沙特還是美國 誰是ISIS的幕後金主？

Much has been written about the support Islamic State (IS) has received from donors and sympathisers, particularly in the wealthy Gulf States. Indeed the accusation I hear most from those fighting IS in Iraq and Syria is that Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are solely responsible for the group's existence. But the truth is a little more complex and needs some exploring.
很多人都曾報道過伊斯蘭國家得到的資助和支持，尤其來自富有的海灣國家。實際上，我聽到的指控中大多來自好戰的伊拉克和敘利亞，而他們所指責的對象則是卡塔爾、土耳其以及沙特阿拉伯。然而事實卻更爲複雜，並需要進一步的探索。

It is true that some wealthy individuals from the Gulf have funded extremist groups in Syria. It is also true that Saudi Arabia and Qatar, believing that Syrian President would soon fall and that Sunni political Islam was a true vehicle for their political goals, funded groups that had strongly Islamist credentials.
無可否認的是，來自海灣國家的某些富人的確資助了敘利亞的極端組織；然而我們也必須看清，沙特阿拉伯和卡塔爾都認爲敘利亞總統即將倒臺，而遜尼派伊斯蘭教將成爲實現他們政治目標的工具，因此它們選擇主張最鮮明的伊斯蘭組織。

Turkey for its part operated a highly questionable policy of border enforcement in which weapons and money flooded into Syria, with Qatari and Saudi backing. All had thought that this would facilitate the end of Mr Assad's regime and the reordering of Syria into a Sunni power, breaking Shia Iran's link to the Mediterranean.
土耳其所實施的邊境政策實際上存在很大問題，在卡塔爾和沙特阿拉伯的支持下，武器和金錢大批涌入敘利亞。人們普遍認爲這將終結阿薩德的統治，使敘利亞重組歸於遜尼派權力之下，並且中斷什葉派與地中海的聯繫。

Yet as IS began its seemingly unstoppable rise in 2013, these groups were either swept away by it, or deciding it was better to join the winning team, simply defected bringing their weapons and money with them. So has Qatar funded Islamic State? Directly, the answer is no. Indirectly, a combination of shoddy policy and naivety has led to Qatar-funded weapons and money making their way into the hands of IS.
然而2013年以來，伊斯蘭國家勢力不斷增長，這些極端組織或者被掃清，或者決定帶着武器和金錢加入他們——畢竟他們是更有希望贏得勝利的一方。因此，我們可以說卡塔爾資助了伊斯蘭國家嗎？答案是：直接資助——並沒有；間接資助——政策的漏洞和人爲的忽視確實使武器和金錢流入了伊斯蘭國家之手。

But there are deeper issues here; religious ties and sympathy for a group that both acts explicitly against Shia Iran's interests in the region and has the tacit support of more people in the Gulf than many would care to admit. The horrific acts committed by IS are difficult for anybody to support, but its goal of establishing a caliphate is certainly attractive in some corners of Islamic thought. Many of those who supported the goal have already found their way to Syria and have fought and died for Islamic State and other groups. Others express support more passively and will continue to do so for many years.
我們還必須考慮一些更深入的問題：宗教的束縛以及對組織的同情都有損於什葉派的利益，而且吸引了更多海灣國家人民祕而不宣的支持。伊斯蘭國家駭人的舉動讓人無法贊同，但是它關於建立哈里發王權的想法還是獲得了一些支持。許多支持這一想法的人爲伊斯蘭國家和其他組織而戰，而犧牲；其他人則以相對不那麼激進的方式持續多年地表示支持。

War Economy
戰爭經濟

To understand how the Islamic State economy functions is to delve into a murky world of middlemen and shady business dealings. IS exports about 9,000 barrels of oil per day at prices ranging from about $25-$45. Some of this goes to Kurdish middlemen up towards Turkey, some goes for domestic IS consumption and some goes to the Assad regime, which in turn sells weapons back to the group.
若想理解伊斯蘭國家的經濟功能，我們需要深入探索到經紀商和暗箱商業活動中去。伊斯蘭國家每年以每桶25~45美金的價格出口約9000桶原油，其購買者包括爲土耳其服務的庫爾德經紀商，另一些則爲國內消費。剩下的則爲阿薩德政權服務，而他們則通過向組織銷售武器作爲回報。

The point is that Islamic State is essentially self-financing; it cannot be isolated and cut off from the world because it is intimately tied into regional stability in a way that benefits not only itself, but also the people it fights.
重點在於，伊斯蘭國家本質來講屬資金自籌範圍。因而，它無法切斷與外界聯繫保持獨立。原因不只在於它和地區的穩定緊密相連，更在於它和爲它戰鬥的人民的利益。

The larger question of course is whether such an integral pillar of the region can be defeated. Without Western military intervention it is unlikely. Although Sunni tribes in Iraq ponder their allegiances to the group, they do not have the firepower or finances necessary to topple IS and neither does the Iraqi army nor its Syrian counterpart.
更大的問題在於，它是否可能被擊敗，當然，如果沒有西方武力干預這並不可能。儘管遜尼派表達了他們對組織的忠誠，但無論是他們，還是伊拉克軍隊或敘利亞武裝，都沒有足夠的武力或經濟實力以推翻伊斯蘭國家。