值(GDP)的比率達到約7%，英鎊貶值可能恰逢其時。鑑於英鎊貶值就性質而言並非刻意爲之，因此基本不能稱爲競爭性貶值。

The change in the dynamics of currency wars leaves Japan and the eurozone in an uncomfortable place. Devaluation was the one component of their monetary policies that appeared to have much effect. But the ability of their central banks to raise inflation to meet their targets is now even more in doubt than before. That matters for the world. While competitive devaluation was conventionally regarded as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy it could be globally benign if the monetary loosening it entailed helped lift the world economy further from the threat of deflation.

貨幣戰形勢的這種變化讓日本和歐元區處境尷尬。貨幣貶值是它們貨幣政策中少有的收效不錯的部分。但現在它們的央行提升通脹至目標水平的能力被打上了一個比以往更大的問號。這對世界很重要。傳統而言，競爭性貶值被視爲一種“以鄰爲壑”的政策，但如果貶值所需的貨幣放鬆幫助全球經濟進一步擺脫通縮威脅，那麼這對全球或許是件好事。

What we are left with is the hope that the US economy will prove more robust than Ms Yellen’s speech suggested, the possibility that currencies may realign, and the recognition that currency wars have been an important driver of policy rates and bond yields into negative territory.

現在留給我們的是期待事實證明美國經濟比耶倫講話所暗示的更健康，匯率可能重新調整以及承認貨幣戰一直是將政策利率和債券收益率推向負值的重要力量。

This inflicts a profits squeeze on a fragile eurozone banking system. That may well end up entrenching pessimistic sentiment in households and businesses that have already brought forward spending in response to QE and are thus less responsive to interest rate signals. At the same time these low or negative rates cause pension liabilities to balloon, which is hardly conducive to animal spirits in the boardrooms of corporate sponsors.

這將令脆弱的歐元區銀行體系的利潤受到擠壓。這最終很有可能會加劇家庭和企業的悲觀情緒，它們已爲應對量化寬鬆將支出提前了，因此對利率信號的反應將不那麼敏感。與此同時，這些低利率或負利率將導致養老金給付責任大幅加重，這很難有利於養老金出資企業董事會裏的冒險精神。

The tragedy is that the lowest interest rates in living memory are not being used to engage in badly needed infrastructure spending. Everyone agrees that monetary policy is carrying too much of the burden in an anaemic post-crisis recovery. No one seems to want to do much about it. Policy paralysis remains the order of the day.

可悲的是，我們記憶中最低水平的利率沒有用於啓動亟需的基礎設施支出。所有人都認爲，在危機後的疲弱復甦中，貨幣政策承擔了太重的擔子。似乎沒有人想對此採取什麼行動。總體而言，世界仍然處於政策癱瘓狀態。