美國國家安全政策大轉變

If failure deserves never to be rewarded, the Central Intelligence Agency’s paymasters clearly did not read the memo. It makes little difference what event the CIA has missed, its budget and scope only appear to grow.

如果說失敗就絕不能得到獎賞，那麼美國中央情報局(CIA)的老闆顯然不明白這一點。不論CIA搞砸了什麼事情，它的預算和活動範圍依然在擴大。

“The CIA gets what it wants,” President Barack Obama told Leon Panetta, the agency’s then director, who had just read out a list of requests. Obama’s reaction was “uncharacteristically and bracingly decisive”, writes Panetta. Unfortunately, he cannot specify what goodies Obama so readily agreed to. Just as the CIA gets the drone strikes it wants, so it can delete passages from memoirs of former employees – even ones as august as Panetta.

時任CIA局長的利昂•帕內塔(Leon Panetta)剛向美國總統巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)唸完一份物品清單，奧巴馬就立刻表態：“CIA想要什麼就有什麼。”帕內塔在書中寫道，奧巴馬的反應“一反常態，果斷得令人振奮”。可惜的是，他卻不能詳細說明奧巴馬一口答應的究竟是什麼要求。就像CIA能如願實施無人機空襲一樣，它也能刪除前員工回憶錄中的某些段落——即使是像帕內塔這樣德高望重的人物也不例外。

Almost all the publicity around Panetta’s Worthy Fights has focused on the handful of paragraphs critical of Obama. “Too often, in my view, the president relies on the logic of a law professor rather than the passion of a leader,” he wrote. That, indeed, is true. But it is hardly news. Panetta’s follow-up interviews have been far stronger. Obama has “lost his way”, says his former Pentagon and CIA chief. From Islamists in Syria to Putin’s encroachments on eastern Europe, the world’s challenges threaten to overwhelm him. There are few more loyal and discreet Washington operators than Panetta. The fact that even he – like Brutus – is wielding the knife says a lot about the emperor’s waning authority.

媒體對帕內塔新書《值得戰鬥》(Worthy Fights)的關注幾乎都聚焦於書中對奧巴馬的若干處批評。“在我看來，總統往往依賴法學教授的邏輯行事，而非領導人的激情，”他這樣寫道。這一點的確所言非虛。但這不算新鮮。接下來的一些訪談內容更爲勁爆。先後在奧巴馬政府執掌過CIA和五角大樓的帕內塔表示，奧巴馬已經“迷失了方向”。從敘利亞的伊斯蘭分子到普京在東歐的入侵行徑，世界各處的挑戰幾近把他壓垮。在華盛頓政壇上，很少有人比帕內塔更忠誠、更謹言慎行，然而，即使是帕內塔，也像布魯圖（Brutus，刺殺愷撒的主謀——譯者注）那樣對皇帝揮刀相向，這很能說明奧巴馬的權威正在不斷下降。

In all other respects, Panetta’s book is a traditional Washington memoir – a ploddingly written account of an illustrious career that does it little justice. Panetta came to Washington in the 1960s and never left. On the way, he was a liberal Republican in the Nixon administration, a Democratic congressman from California, chief of staff and budget director to Bill Clinton, and one of Obama’s key people in the successful hunt for Osama bin Laden.

從其他方面的內容來看，帕內塔的書算是一本中規中矩的白宮回憶錄——其單調緩慢的敘述風格與作者本人輝煌的職業生涯不太相稱。帕內塔在20世紀60年代來到華盛頓，此後就一直在那裏工作。他曾是尼克松政府裏的一名自由主義共和黨人，加州的民主黨國會議員，比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)的白宮辦公廳主任和預算局局長，也是奧巴馬政府成功擊斃奧薩馬•本•拉登(Osama bin Laden)行動中的關鍵人物之一。

The last event yields the book’s most interesting passages. Making up for its patchy record, it was the CIA that identified bin Laden’s hide-out in Abbottabad. Panetta was in the situation room when the operation went ahead. Unlike Robert Gates, the then defence secretary (who published Duty , his own coruscating memoirs, earlier this year), and Joe Biden, the vice-president, Panetta was all in favour. He credits Obama with the foresight to suggest a back-up helicopter in case the operation went awry. The spare chopper saved the day.

