基建項目 中日角力泰國鐵路項目
The strategic rivalry between Japan and China in Asia is finding expression not only in territorial disputes in the east China sea but also in plans for railways to criss-cross Thailand and eventually link the country to a wider Indochina rail network.
Both lines will serve primarily as freight transport systems. The planned Chinese-backed railway will run north-south from Thailand’s main deep seaport in Rayong to the Laos border at Nong Khai, with a separate spur that connects to Bangkok.
這兩條鐵路線都將主要用於貨運。擬議中由中國出資建設的鐵路線將自南向北，從泰國在羅勇(Rayong)的主要深水港通至泰國和老撾邊境線上的廊開(Nong Khai)，並有一條支線連接到曼谷。The proposed Japanese one would cross Thailand east to west, connecting Bangkok to the border towns nearest to Siem Reap, Cambodia, and Dawei, Myanmar. Dawei is the planned site of a major industrial zone and deep seaport backed by the Japanese, Thai and Myanmar governments.
擬議中由日本出資建設的鐵路線將是東西走向的，將曼谷與距柬埔寨暹粒(Siem Reap)和緬甸土瓦(Dawei)最近的泰國邊境城鎮連接起來。土瓦是規劃中的主要工業區和深水港的所在地，該計劃得到日本、泰國和緬甸三國政府的支持。
In addition to these two rail projects, China and Japan have each also expressed interest in developing additional train lines, including high-speed passenger railways.
除了上述兩個鐵路項目以外，中日兩國都表達出對建設其他鐵路線的興趣，包括客運高速鐵路線。The projects reflect more than the desperate need for modern long-distance trains in Thailand. China and Japan are openly vying for economic influence in South-east Asia, though for different sets of reasons.
這些項目不僅反映出泰國亟需現代化長途鐵路線，也反映出中日正在東南亞公開爭奪經濟影響力，儘管這兩個國家是出於不同的原因。As its economy continues to expand, China is accelerating efforts to increase its economic influence in Southeast Asia. The proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank stands as perhaps the most ambitious example, but China is also ramping up its use of official development assistance (ODA) projects, historically the domain of wealthy developed countries.
隨着中國經濟不斷增長，中國加快了在東南亞擴大其經濟影響力的步伐。擬議中的亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)，或許就是最能體現中國雄心抱負的一個例子。但中國還在擴大對官方發展援助(ODA)項目的使用，這類項目過去一直是富裕發達國家的專屬領域。China has also been eager to support Thailand’s new military government, which came to power with the May 22 coup last year. In addition to the railway development, China has agreed to government-to-government (G2G) purchases of rice and rubber, both commodities that have suffered oversupply and weak prices in the last year. These and other overtures to Thailand are particularly strategic while the suspension of democracy under the junta has strained relations with the US.
中國還迫切想要支持去年5月22日通過政變上臺的泰國新一屆軍政府。除了鐵路建設以外，中國還與泰國達成了一項政府間採購協議，購入泰國的大米和橡膠。去年，這兩種大宗商品遭遇了供應過剩和價格疲軟。在泰國軍政府中止實行民主制、導致泰國與美國關係趨於緊張之際，中國的上述及其他向泰國示好的舉措格外具有戰略意義。Japan, meanwhile, seeks to maintain its long-established economic influence in Southeast Asia. The country remains the leading source of foreign direct investment in the 10-members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) and increasingly relies on the region as a manufacturing base.
日本則尋求維持其在東南亞地區確立已久的經濟影響力。日本目前仍是東盟(Asean)十國的最大外商直接投資(FDI)來源國，同時日本也越來越依賴於作爲製造基地的東南亞地區。This is most true in Thailand, which serves as the most important hub for Japanese automobile, industrial, and consumer goods exports in Asia. Indeed, Japan has so much manufacturing in Thailand that in a very direct sense an investment in Thailand’s infrastructure is an investment in Japan’s industrial sector.
在泰國尤其如此。泰國現在是日本面向亞洲出口汽車、工業品和消費品的最重要樞紐。事實上，日本有大量製造工廠設在泰國，從這個意義上說，對泰國基礎設施的投資就是對日本工業部門的投資。The extent of Japan’s reliance on Thailand as its Southeast Asian manufacturing bulwark hit home in the aftermath of the 2011 floods that plunged Thai industry into a crisis and clobbered Japan’s supply chain.
日本依賴東南亞作爲其重要的生產基地，其依賴程度之深在2011年令其深受其害。那一年發生了洪災，導致泰國工業陷入危機，沉重打擊了日本的供應鏈。Unease over China’s emergence as the leading Asian economic and military force also means that Japan has a special interest in preserving economic soft power in Asean. The region’s shared border with China, coupled with Beijing’s strong existing ties with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, makes Indochina ripe for Chinese inroads into Japan’s regional influence.
中國崛起爲亞洲最大的經濟與軍事強國引起了一些人的不安，這也意味着在東盟保有經濟軟實力對日本有着特殊的利益。東盟國家與中國有着共同的邊界，再加上中國與柬埔寨、老撾和緬甸目前關係緊密，使得中國在印度支那侵蝕日本在該地區影響力的時機已經成熟。Thailand is a potential winner here, assuming the railways are actually constructed. But in a country with a history of cancelled and abandoned infrastructure projects, it is too soon to assume that either project will move forward, or that they will be completed even if ground is broken. Sceptics will point to “Thai Stonehenge”, several kilometres of concrete pillars intended for an abandoned elevated train to Don Muang International Airport.
如果上述鐵路線真的建成，泰國將成爲贏家。但考慮到該國在歷史上曾多次取消和放棄基建項目，現在就認定這兩個項目中至少有一個項目會向前推進還爲時過早，即使破土動工了，項目最終也未必會完工。懷疑論者會提到“泰國巨石陣”——這裏指的是一些矗立的混凝土柱子，連綿數公里排開，原本是用來修建通往廊曼國際機場(Don Muang International Airport)的高架軌道線，後來項目被放棄了。Every government since the 1990s has discussed replacing the country’s ancient rail system, but two decades later no significant progress has been made. The failure stands as a testament to dysfunctional politics: even with clear support from the public, business community, and no genuine resistance from opposition parties, no administration has succeeded in making such an obvious and beneficial investment.
自20世紀90年代以來，泰國曆屆政府都討論過更換該國古老的鐵路系統，但20年過去了，沒有取得任何重大進展。這一失敗成了該國政治失靈的證據：儘管得到公衆和企業界的明確支持，而且反對黨未有任何實質性抵制，但沒有一屆政府成功地作出了這樣一項公認應當作出的、有益的投資。Nonetheless, the current military leadership has shown an ability to get things done, giving the projects a greater chance of getting off the ground – especially when the railways reflect the wider geopolitical concerns of both regional heavyweights.
不過，泰國現在的軍政府已展示出了把事情做好的能力，這使得上述鐵路項目有更大的可能向前推進——特別是考慮到這些項目反映出了兩個亞洲大國更大的地緣政治關切。
