日本因何喪失電子業霸主地位?大綱

During a business trip to Japan in 2004, technology analyst Michael Gartenberg caught a glimpse of Sony Corp.'s Librie, the first e-reader to use electronic ink displays now common in today's devices.
2004年，科技分析師邁克爾•加滕伯格(Michael Gartenberg)在日本出差時偶然看到索尼公司(Sony Corp.)的電子閱讀器Librie。它是第一款採用電子墨水顯示屏的電子閱讀器，如今這種顯示屏已被普遍應用於電子閱讀器。

Mr. Gartenberg was impressed with the lightweight design and long battery life and brought it back to the U.S., seeing it as a harbinger of a new wave of products.
Librie機身輕盈，而且電池續航時間長，給加滕伯格留下了深刻印象，於是他把這部閱讀器帶回了美國，把它視爲新一波電子產品的前兆。

But there were problems with the Librie. The software was in Japanese. It required a computer to download a book. The selection was limited, and books were only available for 60-day rental.
但是，Librie也存在一些問題，比如說它的軟件是日文的，下載電子書還得用電腦，而且它提供的選擇非常少，電子書只能租看60天時間。

Sony stopped selling the Librie in 2007 - the same year that Inc. sparked the e-reader boom with the Kindle, a wireless device with a large selection of e-books and an easy-to-use download service. Now Sony is playing catch-up with its successor device, the Reader, which ranked a distant third in the global market, with just 5% share in 2011, according to research firm IDC.
後來，索尼在2007年停售Librie，也就是在這一年，亞馬遜公司( Inc.)憑藉Kindle引發了電子閱讀器熱潮。Kindle具有無線上網功能，有一大批電子書可供選擇，而且其下載服務也簡便易用。如今，索尼正憑藉其電子閱讀器Reader追趕競爭對手。據國際數據公司(IDC)統計, Reader在全球市場的份額位列第三，遠遠落後於前兩名，其在2011年的全球市場份額只有5%。

'Even though the first device definitely pointed the way to the future, it's a market that got away from Sony,' said Mr. Gartenberg, research director at technology research firm Gartner Inc. 'Others have far more successfully capitalized.'
身爲科技行業研究公司Gartner研究總監的加滕伯格稱，儘管（索尼的）第一部電子書閱讀器明確指明瞭通向未來的發展道路，但如今這個市場卻不是由索尼主導，其他企業從中所獲得的利益已經遠遠超過了它。

It is a story that has played out repeatedly over the last 20 years for Japan's once-world-dominant electronics firms. During that period, Japanese companies have beaten rivals to the market with hardware breakthroughs - from flat-panel televisions to advanced mobile phones. But in each case, foreign rivals have cashed in by delivering faster improvements, integrating the products with intuitive software and online services, cutting costs more deftly, and delivering a smarter marketing message.
過去20年來，這樣的故事不斷地在日本曾經稱霸於世的電子產品公司身上上演。在這期間，日本企業在硬件方面的突破勝過了競爭對手，從平板電視到高端手機均是如此。然而，在這兩項業務中，它們的海外競爭對手通過實現更快速的技術改進、在產品中集成直觀簡便的軟件和在線服務、更巧妙地削減成本和推出更靈活的營銷信息而大賺特賺。That is a contrast with the glory days of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Japan started to dominate theworld of consumer electronics. As the Japanese economy surged, its electronics conglomerates ruled the market for memory chips, color televisions, and videocassette recorders, while their research labs gave birth to gadgets that would define an era: the Walkman, CD and DVD players.
這與上世紀70年代末和80年代初的情況形成了鮮明對比，當時日本開始壟斷世界消費電子產品市場。隨着日本經濟飛速發展，該國的電子業巨頭也開始統治內存芯片、彩色電視和盒式磁帶錄像機市場，它們的研發實驗室開發出了一批定義了一個時代的產品，例如隨身聽、CD和DVD播放機。