最後一個事件是全書最有趣的部分。CIA發現了本拉登在阿伯塔巴德(Abbottabad)的藏身之處，這彌補了CIA此前並不完美的紀錄。正式展開行動時，帕內塔身處白宮戰情室。不像當時的副總統喬•拜登(Joe Biden)和時任國防部長的羅伯特•蓋茨(Robert Gates)——蓋茨今年早些時候也出版了引人入勝的回憶錄《職責》(Duty)——帕內塔完全支持那次抓捕行動。他還讚揚了奧巴馬提議出動後備直升機以防行動出岔子的先見之明。那架直升機挽救了整個行動。

Worthy Fights has some telling insights into key Washington figures of the past generation. Bill Clinton is described as “ravenously intelligent”. Lyndon Baines Johnson once telephoned the mother of Panetta’s boss to wish her a happy birthday – a gesture that secured the vote LBJ was seeking. It is impossible to imagine Obama doing such a thing. Washington is a town of towering egos. David Petraeus, who was Panetta’s successor at the CIA, is described as having an office that was “a shrine . . . to him”. And so on. But we must turn to other books for insights into the big shifts in US national security policy of the last few years. Of the current batch, two stand out in very different ways.

《值得戰鬥》對上一代白宮人物有一些精妙的洞見。在他筆下，比爾•克林頓是“極爲聰明”的一個人。林登•貝恩斯•約翰遜(Lyndon Baines Johnson)曾打電話給帕內塔上司的母親，祝她生日快樂，這一舉動讓約翰遜贏得了他想要的選票。很難想象奧巴馬會做這樣的事情。華盛頓多的是心高氣傲的人物。對帕內塔在CIA的繼任者大衛•彼得雷烏斯(David Petraeus)來說，辦公室就是“他的神殿”。除了《值得戰鬥》一書之外，我們也有必要通過其他書籍來了解美國國家安全政策在過去幾年的重大轉變。目前有兩本書特別引人注目，它們的精彩之處也各不相同。

The first, National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear, could lay claim to being the definitive book on how 9/11 affected US foreign policy. As the author of Running the World (2006) – the most authoritative history to date of the National Security Council – David Rothkopf has interviewed all but one of the NSC advisers since the role was established. Rothkopf started his career working for Henry Kissinger. There is pretty much no decision maker, including Panetta (he appears to have divulged his juiciest thoughts to this book, rather than his own) who has not opened up to Rothkopf.

第一本書是《國家不安全：恐懼時代的美國領導地位》(National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear)。在9•11事件對美國外交政策的影響方面，這本書堪稱權威之作。作者大衛•羅斯科普夫(David Rothkopf)曾就美國國家安全委員會(NSC)的發展歷史，出版過最權威的著作《運作世界》(Running the World, 2006)，爲此他採訪了自國家安全顧問一職設立以來，除一人之外的歷任顧問。羅斯科普夫職業生涯的起點是爲亨利•基辛格(Henry Kissinger)工作。幾乎沒有哪位決策者，包括帕內塔（他似乎把自己最有料的思想透露給了這本書，而沒有留給自己的回憶錄）在內，未曾對羅斯科普夫吐露心跡。

On the day the planes hit the Twin Towers, Rothkopf was having coffee in Georgetown with one former and one future occupant of the role – Anthony Lake, who was Bill Clinton’s first national security adviser, and Susan Rice, who holds the job now. It was an attack that spoke “without translation or dilution to our animal selves”, Rothkopf writes. His aim is to capture what has happened since 9/11 – “a moment when America felt more vulnerable and adrift than at any time in modern memory”.

飛機撞上雙子塔那天，羅斯科普夫正在喬治城大學(Georgetown)與安東尼•雷克(Anthony Lake)和蘇珊•賴斯(Susan Rice)喝咖啡。前者曾擔任比爾•克林頓的首位國家安全顧問，而後者目前擔任該職。羅斯科普夫寫道，這次襲擊事件“直截了當、毫不含糊地展現了人類的動物本性”，那是“現代史上美國人比任何時候都脆弱和迷失的時刻”，而他的目標就是記錄9•11之後發生的變化。

Rothkopf sets out what is essentially a game of two halves, to borrow a soccer cliché. In the first, George W Bush’s administration strikes out thoughtlessly – invading Iraq, telling the world it was either for the US or against it, trashing the Geneva Conventions and so on. “It took some time before we could stop, catch our breath and make a critical reappraisal of what we were doing,” Condoleezza Rice tells Rothkopf with some understatement.

