美國復甦仍需顧及中國波動

Jobs growth in the US is back. Over the past three months, official statistics show that the US has added more jobs than in any such period since September-November 1997, at the height of the Clinton boom. The freefall in oil prices is over. The European Central Bank has acceded to market wishes and resorted to “QE” bond purchases. The strong dollar has wrought less damage on US corporate profits than feared. What could possibly go wrong?

美國的就業增長已經恢復。官方數據顯示，在過去三個月裏，美國新增就業崗位比1997年9月至11月（當時正值克林頓繁榮景象最鼎盛的階段）以來的任何時期都多。油價結束了急跌走勢。歐洲央行(ECB)滿足了市場期望，推出“量化寬鬆”債券購買舉措。強勢美元對美國企業利潤的影響，並未如人們擔憂的那麼大。還有哪裏可能出問題？

The answer, in a word, is “China”. The world’s second-largest economy contributes more towards world growth than any other, and has many tools — due to its enormous foreign exchange reserves — with which to avert a crisis. But the litany of economic indicators flashing reasons for concern is growing longer.

答案很簡單，那就是“中國”。中國是全球第二大經濟體，它對世界增長的貢獻超過其他所有國家，而且有許多規避危機的工具（歸因於其龐大的外匯儲備）。但引發人們擔憂的經濟指標正變得越來越多。

Economic growth numbers themselves are notoriously prone to revision. Diana Choyleva of London’s Lombard Street Research, a long-term sceptic on China, estimates that Chinese real growth in domestic product dropped to 5 per cent last year, once the impact of “missing” output “almost equal to the size of Malaysia’s economy” added to the data at the end of last year is stripped out. This would represent a startling slowdown from the trend of the past two decades.

經濟增長數據本身向來有修正的餘地。倫敦朗伯德街研究(Lombard Street Research)的黛安娜•喬伊列娃(Diana Choyleva)長期以來對中國抱懷疑態度，她估計，一旦考慮“近乎相當馬來西亞經濟規模”的“遺失”產值對中國去年年底發佈的數據的影響，其去年的實際國內生產總值(GDP)增長率就會降至5%。這將意味着，與過去20年的增速相比，中國經濟增長出現了驚人的放緩。

Electricity output, a “truth-telling” indicator that is hard to manipulate, is negative for the first time since the crisis year of 2009. Steel production is also its weakest since 2009. The monthly ISM survey of purchasing managers, a great economic leading indicator where figures above 50 indicate that the economy is expanding, while figures below it suggest contraction, has dropped below 50 this month. The prices of the commodities most sensitive to the recently insatiable Chinese demand, iron ore and copper, have fallen severely over the past year.

發電量是一個很難受到操縱、並“可以反映事實真相”的指標，該指標自2009年爆發危機以來首次出現下降。鋼鐵產量也處於2009年以來的最低水平。每月發佈的採購經理人指數本月降至50以下——採購經理人指數是一個靈敏的經濟領先指標，當該數據高於50時表示經濟擴張，當數據低於50時表明經濟收縮。鐵礦石和銅是對近年龐大的中國需求最為敏感的大宗商品，它們的價格在過去一年中大幅下跌。

Most concerning should be measures of the financial system. The growth in Chinese bank assets appears to have stalled, following an increase of some $17tn in total debt in the banking system over the six years since the crisis. Managing this number gently down is a priority; the vital question, as ever, is whether the Chinese authorities can do it. The change in banks’ reserve requirements this week, an effective monetary easing, was part of this process, but there is a long way to go.

最令人擔心的應該是金融體系的各項指標。中資銀行資產增長似乎已經停滯，此前在自危機爆發以來的六年裏，銀行業體系債務總額增加約17萬億美元。逐步削減債務是中國的優先任務。和以往一樣，關鍵問題是中國當局能否做到這一點。上週調整銀行存款準備金率是這一過程的一部分，但中國仍有很長的路要走——調整銀行存款準備金率是有效的貨幣寬鬆措施。

Atul Lele, chief investment officer at Deltec International, estimates flows of “hot money” by taking the change in foreign exchange reserves, and subtracting the changes that can be explained by trade flows and by foreign direct investment. The balance is “hot money” in that it can be moved swiftly by investors, and it appears to be sharply negative.

