當貿易長期停滯遭遇保護主義

One of the surprises of the Great Recession period since 2008 has been that global protection against free trade has increased only slightly, in sharp contrast to the enormous spread of trade controls during the Great Depression from 1931-34.

2008年以來的“大衰退”(Great Recession)中幾件令人驚訝的事情之一是，全球反對自由貿易的保護主義僅僅略有加強，這與1931至1934年“大蕭條”(Great Depression)中貿易管制的廣泛蔓延形成鮮明的對比。

This period of opposition to autarky might, however, be coming under threat. Two of the three candidates left in the American presidential race are clearly protectionists. Although Hillary Clinton, the likely winner, has always leaned towards free trade agreements, she has recently hedged her previous support for the Trans Pacific Partnership because of the developing political climate.

然而，這段反對自給自足的時期或許開始面臨威脅。在目前美國總統大選角逐中剩下的三位參選人之中，有兩位顯然是保護主義者。儘管可能的贏家希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)一直傾向於自由貿易協定，但由於政治氣候的變化，近來她避免明確支持《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(TPP)。

Betting markets think there is a 30 per cent chance of a President Trump. He has called for a 45 per cent tariff, no less, on imports from China. His presumptive nomination, according to Edward Luce, overturns decades of Republican support for free trade.

博彩市場認爲，特朗普(Trump)當選總統的機率爲30%。而他竟然呼籲對從中國進口的產品徵收45%的關稅。愛德華•盧斯(Edward Luce)認爲，特朗普成爲共和黨假定被提名人逆轉了共和黨人數十年來對自由貿易的支持態度。

And he would have a lot of sway in this area, because the usual checks and balances in the US political system do not really apply in the case of protectionist trade Policy. In that field, the president has been accorded unusual powers to act, ever since President Roosevelt’s Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934.

他在這方面將擁有很大影響力，因爲美國政治制度中通常的制衡，並不真正適用於貿易保護主義政策。自1934年羅斯福(Roosevelt)的《互惠貿易協定法》(Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act)出臺以來，美國總統在這一領域被授予了非同尋常的行動權。

Currency “Manipulation” and Monetary Policy

匯率“操縱”和貨幣政策

Even under President Obama, who is clearly a convinced proponent of free trade deals, the US has been edging nearer to interference in trading relationships, under the guise of “currency manipulation”. Two weeks ago, the US Treasury reported that five of America’s largest trading partners – China, Japan, Germany, Taiwan and Korea – might be guilty of some aspects of currency manipulation, though no partner transgresses on all the criteria used by the Treasury.

即使在明顯是自貿協議堅定支持者的奧巴馬(Obama)總統治下，美國也一直以別國“匯率操縱”爲幌子，朝着干預貿易關係的方向滑得更近。上月，美國財政部(US Treasury)報告稱，美國的五大貿易伙伴——中國、日本、德國、臺灣和韓國——可能在某些方面進行了匯率操縱，儘管沒有哪個貿易伙伴違反美國財政部使用的全部標準。

The legislation does not specify the action that should be taken by the US government against a currency manipulator, but it clearly might include direct controls over imports into America.

法律並未說明，美國政府應對匯率操縱方採取何種行動，但措施顯然可能包括對美國的進口實施直接管控。

Furthermore, the US Treasury is making it very clear that excessive reliance by foreign economies on monetary easing will not be accepted, especially if this devalues their exchange rates against the dollar. Instead, these countries are expected to use other measures to support growth, including fiscal expansion.

此外，美國財政部明確指出，將不接受外部經濟體過度依賴貨幣寬鬆，尤其是如果該經濟體讓本國貨幣對美元貶值的話。相反，美國希望這些經濟體使用其他措施支持增長，包括財政擴張。

In particular, Japan is clearly coming under this type of pressure prior to the G7 Summit in Shima on 26/27 May. This may explain the Bank of Japan’s decision to eschew monetary easing last month, despite clear signs of recession and returning deflation in the economy.