用足球術語來說，羅斯科普夫的敘述分成了兩個半場。在上半場，喬治•W•布什(George W Bush)政府輕率地出擊——入侵伊拉克，向世界宣告要麼支持美國要麼與美國作對，踐踏《日內瓦公約》(Geneva Conventions)，等等。“過了一段時間我們才停了下來，喘了口氣，對我們此前所做的事情進行了批判性的回顧，” 康多莉扎•賴斯(Condoleezza Rice)有些輕描淡寫地對羅斯科普夫說。

In his first term, Bush essentially lost control of his national security machinery. Both Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon chief, and Dick Cheney, the vice-president, ran rings around Rice and excluded Colin Powell, the secretary of state, from key decisions, such as disbanding the Iraqi army. In Bush’s second term, the NSC worked more as it should, principally because Rumsfeld and Cheney had been sidelined. By then it was headed by Stephen Hadley, an impressive operator, who kept the trains running on time.

在第一個任期內，布什基本失去了對國家安全機器的控制。國防部部長唐納德•拉姆斯菲爾德(Donald Rumsfeld)和副總統迪克•切尼(Dick Cheney)比賴斯強勢，並在關鍵決策上把國務卿科林•鮑威爾(Colin Powell)排擠在外，比如解散伊拉克軍隊。在布什的第二個任期內，NSC的運作更像它應有的樣子，主要原因是拉姆斯菲爾德和切尼已經被邊緣化。當時執掌NSC的是斯蒂芬•哈德利(Stephen Hadley)，一位令人印象深刻的政客，他讓NSC穩步有序地運作。

Bush spent much of his second term atoning for the mistakes of the first. But it was too late to make up for such costly mistakes. Rothkopf is unflinching in tallying the price of Bush’s errors, even if he credits him for a belated course correction. “Our reaction [to 9/11] was so overheated, so ill considered, of such scale and so broad in its unintended consequences that it became more defining, constraining and damaging than the original event to which it was intended to respond,” says Rothkopf.

在第二個任期的大部分時間裏，布什都在彌補他在第一個任期內犯下的錯誤。然而，要彌補這些代價高昂的錯誤已經太遲了。羅斯科普夫並不諱言這些錯誤造成的代價，即使他讚揚了布什遲到的路線修正。“我們（對9•11）的反應太激憤、太欠考慮、行動規模太大、意外後果也太廣，以至於它變得比我們本來要應對的事件更具決定性、約束性和破壞性。”

In the second half of the game, Obama dons the captain’s shirt. Again, the team fails to play as it should, although for very different reasons. Under Bush, the US overreacted to 9/11 partly because the NSC failed to perform its role. The White House lacked the co-ordination – and thinking – the NSC was there to provide. Under Obama, the problem is reversed. His priority has been to undo the mistakes of the Bush years. Partly as a result, he runs the most centralised White House in living memory. The NSC has now grown to 370 staff, which is 10 times its size under Kissinger. It spends its time second-guessing other departments rather than thinking big thoughts. “It is not strategy to simply undo the mistakes of the recent past,” writes Rothkopf.

在遊戲的下半場，奧巴馬穿上了隊長球衣。隊伍再一次沒能找回應有的狀態，儘管原因截然不同。布什領導下的美國對9•11事件反應過度，部分原因是NSC沒能發揮應有的作用。白宮缺乏協作和思想，而NSC本應提供這些。而在奧巴馬的領導下，問題卻相反。奧巴馬優先做的是修正布什任內犯下的錯誤。這導致的一個結果是，他治下的白宮成爲了人們記憶中最集權的白宮。NSC的人員數量上升到370人，是基辛格時期的10倍。NSC把時間都花在對其他部門進行事後批評，而不是着眼於大局。“僅僅糾正不久前的過錯算不上戰略，”羅斯科普夫寫道。

Bush’s administration was known for blundering into rash decisions. Obama’s will be remembered for agonising over tweets and press releases. Panetta’s memoirs have plenty of examples of junior White House officials rebuking him for talking in public without having first sought their permission. Hillary Clinton’s memoirs, Hard Choices , are far too polite to echo that complaint. As Rothkopf concludes: “They [Obama’s White House staff] supplanted the agencies they were supposed to lead, attempted to do their jobs for them, micromanaged decisions, and as a result did not have time to do the strategic planning and co-ordination work that only they could do.” The result has been strategic drift under Obama following the blunders he inherited.

