海航集團全球擴張引發槓桿質疑(下)
The spending spree has raised concerns among some overseas lenders about overall borrowing levels.
該集團的收購狂歡引起了一些海外銀行對其整體債務水平的擔憂。
We don’t understand where HNA’s money is coming from, says a senior foreign banker in China, whose credit committee colleagues are wary of lending to HNA.
我們不明白海航集團的錢是從哪來的，一名常駐中國的外國資深銀行人士表示，
They are spending a lot and investing in a lot of things.
他在信貸委員會的同事對向海航集團放貸很謹慎，他們花錢很多，投資也很多。
But it’s too much leverage.
但是槓桿太高。
When we don’t understand something we don’t lend.
當我們看不明白一些事時，我們不會發放貸款。
But one HNA adviser counters: The leverage is definitely high but it’s coming down.
但是海航集團一名顧問反駁道：槓桿高是肯定的，但是已經在下降。
The group realises it overleveraged.
集團意識到槓桿水平太高了。
According to the adviser, HNA’s ratio of debt-to-earnings before interest, tax, deprecation and amortisation at group level was 17 in 2012, 12 in 2015 and will be reduced further this year.
據該顧問表示，2012年整個集團的債務是息稅折舊及攤銷前利潤(EBITDA)的17倍，2015年爲12倍，今年還將進一步降低。
Group liquidity rose to $19bn in the first half of this year, boosted by several capital raisings by its Chinese-listed entities.
由於該集團旗下中國上市公司的幾次融資，今年上半年海航集團的流動性資金增至190億美元。
A rights issue by Hainan Airlines cut its gearing — borrowings as a percentage of equity — from 207 per cent to 150 per cent.
海南航空的一次增發將其負債權益比率——負債與權益之比——從207%降低至150%。
Gearing also declined from 359 per cent to 280 per cent at the group’s infrastructure investment arm after a restructuring.
在一次重組後，海航集團的基礎設施投資部門的負債權益比率也從359%下降至280%。
Chinese banks appear to have fewer concerns.
中國的銀行似乎沒那麼擔憂。
In May, China Construction Bank agreed to provide a Rmb30bn line of credit to HNA.
5月，中國建設銀行(CCB)同意向海航集團提供300億元人民幣的授信額度。
In a statement at the time, the group said that various banks have provided credit facilities of over Rmb530bn.
在當時發表的聲明中，該集團稱多家銀行對海航集團的總授信額度已超過5300億元。
HNA has over-invested before.
海航集團此前也曾投資過度。
The global aviation slump after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, exacerbated by the spread of the Sars virus across Asia two years later, inspired it to diversify into shipping.
2001年9.11恐襲後，全球航空業陷入低迷，兩年後亞洲爆發的非典疫情使形勢進一步惡化，這激發該集團向貨運領域多元化拓展。
HNA amassed a number of shipyards and a fleet of 97 vessels, both chartered and owned.
海航集團擁有了多家造船廠，並建起了一支由97艘租賃和自有船隻組成的船隊。
Soon after that the industry entered a deep downturn, which forced HNA to shed many of its acquisitions.
隨後，該行業很快進入了深度衰退，這迫使海航集團將收購的許多資產出手。
At the centre of the storm was China Grand Logistics,
處於風暴中心的是大新華物流(Grand China Logistics)。
a heavily indebted HNA subsidiary that was the owner of China’s first domestically operated cruise ship.
它是海航集團旗下一家負債累累的子公司，擁有中國首艘國內運營的郵輪。
Its financial difficulties spilled into the open in 2013 when a rival Chinese company asked South Korean authorities to impound the MS Henna on Jeju island.
2013年，大新華物流的財務困難問題公開，當時與之競爭的一家中國企業要求韓國政府在濟州島扣押海娜號(MS Henna)。
HNA had to deploy jets to repatriate the 1,600 passengers on board.
海航集團不得不派出飛機將船上1600名乘客接回國。
HNA Cruises suspended operations in 2015 and the Henna was sold for scrap in June.
2015年，海航郵輪(HNA Cruises)停止運營，海娜號今年6月擬出售拆解。
They got heavily into bulk carriers and charter ships, says a Hong Kong-based shipping executive who has dealt with HNA.
他們在散裝貨船和船舶租賃上投入太大，一名駐香港、與海航集團打過交道的航運高管稱，
They’d crowd into things, grew too big too fast and in the end they got caught.
他們一擁而上，發展太快，規模過大，最終被套牢。
They got caught big because they went in big.
被深深套牢就是因爲他們做太大了。
