特朗普將辜負憤怒的支持者

Will Donald Trump benefit the enraged white working class that brought him into the White House? To answer this, one must examine his plans and the desires of congressional Republicans.

唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)會造福將他送入白宮的憤怒的白人勞動階層嗎？若要回答這個問題，必須考察一下他的計劃和共和黨國會議員的意願。

One must also consider how these plans might affect the world economy.

還必須考慮這些計劃可能如何影響世界經濟。

The conclusion is straightforward: some people will indeed benefit but the white working class will not be among them.

結論很簡單：有些人確實會受益，但白人勞動階層不在其列。

Republicans have long stoked rage they do not assuage.

長期以來，共和黨人一直在煽動憤怒，卻沒有做什麼來平息他們煽動起來的怒火。

Mr Trump has taken this approach in new directions.

特朗普用新的方式延續了這一傳統。

Huge, permanent and regressive tax cuts seem the one certainty.

大幅度、永久性和累退式的減稅似乎是確定要發生的。

It is something on which Mr Trump and congressional Republicans agree.

特朗普和共和黨國會議員在這方面達成了共識。

The revised Trump plan would reduce the top individual income tax rate to 33 per cent and the corporate tax rate to 15 per cent.

特朗普修改後的計劃，將會把最高一檔個人所得稅率降至33%，將公司稅率降至15%。

It would also eliminate the estate tax.

它也將廢除遺產稅。

The highest-income taxpayers — 0.1 per cent of the population, those with incomes over $3.7m in 2016 dollars — would receive an average cut of more than 14 per cent of after-tax income.

最高收入納稅人——佔總人口的0.1%、2016年收入超過370萬美元的那些人——所獲的平均減稅幅度將超過其稅後收入的14%。

The poorest fifth’s taxes would fall by an average of 0.8 per cent of taxed income.

最貧窮的五分之一人口所獲平均減稅幅度，將爲其稅後收入的0.8%。

To those who hath, it shall be given.

凡有的，還要加給他。

Mr Trump (much less so the congressional Republicans) plans to increase infrastructure spending.

特朗普計劃增加基礎設施支出（共和黨國會議員這樣做的意願低得多）。

This is desirable, though it would have made even more sense if Republicans had supported such a programme in the midst of the Great Recession.

這是可取的，不過，要是共和黨人在大衰退(Great Recession)期間曾支持這樣的計劃，那會更合理。

But as noted by Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, the Trump plan relies mainly on private investment.

但正如美國前財長勞倫斯.薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)所說，特朗普的計劃主要依靠私人投資。

Experience elsewhere suggests this often leads to exploitation of taxpayers and a failure to put into effect public investments that deliver high social benefits but have limited commercial returns.

其他地區的經驗表明，這往往導致對納稅人的剝削，並讓創造很高社會效益但商業回報有限的公共投資無法實現。

The net effect of these plans would be a large rise in fiscal deficits.

這些計劃的最終後果將是財政赤字的大幅增加。

Calculations by the Tax Policy Center at the Brookings think-tank suggest that by 2020 the deficit would increase by 3 per cent of gross domestic product.

智庫布魯金斯學會(Brookings)稅收政策中心(Tax Policy Center)的測算表明，到2020年，赤字增幅將相當於國內生產總值(GDP)的3%。

With current forecasts as the baseline and ignoring any additional spending, this would mean a deficit of around 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2020.

以目前預測爲起點，並忽略任何額外支出，這意味着到2020年赤字將相當於GDP的5.5%左右。

Cumulatively, the increase in federal debt by 2026 might be 25 per cent of GDP.

累計下來，到2026年聯邦債務的增加額或許將相當於GDP的25%。

Congressional Republicans such as Paul Ryan would surely demand matching cuts in spending.

保羅.瑞安(Paul Ryan)等共和黨國會議員，肯定會要求以同等程度削減支出。

Annual federal outlays are close to 20 per cent of GDP.

年度聯邦支出接近GDP的20%。

Spending on health, income support, social security, defence and net interest absorbed 88 per cent of this in 2015.

在2015年，醫療、收入補助、社會保障、國防和淨利息支出佔到總支出的88%。

Elimination of spending on all else (a catastrophic mistake) would merely halve the prospective deficit.

取消所有其他支出（一個災難性的錯誤）僅僅將令預期赤字減半。

In sum, the plan’s logic leads towards either big increases in federal debt relative to GDP or sharp cuts in spending on programmes on which Mr Trump’s supporters depend.

總而言之，依照邏輯推斷，特朗普的計劃要麼會導致聯邦債務相對於GDP的比例大幅增長，要麼會導致特朗普的支持者們所依賴的種種計劃的開支遭到大幅削減。

The envisaged rise in US fiscal deficits would however be expansionary, even though the concentration of the cuts on the wealthiest would limit this effect.

然而，美國財政赤字預計中的上升將有助於經濟擴張，儘管減稅主要針對最富裕人羣將削弱這一效果。

Still, a jump in US fiscal deficits would accelerate rises in US short-term interest rates.

然而，美國財政赤字猛增將加速美國短期利率的上升。

Mr Trump could hardly complain since he has attacked the Federal Reserve’s low rates.