布什政府以決策盲目輕率著稱，奧巴馬政府卻給人們留下爲推特(tweet)消息和新聞稿絞盡腦汁的印象。帕內塔的回憶錄中多次提到，一些級別較低的白宮官員指責奧巴馬未事先徵詢他們意見就發表公開講話。希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)的回憶錄《艱難的抉擇》(Hard Choices)過於禮貌，並沒有呼應帕內塔的抱怨。羅斯科普夫總結道：“他們（奧巴馬的白宮班子）取代了他們本應領導的機構，試圖代替後者履行職責，做一些微觀管理層面的決策，結果是他們沒有時間去做只有他們能做的戰略規劃和協調工作。”其結果是奧巴馬政府在接過前任的爛攤子後，迷失了戰略方向。

In Rothkopf’s world, it is the big personalities that matter. A good president delegates authority to capable people. George HW Bush, whose national security adviser was Brent Scowcroft, is considered the model of how things should work. In their very different ways, Bush Jr and Obama show the opposite.

在羅斯科普夫的敘述中，大人物最爲重要。一個好總統會把權力授予能人。老布什(George HW. Bush)被視作這方面的標杆，他的國家安全顧問是布倫特•斯考克羅夫特(Brent Scowcroft)。而小布什和奧巴馬分別以不同的方式展示了反面教材。

To Michael J Glennon, in National Security and Double Government, the shifting personalities are mere detail. No matter who is elected to run White House and Congress, they are puppets of a permanent apparatus. In less capable hands, Glennon’s thesis might come across as sophomoric. Yet as a scholar who worked on Capitol Hill for years, Glennon is that rare thing: an academic with real world experience. Instead of a rupture between George W Bush and Obama, Glennon sees remarkable continuity. Towards the end of his presidency, Bush was asked what most surprised him about the job. “How little authority I have,” he said. That is also what people say about Obama.

在邁克爾•J•格倫農(Michael J Glennon)所著的《國家安全和雙重政府》(National Security and Double Government)中，不斷更替的個人並不重要。不管人民選舉誰來掌管白宮和國會，他們只是永恆的政府體制下的傀儡而已。格倫農的論題如果是由一個能力不夠的人來書寫，會給人一種膚淺的感覺。但作爲一個在國會山工作多年的學者，格倫農擁有學者身上罕有的實踐經驗。格倫農並沒有將小布什和奧巴馬割裂開來，相反，他看到了二者之間不同尋常的連續性。在小布什任期將盡的時候，有人問這份工作的哪個地方讓他最驚訝。布什回答：“我擁有的權力竟然如此之少。”這也是人們談及奧巴馬時會說的話。

Glennon draws an analogy from Walter Bagehot’s portrait of the English system, which was divided between its “dignified institutions” – the monarchy, the Lords, the aristocracy and the pomp – and its “efficient institutions” – the Commons, the City, the bourgeois and the real power. No daylight should be allowed upon the former lest its magic be destroyed.

格倫農借用了沃爾特•白芝浩(Walter Bagehot)關於英國政制的論述。白芝浩認爲，英國政制可以分成“尊嚴的部分”和“效率的部分”，前者包括皇室、上議院、貴族和奢華的表相，後者則包括下議院、倫敦金融城、資產階級和實權。爲了保證前者的魔力不至於消失，前者應該始終隔絕於人們的視線之外。

In today’s Washington, the dignified constitution comprises the three Madisonian branches of government – the presidency, Congress and the Supreme Court. The efficient parts are labelled “Trumanite” after President Harry S Truman, who set up the NSC, the National Security Agency and the other key planks of Dwight Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex”. It might better be called the Data-Intelligence complex. For Glennon’s thesis to work, America’s double government must meet two criteria, he says. First, the Madisonian institutions must appear to have control over the national security agencies. Second, they must not actually have that control.

