對不起美國:中國不會崩潰

In a recent piece published in the Wall Street Journal, The Coming Chinese Crackup, China scholar and George Washington University professor David Shambaugh boldly predicts that the Communist Party of China (CCP)'s endgame has begun. Although, in the past, such brave predictions of the CCP's collapse have been proven wrong, the fact that such a prediction has come from Shambaugh, a leading China expert, makes it all the more interesting. In a report from China's Foreign Affairs University, Shambaugh was named the second most influential China expert in the United States. As such, Chinese scholars and officials will take his opinions seriously.

華爾街日報最近發表了一篇文章，標題爲《中國即將崩潰》。本文作者沈大偉是喬治華盛頓大學的教授，也是研究中國問題的專家。他在文中預測中國GCD（CCP）的統治已進入了‘諸神的黃昏'階段。儘管這種預言過去曾多次被打臉，但從沈大偉這樣一位專業的中國通口中說出這樣的話，使整件事變得更加有趣了。據中國外交學院的一份報告顯示，美國最有影響力的中國專家中，沈大偉名列第二。與此同時，中國學者和官員們也會認真聆聽他的意見。

Professor Shambaugh listed five indicators that point to China's coming collapse. However, a closer analysis of these five points reveals that Shambaugh's conclusion is based on incorrect facts and flawed interpretations of China's recent socioeconomic and political developments.

沈教授列出了五個中國崩潰的徵兆。但對這五點做進一步的分析，我們可以發現沈教授的結論建立在錯誤的論據上，他對於中國近期的社會經濟和政治發展所做出的詮釋是有瑕疵的。

First, he asserts that wealthy Chinese are fleeing China. Actually, this is only half true. While a large number of wealthy Chinese have migrated to countries like Canada, most of them still do business in China, meaning that they are still have a positive outlook on China's future. In any case, a good number of these wealthy people move their assets out of China to avoid corruption charges, which has nothing to do with China's future development. Moreover, in recent years an increasing number of overseas students have chosen to come back to China because they have confidence in China's future.

首先，他聲稱中國的富人正在逃離中國。事實上，這句話只對了一半。儘管有許多富有的中國人移民加拿大等國，但大部分的移民仍留在中國做生意。這意味着他們仍舊看好中國的前景。總之，數量可觀的有錢人轉移資產到海外來逃避貪污的指控，這與中國未來的發展毫無關聯。更有甚者，近年來學成歸國的留學生數量正在不斷增加，因爲他們對中國的發展有信心。

The second indicator is increasing political repression and CCP insecurity. Actually, not much has changed in this area, compared to the Hu Jintao presidency. The party insecurity thesis is an old argument and one can say that the CCP has always been insecure, especially since 1989. So what is so special about the present that signals the Party's endgame? Indeed, one can argue that the Party's endgame is soon, no matter what it does. If the Party opens up, then civil society will rise up and overthrow the regime; if the Party continues to be repressive, it will breed insecurity, which will cause its collapse.

第二個跡象是政治迫害和中國CCP的不安全感與日俱增。事實上，與Hu主席在位時相比，這方面的變化並不大。關於中國CCP不安全感的觀點是個老話題，我們可以說中共從來就沒安全感，特別是在1989年之後。那這一點是如何成爲中國CCP即將滅亡的佐證的呢？事實上，無論怎樣都會有人宣稱中共的末日就在眼前。如果中共實施開放，人民會起義推翻GCD的統治。如果中共繼續實施政治迫害，中共的不安全感將進一步擴大，最終導致其滅亡。

Third, Shambaugh argues that Chinese officials come across as wooden and bored. But many Chinese offic als were always like that, so there is nothing new in this observation. It is definitely not something t hat can support Shambaugh's "China collapsing" argument.

第三，沈教授表示中共官員給人的印象木訥無趣。但許多中國官員從前就是如此，這方面的觀察毫無新意,也不支持沈大偉中國崩潰的觀點。

Fourth, Shambaugh points out there is massive corruption in China. Shambaugh is right about the serious ness of the corruption issue in China. But he neglects to mention that the anti-corruption campaign has been very successful so far, and the main reason for this is because it has the public's support. Corr upt officials know this too, which is why they are unable to fight back.