Now Japan's device makers are an afterthought to Amazon, Apple Inc., Google Inc., and Korea's Samsung Electronics Co. No longer the kings of electronics, Sony, Panasonic Corp. and Sharp Corp. combined to lose about $20 billion in the past fiscal year. Compare that to the $6.4 billion in record profits those firms delivered only four years earlier.
如今，日本的電子產品生產商落後於亞馬遜、蘋果(Apple Inc.)、谷歌(Google Inc.)和韓國的三星電子(Samsung Electronics Co.)。它們不再是電子行業的王者，在上一財年，索尼、松下(Panasonic Corp.)和夏普(Sharp Corp.)共計虧損了約200億美元。就在四年前，這些企業取得了64億美元的創紀錄利潤。

Japan's current weakness is rooted in its traditional strength: a fixation with 'monozukuri,' or the art of making things, focused on hardware advances.
日本當前的疲弱根植於其傳統優勢──專守“monozukuri”（即製造的藝術），專注於硬件的改進。這一理念是日本民族自豪感的來源，它推動該國的電子公司竭力生產常常是世界上最薄最小的產品或是推出其他漸進的技術進步，但是它們忽視了人們真正關心的因素，例如產品的設計和使用的便利度。

This concept, a source of national pride, pushed Japan's electronics firms to strive for products that were often the world's thinnest, smallest, or delivered other incremental improvement - while losing sight of factors that really mattered to people such as design and ease of use.
以電子閱讀器業務爲例，索尼專注於銷售設備，而亞馬遜則專注於銷售電子書。結果是，Kindle更加符合人們購買電子閱讀器的根本理由──買書、看書。剩下的事情大家都知道了。

In the case of the e-reader, Sony was focused on selling devices, while Amazon was focused on selling books. As a result, the Kindle was more in tune with the raison d'etre for purchasing the device: to buy and read books. And the rest was history.

今年6月份，津賀一宏(Kazuhiro Tsuga)在接任松下總裁的新聞發佈會上說道：“日本企業對自己的技術和製造技能太自信了，我們忽略了要從消費者的角度看待產品。”在此之前，松下出現了公司94年曆史上最嚴重的年度虧損。

'Japanese firms were too confident about our technology and manufacturing prowess. We lost sight of the products from the consumer's point of view,' said Panasonic President Kazuhiro Tsuga at a news conference in June upon taking over as the company's new president after it posted the biggest annual loss in its 94-year history.
火上澆油的是，在日圓走強的形勢下，日本企業跟上創新技術、同時又要進行必要的成本削減以吸引普通大衆變得更困難。在尖端技術產品方面，日本企業常常依賴於在國內生產，然後把產品銷往海外。然而，由於日圓匯率上升到接近歷史高位的水平，日本在海外銷售的商品的利潤空間縮窄，但韓國製造商因爲韓圓相對疲軟而避開了這個問題。此外，利潤受到侵蝕也使企業難以對未來產品和技術進行投資。To compound matters, the strong yen has made it more difficult to follow up new innovations with the requisite cost reductions to appeal to the mass market. For cutting-edge products, Japanese firms often rely on domestic production and then sell the goods abroad. The strong yen, near record levels, has narrowed the profit margin of Japanese goods sold abroad - a problem that Korean manufacturers have avoided with the relatively weaker won. The erosion in earnings has also made it difficult to invest in future products and technologies.
日本喪失行業領先地位的最新例證是，在開發有可能成爲下一代電視的主導性技術標準──有機發光二極管（OLED）的競爭中，該國企業又處於落後境地。這種新型顯示器更薄而且能耗更低。

In the latest example of the country's lose-the-lead affliction, Japanese companies are falling behind in the race to develop what is likely to become the dominant technology format for next-generation televisions: OLEDs, or organic light emitting diodes. The new displays are thinner and require less energy.
韓國頂級電視製造商三星已經在小型OLED顯示屏市場佔據主導地位，這種屏幕常用於智能手機和其他移動設備中。如今，三星及其本土競爭對手LG Electronics均計劃在今年晚些時候推出55英寸的OLED電視。

Samsung, Korea's top TV maker, already dominates the market for smaller-size OLED displays featured in smartphones and other mobile devices. Now Samsung and domestic rival LG Electronics Co. each plans to launch a 55-inch OLED television later this year.
與索尼、松下、夏普和東芝(Toshiba Corp.)這些日本企業相比，這是一個很大的進步，這些公司花費了多年時間研發這一技術，同時也在苦苦思索如何將其商業化。爲了試着縮小與韓國競爭對手的差距，索尼和松下這兩個宿怨已久的對手史無前例地在6月同意結成聯盟，共同開發OLED生產技術。