在當今的華盛頓，尊嚴體制包含3個麥迪遜主義的政府分支——總統、國會和最高法院。而效率體制則被貼上“杜魯門主義”的標籤，哈里•S•杜魯門總統(Harry S Truman)設立了NSC、國家安全局(US National Security Agency)，以及德懷特•艾森豪威爾(Dwight Eisenhower)所稱的“軍事-工業複合體”的其他關鍵組成部分。這個複合體更恰當的名稱應該是“數據-情報復合體”。格倫農稱，自己的理論如果要站得住腳的話，美國的雙重政府就必須滿足兩個標準。首先，麥迪遜主義的體制必須看上去控制了國家安全機構。第二，它們事實上必須沒有控制這些機構。

Glennon identifies 46 federal departments and agencies that generate classified information and 2,000 private companies working for them at 10,000 locations across the US. In theory, the president tells them what to do, Congress gives them the authority and the courts evaluate the legality of their actions. In practice, the agencies write the orders the president issues, draft the laws Congress passes, and appoint the judges to the secret courts that oversee them.

格倫農談到了負責情報工作的46個聯邦部門和機構，以及分佈在全美10000個地方爲這些機構效力的2000傢俬營企業。理論上，總統向這些機構下達指令，國會授予它們權力，法院評估它們的行動是否合法。實際上，是這些機構起草總統要發佈的指令，草擬國會要通過的法律，並指定監督這些機構的祕密法庭的法官。

After Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 about the NSA’s rampant surveillance activities, officials insisted that there was a “robust legal regime” overseeing it. The numbers tell a different story. Between 1979, when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was established, and 2013, it received 35,333 surveillance requests from the NSA. All but 12 were given the green light. The judges are appointed at the sole discretion of the Supreme Court’s chief justice. The court’s decisions are secret. No appeals are allowed. Obama ordered an “independent” review of it after the Snowden leaks. Very little has changed.

在2013年愛德華•斯諾登(Edward Snowden)曝光美國國家安全局大肆進行監視活動後，官員們堅稱有一個“健全的法律體制”在監督國安局的活動。然而數據卻說明情況並非如此。外國情報監視法院(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court)自1979年設立到2013年期間，總共從國安局那裏收到了35333次監視請求。其中只有12次請求未能獲准。該法院的法官任命由最高法院的大法官全權決定。法院的裁決是祕密的。不允許進行上訴。在斯諾登事件後，奧巴馬曾下令對該法院進行“獨立”審查。但幾乎什麼都沒有改變。

Great play is also made of Capitol Hill’s oversight. In practice the intelligence agencies brief only eight lawmakers and usually only after the fact. They are not allowed to bring aides or take notes. “We are like mushrooms,” said Norman Mineta, a former US lawmaker. “They keep us in the dark and feed us a lot of manure.”

國會山的監督也大有文章。事實上，各情報機構只向8位立法者介紹情況，而且通常是在事後。這些立法者不允許帶助手或者做筆記。“我們就像蘑菇一樣，”前立法者諾曼•米內塔(Norman Mineta)說，“他們讓我們呆在暗處，給我們灌輸大量肥料。”

Few people will read Glennon’s work. It is too academic for popular taste. More will read Rothkopf’s. Still more should do so. As an account of post 9/11 policy making, it is unlikely to be surpassed. By far the largest market will be for Panetta’s memoir because of the publicity around it. However, those who buy the latter should remember that most of the interesting stuff has been left out. Like the man said, the CIA gets what it wants.

閱讀格倫農作品的人不會太多。他的書學術味太濃，不符合大衆口味。更多人會閱讀羅斯科普夫的著作，這本書也的確值得更多人閱讀。作爲一本講述9•11後政策制定的書，羅斯科普夫的著作不太可能被超越。但最暢銷的將會是帕內塔的回憶錄，因爲這本書的宣傳力度很大。然而，那些購買了帕內塔的書的讀者應該記住，書中遺漏了大部分有趣的內容。正如總統所說的，CIA想要什麼就有什麼。