第四，沈大偉指出中國的腐敗現象很普遍。沈教授對於中國腐敗的擔心是對的,但他沒有提到迄今爲止中國的反腐鬥爭十分成功，並且成功的原因是得到了羣衆支持。腐敗的官員也同樣清楚這一點，那是他們無力反擊的原因。

Shambaugh's final argument is that the Chinese economy is slowing. Arguably, this fifth factor is the only new point in Shambaugh's argument, as the previous four factors have been features of China's political culture for quite some time. As such, this argument deserves serious consideration.

沈教授最後的論點是中國經濟發展速度正在變慢，這可能是沈教授文章中唯一具有新意的一點。前四項觀點早已被視爲中國政治文化的特點。因此，我們有必要認真考慮第五項觀點。

Shambaugh seems to believe that a slowing economy will lead to widespread grievances, which in turn will lead to civil unrest. This will lead to the collapse of the regime. Arguably, this is what fueled the Arab Spring and may be applied to China today.

沈教授似乎相信經濟放緩會引起大範圍的民怨，最終導致中國內亂，最後瓦解中共的統治。作爲阿拉伯之春的導火索，也許同樣適用於今天的中國。

However, there are several problems with this argument.

然而，這一觀點有幾個問題。

First, China's economic slowdown is not an economic meltdown. It is true that compared to China's past sensational growth rate, a six to seven percent growth rate is a slowdown. But which other major economy can grow at this rate? China's economic growth must be viewed in a relative sense.

首先，中國經濟放緩並不是滑坡式的下跌。與過去中國爆發性的增長相比較，6%到7%的增長率確實慢下來了。但還有哪個主要經濟體能有這個增長速度呢？我們應用‘相對增長速度'來看待中國的經濟。

Second, would a slowdown, or even a massive financial meltdown lead to widespread disruption in Chinese society? The answer actually depends on how the effects of the slowdown are distributed throughout society. As Confucius pointed out long ago, Chinese people tend to get riled up more about inequality than scarcity(患均不患寡), which is just as true today. Most ordinary Chinese hate a high level of inequality, especially if such inequality is a result of corruption rather than legitimate hard work. While a severe crisis would lead to a massive loss of jobs and lower incomes, if the U.S. economy survived the 2008 global financial crisis, there is no reason to believe the Chinese economy cannot overcome a similar one.

第二，中國經濟放緩，甚至大範圍的金融危機是否會導致中國社會土崩瓦解？答案取決於社會如何分擔經濟放緩的後果。很久以前孔子曾經說過，中國人不患寡而患不均，今天也同樣如此。絕大多數中國平民仇富，特別是那些非法腐敗所取得的財富。當嚴重的經濟危機導致大範圍的失業和收入降低時，如果美國能從2008年經濟危機的打擊中恢復元氣，那我們沒有理由相信中國不能克服同樣的困難。

Third, even if a severe economic crisis hits China and causes greater social grievances, why does this mean that social unrest will automatically lead to an uprising against the regime? In other words,, this claim is premised on the belief that the Chinese government's legitimacy relies solely on economic performance.

第三，即使中國產生嚴重的經濟危機，由此而引發了更嚴重的社會問題，爲什麼認爲中國內亂會導致人民揭竿而起，推翻中國GCD的統治？換句話說，這種假設建立在中國政府的合法統治權僅僅依賴於經濟表現的觀點上。

Unfortunately this assumption, though widely held among scholars, is no longer true. Economic growth is certainly important for most Chinese people, but education, the environment, corruption, and legal justice matter just as much as growth. As long as the Chinese government seriously tackles problems in those areas, support for the CCP will remain high. This explains why the Xi administration has initiated bold reforms in all these areas.