Deltec International首席投資官阿圖爾•萊勒(Atul Lele)，通過將外匯儲備變化數值減去貿易及外國直接投資所引起的變動值來估計“熱錢”流動的規模。其餘額就是“熱錢”，因為這部分資金可以被投資者迅速轉移，如今這個數值似乎出現了非常大的負值。

Where has it gone? Some of it fuelled the rally at the end of last year, which saw the Shanghai stock exchange gain some 40 per cent in a matter of months. And much will have returned to the booming asset markets of the US.

這部分錢哪裏去了？其中一些引發了去年年底股市的上漲——上證綜指在短短几個月時間裏上漲約40%。還有許多資金應該回流到了美國蓬勃發展的資產市場中。

This is a disquieting scenario. The Fed’s decision on whether to raise rates this summer is a finely balanced one, which is dependent on the data. Friday’s strong jobs report, which also helped show that various data points weighing against a move to more normal rates were either flukes or errors, unarguably raises the probability that US rates will indeed rise this summer.

這種場景令人不安。美聯儲(Fed)將會仔細權衡才會做出是否在今年夏天加息的決定——這將取決於經濟數據。上週五強勁的就業報告無疑提高了美國在今年夏季加息的可能性——該報告也有助於表明，反對轉向更正常利率舉措的多個數據點，要麼是偶然現象，要麼是出了錯。

This matters for emerging markets, particularly China, which are driven by flows of dollars. When money started to flow back to the US in May 2013 when the Fed talked of “tapering” off QE bond purchases, many emerging markets instantly sold off. A rise in US rates would intensify such problems.

這對新興市場（尤其是中國）至關重要——新興市場的經濟增長受到美元流入的推動。在2013年5月美國談論“逐步退出”量化寬鬆債券購買舉措、資金開始迴流美國的時候，許多新興市場立即大跌。美國利率上升將會加劇此類問題。

All of this is a reversal of fortune. In late 2008, it was the aggressive fiscal stimulus by China that helped pull the rest of the world through the Great Recession.

所有這些都代表着形勢的逆轉。在2008年末，正是中國激進的財政刺激政策幫助全球其他地區渡過了“大衰退”(Great Recession)。

Now, China needs help from exports to the US. The stronger US economy, and the stronger dollar and demand that it implies, should therefore be helpful. But foreign exchange could be a crucial stumbling block. China, long castigated for an artificially weak currency, has allowed its currency to appreciate gently against the dollar over the past five years. With other central banks aggressively easing monetary policy, and thus weakening their currencies against the dollar, this has sharply reduced China’s competitiveness, as the chart shows.

現在，中國需要向美國出口以提振經濟。因此美國經濟、美元及其所暗含的更強勁需求應該有所幫助，但匯率可能是一大絆腳石。中國一直以來因為人為壓低人民幣匯率而遭受指責，但已經在過去五年允許人民幣兑美元小幅升值。隨着其他央行激進地放緩貨幣政策，從而讓本國貨幣兑美元貶值，中國的競爭力將極大地遭到削弱。

China has let its own currency weaken by about 3 per cent against the dollar over the past year. Further dollar strength may force a more aggressive weakening — which could entail an intensified “currency war,” and financial stress within China.

在過去的一年裏，中國已經讓人民幣兑美元匯率下跌約3%。美元進一步升值可能迫使中國更加激進地貶值人民幣——這可能導致一場加強版的“貨幣戰”——以及中國內部出現金融緊張局面。

Playing this out for investors remains difficult. As I said earlier this year, the valuations on offer in the US and emerging markets suggest that a steady move from the former to the latter should pay off over the next decade or so. Abandoning emerging markets altogether is unlikely to pay off.

投資者依然很難擺脱這種局面。正如我今年早些時候説的那樣，美國和新興市場的估值情況表明，逐步從前者向後者轉移應該能夠在未來十年左右的時間獲得回報。完全放棄新興市場不太可能取得成功。

But the disjunction between the strengthening US and the rest of the world is deepening. Any big shifts in asset allocation would be unwise until that disjunction works itself out.

但經濟增長日益強勁的美國和全球其他地區之間的脱節正在加深。在這種脱節狀況自我修復之前，資產配置的任何重大轉變都將是不明智的。