去工業化的詛咒 老製造業走上末路

In the debate about how to understand the rise of anti-globalism — is it most deeply driven by cultural or economic anxiety — there is little disagreement that the heartlands of support for Donald Trump, Brexit and other anti-establishment movements were areas of marked industrial decline such as the US Rust Belt or northern England.

圍繞如何理解反全球化主義崛起的辯論（這個現象最深層的驅動因素是文化還是經濟方面的焦慮？），各方至少對於一點沒有什麼異議，那就是支持唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)、英國退歐和其他反建制運動的心臟地帶，也是出現顯著工業衰敗的地區，比如美國鏽帶或者英格蘭北部。

These areas have been deindustrialising for a long time.

這些地區的去工業化已經持續了很久。

The end of the old manufacturing sectors — and the disappearance of plentiful and reasonably well-paid jobs for low-skilled men — started in the 1970s, with British industry going through the most rapid change of all in the 1980s.

老製造業走上末路，低技能男子有望獲得的大量且報酬相當不錯的工作崗位消失，這一切始於上世紀70年代；英國工業在上世紀80年代經歷了最爲急劇的變化。

But we should note that everywhere, it was not the amount produced by factories that fell — it didn’t — but that production could increasingly happen with fewer workers thanks to technological change.

但我們應該注意到，無論是在哪裏，工廠的產出並未下降，而是技術變革使得達到相同產量所需要的工人減少了。

Diane Coyle writes movingly in the FT about the her Lancashire home town which saw huge losses of factory jobs in the late 1970s.

黛安.科伊爾(Diane Coyle)在英國《金融時報》撰文，深情描述了蘭開夏郡(Lancashire)的故鄉小鎮是如何在上世紀70年代末經歷工廠就業崗位的大規模流失的。

Her main point is that the economic damage to such communities, and the anger it engendered, came long before the immigration that was such a big factor in the Brexit debate.

她的主要觀點是，這些社區所受的經濟損害以及因此產生的憤怒，在移民問題成爲英國退歐辯論中的一大議題之前早就出現了。

And that it was caused not by globalisation but by automation — and the catastrophic failure by the UK and other western governments to deliver on the most basic task of a democracy: insure people against a system-wide shock that they could not have foreseen or prevented.

其誘因並不是全球化，而是自動化——以及英國和其他西方國家政府在履行民主政體的最基本任務上出現了災難性的失敗：保護人民免受他們無法預見或者預防的系統性衝擊的傷害。

There is evidence, however, that the China shock has made things worse, and prompted the upsurge in support for anti-globalist politics.

然而，有證據表明中國衝擊讓情況變得更糟，引發了反全球化政治的人氣高漲。

Economists have analysed the US election results and found that the swing in the voting shares towards the Republican party since 2000 was larger in areas that were hit harder by Chinese import penetration after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.

經濟學家們分析了自2001年中國加入世貿組織(WTO)以來幾次美國大選的結果，發現自2000年以來，在那些被來自中國的進口滲透衝擊比較嚴重的地區，投票立場的轉變（從投民主黨轉爲投共和黨）比例更大。

For example, the findings suggest that had Chinese import growth been 25% smaller, they calculated, Mrs Clinton would have won Wisconsin and Michigan.

比如，這些經濟學家的推算似乎表明，如果來自中國的進口增長比實際水平低25%，希拉里.克林頓(Hillary Clinton)將能夠拿下威斯康辛州和密歇根州。

The same seems to hold true in Britain.

同樣的規律似乎也適用於英國。

Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig establish that regions that have been more exposed to the recent surge of manufacturing imports from China, due to their historical industry specialisation, show systematically higher Leave vote shares.

伊塔洛.科蘭託內(Italo Colantone)和皮耶羅.斯塔尼格(Piero Stanig)證實：一些地區由於歷史性的專業化工業，受近期來自中國的製造業進口激增的影響更大，這些地區系統性地表現出更高比例的人羣投票選擇退歐。

We claim that this causal effect is driven by the displacement determined by globalisation in the absence of effective compensation of its losers.

我們主張，驅動這種因果關係的是在缺乏對全球化的輸家進行有效補償的情況下，全球化所造成的取代效應。

The same researchers have earlier found a similar link between exposure to Chinese import competition and support for nativist parties across European regions.

此前這兩名研究人員還在歐洲各個地區發現，受到中國產品競爭的程度，與本土主義政黨得到的支持率存在類似關聯。

So the China shock mattered.

因此，中國衝擊的確事關重大。

But the forward march of technology means that even without it, similar disruptions should be expected as the consequence of increased automation over time.

但是不可阻擋的技術進步意味着，即使沒有中國衝擊，隨着自動化程度逐漸提高，類似的衝擊也可以預見。

Which raises the question of what governments must do about it.

這就提出了一個問題，政府針對這種情況必須採取什麼行動呢？

Not restrict trade, as Chad Bown explains: cancelling trade agreements does not do much to help displaced workers (though enforcing them better might), and there is little in modern trade deals that stops governments from enacting domestic policies to mitigate the harm for those on the losing side, such as better healthcare provision in the US.

答案並非限制貿易，查德.鮑恩(Chad Bown)解釋道：取消貿易協定對失業工人幫助不大（不過更好地執行貿易協定或許有幫助），而且現代貿易協定中並沒有什麼內容阻止政府實施國內政策來緩解輸家所受的傷害，比如美國可以推出更好的醫療保健服務。

The solution is not for national governments to take back control from global institutions and rules, but to use better the control they have always retained.

對國家政府來說，解決方案不是從全球機構和規則那裏奪回控制權，而是更好地利用它們一直保留着的控制權。

This will, as Coyle points out, require taking place seriously: national policies . . . are delivered in specific places.

就如黛安.科伊爾指出的，這個過程需要嚴肅認真地進行：國家政策……在特定地區實施。

The geography of the economy was ignored.

以往經濟的地理分佈受到忽視。

In the presence of a regional shock, national policy should be directed to maintain strong aggregate demand in the affected locations, so that new job creation is stimulated.

在存在地區性衝擊的情況下，國家政策應該着眼於在受影響的地方保持強勁的總需求，從而刺激新的工作崗位產生。

Then there is the pedestrian but crucial need for policies to adapt people’s skills to what those new jobs may be.

然後是看似瑣碎但十分關鍵的政策需要——讓人們的技能適應新的工作。

David Leonhardt reports from New Castle, Delaware, which has had to confront post-industrial devastation . . . that now has the country’s attention.

戴維.倫哈特(David Leonhardt)在特拉華州的紐卡斯爾進行了報道。該地區不得不面對後工業時代的毀滅性打擊……現在受到舉國關注。

A skills and school development policy that has tapped into the area’s deep cultural connection to craftsmanship — to making things and working with their hands seems to have helped address both economic decline and the status anxiety that comes with it.

一項技能和學校發展政策挖掘了該地區在手藝（用雙手工作和製作東西）方面的深厚文化淵源，這一政策似乎有助於同時解決經濟滑坡問題和隨之而來的身份焦慮。

It amounts to, in the words of Leonhardt’s headline, a jolt of blue-collar hope.

用倫哈特的標題來說，這帶來了一股藍領的希望。

That is something mainstream politicians everywhere should aim to provide, lest the false hope peddled by the anti-globalists is seen as the last resort.

任何地方的主流政治人士都應以提供這一希望爲己任，以防反全球主義分子所兜售的虛假希望被人們視爲最後手段。