不幸的是，這種假設雖然被學者們普遍接受，但並不正確。對於大部分中國人而言，經濟增長雖然非常重要，但教育、環境、腐敗和法律也一樣重要。只要中國政府認真解決這幾方面的問題，中國人民將繼續擁護中國GCD。這也是習主席領導的中國政府在上述幾方面開始大刀闊斧改革的原因。

Finally, even if there is political unrest will it necessarily topple the regime? This depends on the balance of power between the government and the dissenters. Where is the political opposition in China today? Does the political opposition enjoy the widespread support of ordinary Chinese people? Is there any leader who might want to play the role of Gorbachev? None of these factors exist in China.

最後，如果一個國家內亂的話，是否必將動搖政府的統治？這取決於政府和異見者之間的權力博弈。而中國的反對派在哪裏？中國的反對派是否獲得了人民的廣泛支持？是否有人想做中國的戈爾巴喬夫？中國不具備上述任何一個條件。

In sum, in order to make the argument that an economic slowdown would lead to regime change, one would have to make the argument that all of the above factors would come into play. Yet, Shambaugh's argument does not demonstrate this. Indeed, a slowing economy is actually bringing several benefits to China. A slower but stable growth rate would mean less pollution, fewer land-grabbing incidents, less corruption, less energy consumption, and lower socioeconomic expectations, all of which lead to reduced social tensions in China, decreasing the possibility of a regime collapse.

總而言之，爲了證明經濟放緩將導致政權更替，作者必須保證上述所有條件能起作用。但沈博士的觀點並未證明這一點。事實上，經濟放緩反而使中國受惠。緩慢但穩定的增長速度意味着污染、徵地衝突、腐敗、能源消耗的減少，社會經濟預期下降，中國社會的緊張局勢有所緩解，政權崩潰的可能性反而降低了。

Implicit in Shambaugh's argument is the claim that China and the CCP will collapse unless they adopt We stern-style liberal democracy. But he never attempts to answer a simple question: is Western-style libe ral democracy what most ordinary Chinese people want?

沈教授的文章中暗示，除非服下西式民主的藥方，否則中國和中國CCP必然崩潰。但他從未試圖回答這樣一個簡單的問 題：中國人民需要西式民主嗎？

As Orville Schell and John Delury point out, wealth and power are the two things that most Chinese peop le have pursued throughout the last century. Today, with China's rising power and influence, internation al respect can be added to this duo.

夏偉和魯樂漢（兩位都是研究中國問題的美國曆史學者)指出，上世紀以來，中國人民唯二的追求是財富和權利。今天，隨着不斷上升的權力和影響，中國追求的目標還包括在國際上受到尊重。

Do the Chinese also desire liberty, democracy, human rights, and so on? Of course they do. My own research, which will be presented in a forthcoming article based on survey data, shows that even among the most liberal Chinese, the desire for liberty and democracy quickly weakens as long as the Chinese government does a good job of tackling corruption, environmental pollution, and inequality. Democracy is seen as a means, rather than as an end.

中國人民是否渴望自由、民主、人權等等？當然。我即將發表一篇文章來展示我的研究結果。其中的調查數據顯示，即使在那些自由程度最高的中國人中，只要中國政府妥善處理腐敗、環境污染和不平等問題，他們對於自由和民主的追求意願就會消退。民主被視爲一種手段，而不是結果。

Research done by late professor Shi Tianjian also shows that Chinese culture still favors authoritarianism even as people also desire democracy. Through this context, we can understand that Xi Jinping has become so popular among the Chinese masses because of his bold reform measures, which range from soccer-reform to overhauling state-owned enterprises. Even in the area of political reform, Xi is proceeding steadily as consultative democratic mechanisms will soon be implemented at various governmental levels. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that Xi has been the most creative leader in the last three decades. If anything, the level of support for the CCP is higher now than it was in the last decade. Ignoring this reality seriously misreads Chinese politics today.