特朗普很難抱怨什麼，因爲他一直抨擊美聯儲的低利率。

Yet, as Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute notes, the world economy is fragile.

然而，正如美國企業研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的德斯蒙德.拉赫曼(Desmond Lachman)所說，世界經濟是脆弱的。

A swift rise in US interest rates might destabilise it.

美國利率的迅速上升可能會破壞世界經濟穩定。

Furthermore, the combination of fiscal loosening with monetary tightening would mean a stronger dollar and a rising current account deficit in the medium term.

此外，寬財政與緊貨幣相結合意味着，中期內美元會走強，經常賬戶赤字會上升。

The US would re-emerge as the global buyer of last resort, so helping the world’s structural mercantilists: China, Germany and Japan.

美國將重新成爲全球最後購買人，從而有利於世界上的結構性重商主義國家：中國、德國和日本。

A strong dollar and rising external deficits would, as in the early 1980s, increase protectionist pressures — Ronald Reagan’s administration was quite protectionist in its first term.

正如20世紀80年代初那樣，強勢的美元和不斷攀升的外部赤字會增加實行貿易保護主義的壓力——頭一屆羅納德.里根(Ronald Reagan)政府的保護主義傾向就相當強烈。

The decision to launch the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations to liberalise world trade was then the response.

當時的迴應是，決定啓動烏拉圭回合多邊貿易談判、以推動世界貿易自由化。

This time, however, a strong dollar would reinforce the bias towards protectionism of the Trump administration.

然而，這一次，強勢美元將強化特朗普政府對保護主義的偏好。

But protection against imports would raise the currency’s value further, shifting the adjustment on to unprotected sectors — above all, on to competitive exporters.

但不利於進口的保護主義措施將進一步推高美元匯率，將調整傳遞到不受保護的部門那裏——尤其是有競爭力的出口商那裏。

In all, a strong dollar must weaken the manufacturing Mr Trump seeks to help.

總而言之，強勢美元肯定會削弱特朗普試圖幫助的製造業。

A likely response would be to cajole the Fed into slowing monetary tightening.

一個可能的對策將是勸誘美聯儲放慢貨幣緊縮進程。

Janet Yellen’s term as Fed chair expires in 2018.

珍妮特.耶倫(Janet Yellen)的美聯儲主席任期將於2018年屆滿。

Her successor could be told that the 4 per cent growth mentioned by Mr Trump has to be attained.

她的繼任者可能被告知，特朗普提出的4%的增長率必須實現。

The last time such growth was achieved over a five-year period was before the crash of 2000 — an ominous warning.

上一次持續五年實現這樣的增長率，發生在2000年崩盤之前——這是一個不祥的警告。

If the Fed tried to achieve this goal, it might trigger inflation, financial instability or, more likely, both.

如果美聯儲試圖實現這一目標，或許會引發通貨膨脹、金融不穩定，或者更可能的是，同時引發這兩種情況。

In all this there seem to be few, if any, gains for Mr Trump’s working-class supporters.

這一切，似乎都對特朗普的勞動階層支持者們好處不大、甚至毫無好處。

The president-elect has also promised to eliminate Obamacare and most environmental and financial regulations.

這位當選總統還承諾廢除奧巴馬醫改(Obamacare)和大多數環保和金融法規。

It is hard to believe any of this would succour the prospects of the working class.

很難相信這些措施的任何一個會改善勞動階層的前景。

They are more likely to suffer from even worse health cover, a dirtier environment, more predatory behaviour by financial institutions and, at worst, even another financial crisis.

他們更有可能會面對更糟的健康保障、更髒的環境、行爲更肆無忌憚的金融機構，在最壞情況下，甚至是另一場金融危機。

Protectionism, too, will fail to help most of his supporters .

保護主義也將無法幫助特朗普的大多數支持者。

Many depend on cheap imported goods.

他們中許多人依靠低價的進口商品過活。

Many would be badly hurt by the dire results of a tit-for-tat global trade war.

一場相互報復的全球貿易戰將造成可怕後果，這些後果將對許多人造成嚴重傷害。

Meanwhile, rapidly rising productivity would still ensure a steady fall in the share of manufacturing in US employment, despite protection.

同時，儘管有保護措施，但生產率的迅速提高仍將導致製造業就業人數在美國就業總人口中的佔比穩步下降。

Mr Trump promises a burst of infrastructure spending, regressive tax cuts, protectionism, cuts in federal spending and radical deregulation.

特朗普承諾瞭如下東西：基礎設施支出大幅增加、累退式減稅、保護主義、聯邦支出削減、大幅去監管。

A big rise in infrastructure spending would indeed help construction workers.

基礎設施支出的大幅增加確實將有利於建築工人。

But little else in these plans would help the working class.

但是這些計劃中的其他部分對勞動階層沒什麼幫助。

Overall, his plans might indeed generate a brief economic surge.

總的來說，他的計劃確實可能帶來短暫的經濟爆發。

But the longer-term consequences are likely to be grim, not least for his angry, but fooled, supporters.

但長期後果可能是嚴峻的，尤其是對於他那些憤怒、但被愚弄的支持者而言。

Next time, they might be even angrier.

下一次，他們可能還會變得更加憤怒。

Where that might lead is terrifying.

那可能會導致什麼後果，讓人不敢想象。