特別是，在5月26日至27日伊勢志摩(Ise-Shima)七國集團(G7)峯會之前，日本明顯感受到了這種壓力。這或許解釋了，儘管日本經濟中衰退和通縮再擡頭跡象已很明顯，但日本央行(BoJ)上月爲何仍決定不放寬貨幣政策。

These linkages between exchange rate policy and trade policy have happened many times before, notably in 1931-34. According to the definitive academic work on the spread of protection in the 1930s by Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin, the countries that opted for direct controls over imports and capital flows were those that had decided to remain on the Gold Standard, following the UK decision to suspend gold and devalue sterling in September 1931. It was the lack of viable alternatives to stem recessionary forces, in the face of devaluation by Britain and related economies, that induced the Gold Standard bloc to resort to trade controls.

以前，匯率政策與貿易政策之間的這種聯動已發生過好多次，尤其是在1931年至1934年。根據巴里•埃森格林(Barry Eichengreen)和道格拉斯•A•歐文(Douglas A. Irwin)對1930年代保護政策蔓延的權威學術研究成果，那些選擇直接管控進口和資本流動的國家，正是在英國於1931年9月決定放棄金本位制並讓英鎊貶值之後，決定繼續實行金本位制的國家。面對英國和相關經濟體的貨幣貶值，正是由於缺乏可行的替代選項來遏制衰退壓力，才導致金本位集團訴諸貿易管控。

Any comparison between then and now is certainly extreme, but it is possible to discern some shades of similarity. In early 2016, the US discovered that deflationary forces in Japan and the eurozone, alongside the consequential monetary easing by the Bank of Japan and the ECB, caused an appreciation in the dollar that the US economy could not withstand. This punctured the myth that the Federal Reserve could proceed without due regard for deflationary forces overseas.

將那時與現在比較當然太極端了，但從中可以發現部分相似之處。2016年初，美國發現，日本和歐元區的通縮壓力以及日本央行和歐洲央行(ECB)隨後實施的貨幣寬鬆，導致美元升值到美國經濟無法承受的地步。這刺破了美聯儲可以不顧海外通縮力量而我行我素的神話。

Global Spread of Secular Stagnation

長期停滯向全球蔓延

Furthermore, the intellectual climate is also changing, and not just among labour market economists, who now frequently argue that trade with China has permanently damaged employment in the US. The Keynesian macro-economists who support Hillary have usually been devout free traders, but this may be changing. They have previously tended to analyse the risks from deflation and secular stagnation within closed economy models, but they are developing new multi country models which might result in a more legitimate role for protection (see this excellent explanation by Greg Ip.)

此外，知識界的氛圍也在改變，而且並不僅僅發生在勞動市場經濟學家當中。如今，這些經濟學家頻繁地聲稱，對華貿易已永久性地損害了美國的就業。那些支持希拉里的凱恩斯主義宏觀經濟學家，通常一直是自由貿易的衷心擁護者，但這種情況或許正在改變。他們過去往往在封閉經濟模型內部分析通縮與長期停滯帶來的風險，但他們正開發新的多國模型，這或許會賦予保護主義更大的合法性（參看葉偉平(Greg Ip)的精彩論述）。

For example, Lawrence Summers (with Gauti Eggertsson and Neil Mehrotra) has produced an analysis of “Secular Stagnation in the Open Economy”, which shows how a liquidity trap in one part of the world can be transmitted to a previously unaffected nation.

例如，勞倫斯•薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)與高迪•艾格特森(Gauti Eggertsson)和尼爾•梅赫羅特拉(Neil Mehrotra)共同撰寫了分析文章《開放經濟中的長期停滯》(Secular Stagnation in the Open Economy)，該文闡釋了，世界某個地方的流動性陷阱是如何傳導到一個此前不受影響的國家的。

Countries in deflation and secular stagnation (eg Japan, Germany and possibly China) run trade surpluses that drive capital inflows into the US and a rising dollar. The US cannot respond by cutting interest rates once the zero lower bound is reached, so it gets dragged into deflation.