已過世的石天健教授同樣表示，儘管中國人民追求民主，但中國文化仍青睞集權統治。在這種背景下，Xi主席大膽的改革，從中國足球改革到國有企業改制，獲得中國大衆的衷心歡迎就變得容易理解了。即使是在政治改革領域，習主席正在各級政府層面推行穩健的協商民主機制。 因此，我們可以毫不誇張的說，習主席是過去三十年來最具有創造力的領導人。甚至可以說，中國GCD的支持率比過去十年更高了。無視這一事實將會錯誤地解讀中國的政治現狀。

Then, why do so many Western analysts not see this reality? What do Shambaugh's article and similar writings reflect about the mentality of some Western thinkers and analysts?

爲什麼這麼多的西方分析師都沒能看清現狀呢？沈教授的文章和那些類似的‘中國崩潰論'是如何反映西方智囊和分析師思想的呢？

Perhaps implicit in such arguments is the collective worry or fear that China will continue to become stronger, more prosperous, and more assertive in international affairs. The West has not prepared for a possibility where it is no longer the dominant force in the world. After the Cold War, many Western democracies have adopted the triumphal "End of History" thesis.

也許這些文章集中、隱晦的表達了對於中國變得更加強大、更加繁榮、在國際事務中扮演更重要角色的憂慮或畏懼。西方社會還沒有準備好面對這樣一個現實，即他們不再是統治世界的中堅力量。冷戰結束後，許多西方民主國家已經接受了‘歷史終結'的觀點。（*弗朗西斯﹒福山提出的歷史終結論：人類歷史的前進與意識形態之間的鬥爭正走向"終結"，隨着冷戰的結束，"自由民主"和資本主義被定於一尊，是謂"資本陣營"的勝利。）

However, now that a strong and authoritarian China has emerged, one not compliant with the standard "liberal democracy model" advocated by the West, it is seen as a threat. The "China threat" narrative is understandable, as people tend to fear something they do not understand or that looks different. And China today is a great "other," but because it is strong, it is more threatening than a weak "other." A strong China causes cognitive dissonance among many Western analysts because according to their theories, an authoritarian China should be weak. This explains the selective reading by Western scholars of China's political reality.

然而，強大、專制的中國已經崛起，因爲中國並不遵守西方‘自由、民主'的模式，西方將其視爲威脅。‘中國威脅論'是可以理解的，因爲人們對他們不理解的事務，或者看上去不一樣的東西感到害怕。今日之中國是個巨大的‘外來者'，但因爲中國的強大，她比其他弱小的‘外來者'更具有威脅性。 許多西方分析師因爲中國的強大產生了意見上的分歧，因爲從理論上來說，專制的中國應該是弱小的。這解釋了爲什麼西方學者會選擇性的解讀中國的政治現狀。

Therefore, Shambaugh's seriously flawed due to its problematic logic. However, this does not mean that there is no merit at all in his piece.

因此，沈教授有問題的邏輯產生了嚴重的偏差。但他的文章還是有可取之處的。

For one, Shambaugh rightly reminds us that China's political system can be quite unstable despite the appearance of stability on the surface and efforts at reform. China's political system does need to be more open, more inclusive, and more democratic; and it will someday. The ultimate outcome of Xi's ongoing reforms remains to be seen. Nonetheless, all existing indicators point to the development of a stronger and more effective system of governance within China. Instead of a quick collapse, a mighty, confident, assertive, and authoritarian China will be around for quite a while. As such, discussion about China should take this reality into account, rather than imagining the victory of the West's vision for China, however uncomfortable this may be.

文章中有一點是正確的，沈教授提醒我們，儘管表面上很平靜，中國政府也正致力於改革，但中國的政治體系並不穩定。中國的政治體系必須更開放、更包容、更民主；而這一天必將來臨。習主席改革的最終成果指日可待。而所有現存的跡象表明，中國將發展成爲一個更強大、管理體系更高效的國家。與其說中國即將崩潰，不如說在很長一段時間內，中國還是那個強大、自信、堅定的集權國家。所以，不管有多困難，關於中國的討論應把這一現實考慮進去，而不是往中國身上生搬硬套西方的成功模式。

Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau and Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights.

陳定定先生是澳門大學政府和公共管理專業的助理教授，也是德國柏林全球公共政策研究所（GPPi）的外籍研究員。他的研究領域包括：中國外交政策、亞洲安全、中國政治和人權。