It is a major step forward compared to the Japanese firms - Sony, Panasonic, Sharp, and Toshiba Corp. - that have spent years developing the technology while struggling with how to commercialize it. In an attempt to close the gap on their Korean rivals, Sony and Panasonic, once bitter rivals, agreed to an unprecedented alliance in June to develop OLED production technology together.
這是索尼的悲慘衰落，索尼五年前就已成爲首家銷售OLED電視的製造商。當時索尼的高管大讚它是“索尼復興的標誌”。這個11英寸機型的屏幕大概只有1/10英寸厚，是一個技術上的奇蹟。然而，高達2,500美元的價格使這款OLED電視在財務收益方面大敗。

That is a poignant comedown for Sony, which five years ago became the first manufacturer to sell an OLED television. At the time, company executives hailed it a 'symbol of Sony's comeback.' The 11-inch model - with a screen about one-tenth of an inch thick - was a technological marvel. But at $2,500 a pop, the OLED television was a financial flop.
索尼在OLED電視業務的失敗距其在上一代電視技術方面遭遇的相同挫折僅隔了數年時間。2004年，索尼成爲首家推出液晶電視的公司，該類電視以亮度更高、也更節能的發光二極管(LED)取代了熒光背光源。此外，索尼還在2008年率先推出第一臺在四周的邊框配備LED的電視，從而使屏幕變得更薄。

The OLED stumble came just a few years after a similar setback in the last generation of TV technology. In 2004, Sony was the first company to introduce LCD televisions that replaced the TV's fluorescent backlight with brighter and more energy efficient light-emitting diodes, or LEDs. It also introduced the first TV that arranged the LEDs around the edges in 2008 to allow the screens to be thinner.
三星在一年之後推出了其生產的機型，並把它們稱爲LED電視，以把這種新型電視與當時已有的LCD電視區別開來。這個營銷戰略獲得了成功，三星讓消費者花高價購買這種新型LED電視，從而幫助延緩了電視價格的急劇下跌。據市場研究公司NPD統計，在2012年上半年，三星在北美的LED電視市場佔據了近半的市場份額，而索尼的排名還沒有進入前五。

When Samsung came out with its models a year later, the company called them 'LED TVs,' a moniker to distinguish the new TVs from existing LCD models. The marketing strategy was a success and Samsung was able to get consumers to pay a premium for the new LED models, helping to slow the sharp decline in TV prices. According to research firm NPD, Samsung accounts for nearly half of all the LED televisions sold in North America while Sony did not rank among the top five sellers in the first half of 2012.
在多年都錯失機會之後，索尼正式改變了發展方向，認爲讓三星和其他公司在開發新技術上擔任領頭羊實際上更加合理。索尼在率先推出突破性技術方面吃盡了苦頭，該公司高管得出結論，他們這麼做只是讓競爭對手有了追趕的目標，並可能以更低的成本進行模仿。

After years of missed chances, Sony has officially shifted gears, deciding that it actually makes more sense to let Samsung and others take the lead in developing new innovations. For all its pains of delivering groundbreaking technologies first, Sony executives concluded they were only creating targets for competitors to pursue and possibly imitate at a cheaper cost.
在今年4月份接掌索尼首席戰略長一職的齊藤正(Tadashi Saito)說，領跑者得頂着風，有時候在後面跑會更容易。另一位熟悉索尼想法的高管稱，索尼在電視業務上的虧損使其更難在OLED業務上大賭一把。

'The first runner has to face the wind - sometimes, it's easier to run from behind,' said Tadashi Saito, who took over in April as Sony's chief strategy officer. Another official familiar with Sony's thinking said the losses at its television business made it harder to take a 'gamble' on aggressively pursuing OLED.
這與索尼創建初期的情況存在很大差距，當時創始人盛田昭夫(Akio Morita)和井深大(Masaru Ibuka)爲了生產一種新型彩電幾乎使公司破產。在1964年發佈原型機後，由於資金耗盡，索尼開始努力開發量產技術。索尼花了四年時間進行研發，然後才推出了奠定該公司後來30年成功基礎的彩色顯像管“特麗瓏”。