俄國十月革命的三點教訓

It remains one of the greatest experiments in economic and political history. A bloody civil war, the abolition of private property, the creation of a command economy with near full state ownership, price regulation and the elimination of markets.

它仍是經濟和政治史上最偉大的實驗之一。一場血腥的內戰，廢除私有制，建立幾乎完全是國有的計劃經濟，實行價格管制，取締市場。

One hundred years on from the Russian Revolution, three main lessons emerge from the 75-year Great Soviet Experiment. They are not rocket science but worth re-stating. First, industrialisation through terror is inefficient. Second, without terror the command economy eventually flags and goes bankrupt. Third, lack of political competition creates a rigid governance system unable to make necessary reforms.

俄國革命已過去100年，這場75年的“蘇維埃大實驗”告訴了我們3條主要教訓。它們並非尖端科學，但值得重新述說。首先，通過恐怖統治實現工業化是低效的。其次，如果沒有恐怖統治，計劃經濟將最終萎靡並破產。第三，缺乏政治競爭造成了僵化的治理體系，無法實行必要的改革。

The first is probably the least obvious. Stalin accomplished industrialisation and eventually led the Soviet Union to victory in the second world war. His method was top-down and, in the words of the writers Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “brutal but effective”.

第一個可能是最不明顯的。斯大林(Stalin)實現了工業化，並最終領導蘇聯在二戰中獲勝。他的方法是自上而下的，用作家達龍?阿杰姆奧盧(Daron Acemoglu)和詹姆斯?羅賓遜(James Robinson)的話來說，“殘酷但有效”。

The benefit of centralised economic control is that it allows you to move 25-30 per cent of the labour force from farm to factory within just one decade. However, a recent study I co-authored found this did not work as planned: the gains from moving resources to industry did not make up for destroying productivity within both agriculture and industry. Terror is brutal and effective in moving resources, but it is not productive in organising them efficiently.

中央控制經濟的好處在於它讓蘇聯得以在僅僅10年的時間內就讓25%至30%的勞動力從農場轉移到工廠。然而，最近我作爲聯合作者所做的一項研究發現，其效果沒有達到計劃：將資源轉向工業的好處沒有彌補農業和工業生產率都遭到破壞的影響。在轉移資源方面，恐怖統治是殘酷但有效的，但在高效組織資源方面它成果低下。

The net economic benefits of Stalin’s policies were trivial — and this is not to mention millions who perished due to repression and famine. Also, the Soviet Union could not win the war alone — resources and equipment provided by the US were essential in beating Hitler.

斯大林政策給經濟帶來的淨好處微乎其微，這還不包括數百萬人因爲被鎮壓和飢餓而死。另外，蘇聯是不可能依靠自己贏得戰爭勝利的，美國提供的資源和裝備在擊敗希特勒(Hitler)方面起到了關鍵作用。

After the war, the Soviet economy recovered, Sputnik was launched and nuclear parity with the US maintained. Yet, it failed to deliver growth and innovation — proving that competitive markets are needed for efficient incentives. Also, as shown by the economist János Kornai, a collectivised system is inherently vulnerable to “soft budget constraints”. In a socialist economy, all inefficient enterprises are bailed out by the state — hence managers have no incentives to avoid bankruptcy.

二戰後，蘇聯經濟復甦，發射了斯普特尼克號(Sputnik)衛星，並在核領域與美國保持了勢均力敵。然而，蘇聯未能實現經濟增長和創新，這證明，有效激勵需要競爭性市場。另外，就像經濟學家雅諾什?科爾奈(János Kornai)所說的，集體制從本質上來說在“軟性預算約束”下很脆弱。在社會主義經濟中，所有低效的企業都會由政府紓困，因此管理者沒有避免破產的激勵。

Soft budget constraints also feature in market economies — as the massive bailouts since the financial crisis show. But there is a major difference: if a capitalist firm goes bankrupt, private shareholders lose their equity. If a socialist one cannot pay its debts they are taken over by the state — and eventually the whole state goes bankrupt. When Mr Kornai was writing in the late 1970s it was unthinkable that a superpower like the Soviet Union could go bankrupt. In fact its bankruptcy was not just plausible — it turned out to be inevitable.

“軟性預算約束”也出現在市場經濟中，就像金融危機之後出現的大規模紓困所顯示的那樣。但其中存在一個巨大區別：如果資本主義企業破產，私人股東會血本無歸。如果社會主義企業無法償還債務，政府可以爲其買單，最終整個國家破產。在科爾奈在上世紀70年代末撰文時，人們難以想象蘇聯這種超級大國會破產。實際上，蘇聯的破產不僅是合理的，而且事實證明是不可避免的。

With the end of Stalinist terror the government could no longer resist pressures to raise living standards. To pay for this, Moscow resorted to petrodollars and later loans. By the late 1980s the Soviet budget deficit went into double-digit percentages of gross domestic product. In its last year it was 30 per cent of GDP. Creditors stopped lending and the Soviet Union was no more.

隨着斯大林式的恐怖統治結束，蘇聯政府無法再抵抗提高生活水平的壓力。要爲此買單，蘇聯政府求助於石油美元以及後來的貸款。到上世紀80年代末，蘇聯的預算赤字與國內生產總值(GDP)之比達到兩位數。在蘇聯解體前的最後一年，這個比例達到30%。債權人停止貸款，蘇聯不復存在。

As bankruptcy loomed, why were Soviet leaders unable to recognise the problem and launch radical reforms? The answer points to the third, most painful lesson. In the absence of political competition and free debate, the USSR ended up with a leadership that was neither competent nor decisive. This was not a coincidence — it was how that system selected and promoted its leaders.

在破產逼近之際，蘇聯領導人爲何無法意識到這個問題並推行徹底的改革呢？答案指向第三個也是最痛苦的教訓。在缺乏政治競爭和自由辯論的情況下，蘇聯的領導層最後既無能又無決斷。這並非巧合，它是這個體制遴選和提拔領導人的方式造成的。

The Great Soviet Experiment demonstrated the deficiencies and unsustainability of the non-market model. Yet still every now and then proposals emerge for a new version of socialism — from “Bolivarian” to market varieties, from state capitalism to a new “digital Gosplan” matching algorithms to economic planning. In decades of socialist experimenting, communists tried many alternatives to the market. None of them worked. That is what we should remember 100 years later.

“蘇維埃大實驗”顯示了非市場模式的缺陷和不可持續。然而，時常會出現社會主義新版本的提議，從“玻利瓦爾主義”(Bolivarianism)到各種市場經濟變體，從國家資本主義到把算法與經濟規劃匹配的新的“數字國家計劃委員會”(digital Gosplan)。在幾十年的社會主義實驗中，共產主義者嘗試了很多替代市場的方案。其中沒有一個成功。這就是我們在100年後應該記住的事情。

The writer is chief economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

本文作者是歐洲復興開發銀行(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)首席經濟學家