陷入通縮和長期停滯的國家（如日本、德國，可能還有中國）處於貿易順差，這推動資本流向美國，推高美元匯率。一旦利率觸及零下限，美國無法採用降息手段加以應對，因此，美國也被拖入通縮。

If the surplus countries try to devalue their currencies by unconventional monetary easing, this simply transfers even more demand away from the US [1].

如果貿易順差國家試圖通過非常規的貨幣寬鬆貶值本國貨幣，那麼這會讓美國損失更多需求[1]。

The strongly preferred policy response to this dilemma is international policy co-ordination and expansionary fiscal policy, but direct interventions in trade, to switch expenditure back to the US, become more defensible than in standard models. As an example of the potential drift away from open economies and globalisation, Paul Krugman, generally a free trader, now says that he is unenthusiastic about an extension of free trade through the TPP, though he is still some way short of arguing for more protection.

面對此困境，受到強烈支持的對策是國際政策協調和擴張性財政政策，但直接干預貿易、把消費帶回美國，變得比在標準模型下更有理由。保羅•克魯格曼(Paul Krugman)總體支持自由貿易，但他可能是漸漸遠離開放經濟和全球化立場的一個例子。他如今表示，他對通過TPP擴展自由貿易不是太熱心，不過，他還沒有直接主張實行更多保護措施。

Implications for Investors

對投資者的影響

What should investors make of all this?

投資者應如何理解這一切？

First, the US political and intellectual climate has cooled towards extensions of trade deals like the TPP and the transatlantic version, the TTIP. President Obama will be fortunate to get these through, even in the lame duck session of Congress in November, when the politically “impossible” sometimes happens. The potential gains from extra trade will therefore be lost.

首先，美國政界和知識界對於擴展TPP和《跨大西洋貿易與投資夥伴關係協定》(TTIP)等貿易協議的熱情已冷卻下來。即便在政治“不可能事件”時有發生的11月國會“跛腳鴨”時期，美國總統奧巴馬如能通過這兩份協議，那也將是很幸運的。因此擴大貿易帶來的潛在好處將消失。

Second, even without an outright shift towards protectionism under a President Trump, the US is making it more difficult for countries like Japan and the eurozone to combat deflation by easing monetary policy through more quantitative easing, especially if there is any suspicion that this is intended to devalue their currencies. Global monetary policy may be less able to respond to deflation threats, unless the US Fed joins in. Policy co-ordination becomes far more important than central bankers usually admit.

其次，即便當上總統的特朗普在任內不完全倒向保護主義，美國也正在讓日本和歐元區等經濟體更難通過加大量化寬鬆力度來對抗通縮，尤其是如果美國稍稍懷疑這是爲了貶值其本國貨幣的話。除非美聯儲也一起行動，否則全球貨幣政策應對通縮威脅的能力或許會減弱。政策協調的重要性已遠遠超過央行官員們通常所承認的程度。

Third, the mainstream Keynesian macro-economists whose thinking normally influences the Fed’s staff are now viewing secular stagnation as an international issue, which could drag the US into a global liquidity trap, even if America is not in such a trap now. This reduces the long term equilibrium real rate of interest in the US, as FOMC members have been recognising this year.

第三，思維通常可以影響美聯儲工作人員的主流凱恩斯主義宏觀經濟學家們，如今把長期停滯視爲一個國際問題，認爲這個問題可能把美國拖入一個全球流動性陷阱，即便美國目前並未遭遇這一陷阱。正如聯邦公開市場委員會(FOMC)今年承認的那樣，這會降低美國的長期均衡實際利率。

Fourth, in a renewed global or American recession, the “tail risk” of a major spread in protectionism could all too easily become reality.

最後，若全球或美國再度發生衰退，保護主義大範圍蔓延的“尾部風險”可能非常容易變爲現實。

I will discuss the economic effects of protectionism another time.

我將在另一篇文章中討論保護主義的經濟影響。